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ABSTRACT 
   
Social shopping has emerged as a popular online retailing segment. Social 
shopping revolves around online communities that bring consumers together to shop for 
deals. Online retailers have been making significant investments to encourage consumers 
to join online communities linked to their websites in the hope that social interactions 
among consumers will increase consumption rates. However, the assumption that social 
interactions increase consumption rates in social shopping remains largely untested in 
empirical settings. Also, the mechanisms of such an effect remain unclear. Moreover, 
extant literature has overlooked the role played by elements of the marketing mix, 
including product characteristics and the commercial context, in defining the effect that 
social interaction mechanisms have on consumption rates in this focused context. 
Furthermore, common knowledge in the operations management discipline challenges the 
largely held assumption, in the social interactions literature, that increasing consumption 
rates will always be beneficial to online retailers. Higher consumption rates may lead to 
stockouts, leading to lower service levels. This dissertation develops and empirically tests 
a theoretical framework that addresses these managerially relevant issues. Specifically, 
the investigation centers on the effects of social interaction mechanisms on consumption 
rates in social shopping. In turn, it assesses the nature of the relationship between 
consumption rates and service levels, after controlling for inventory provision. Finally, it 
assesses the role played by elements of the marketing mix in defining the relationship 
between social interaction mechanisms and consumption rates in this focused context.  
The research methodology uses experiments as the primary source of data 
collection, and employs econometrics techniques to statistically assess the conceptual 
framework. The results from the empirical analysis provide interesting insights. First, 
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they unveil influential consumers in social shopping according to relational and structural 
elements of the social network of consumers and time of purchase. Second, the influence 
of early buyers' purchases on consumption rates becomes weaker when the quality of the 
products being offered as part of a deal increases, but it becomes stronger when the price 
of those products increases. Finally, as deals' consumption rates increase, their service 
levels decrease at a faster pace. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Social shopping is becoming increasingly popular (Knight 2011). Social 
shopping is a form of e-commerce that allows consumers to participate in the marketing 
of deals in online communities (Stephen and Toubia 2010). Simply put, it is an 
application that merges online retailing and social networking by connecting online 
consumers (Gordon 2007; Tedeschi 2006). In essence, social shopping attempts to mimic 
social interactions found in offline retailing (Tedeschi 2006). Thus, it revolves around the 
influence of consumer-generated media on business outcomes (Chevalier and Mayzlin 
2006; Godes and Mayzlin 2004). As social shopping communities grow in number and 
size, the importance of social interactions as a selling mechanism in online retailing has 
become widely recognized (Jing and Xie 2011; Palmer 2008). 
Indeed, a growing list of online retailers, including Woot.com!, Ideeli, Gilt, and 
Kaboodle, have dedicated resources to this innovative selling mechanism by encouraging 
consumers to join and participate in online communities linked to their websites. These 
firms are making these investments because of the fundamental assumption that social 
interactions in online communities will increase consumption rates (Godes et al. 2005). 
Thus, it is not surprising that recent studies have attempted to model (Brock and Durlauf 
2010; Jing and Xie 2011) and empirically validate this assumption (Aral and Walker 
2011; Hartmann 2010; Iyengar et al. 2009).  
Yet, whereas most research has focused on whether social interactions increase 
consumption rates, the academic community has paid much less attention to how and why 
such an effect occurs. Also, the resulting business outcomes from the use of social 
interactions as a selling mechanism remain largely unexplored in the social shopping 
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context. Moreover, the predominant focus on viral marketing strategies (Hill et al. 2006; 
Manchanda et al. 2008; Nam et al. 2010) overlooks attributes of deals that might foster 
(or hinder) the effects of social interactions on consumption rates in this focused context. 
Furthermore, research on social interactions has largely assumed unlimited (i.e. 
unconstrained) supply. In doing so, such a stream of literature has overlooked product 
availability issues due to limited/constrained supply (Ho et al. 2002; Kumar and 
Swaminathan 2003; Swami and Khairnar 2003) that are inherent in online retailing 
settings (Jing and Lewis 2011). This dissertation addresses these shortcomings in the 
extant literature to advance managerially relevant knowledge in the disciplines of 
marketing and operations management. 
From a marketing standpoint, this investigation is of primary importance because 
social interactions may magnify a stimulus to one consumer by its dispersion through the 
online community of consumers (Bikhchandani et al. 1998; Christakis and Fowler 2011; 
Iyengar et al. 2011a). In some cases, a marketing message to a consumer (e.g. mass 
media communication or email blast), can spill over to other consumers in a social 
shopping community. This would allow the latter to learn about a deal despite not being 
directly exposed to that message. In other cases, consumers may not only share 
information or spread information through the online community, but may actually care 
about whether other consumers in the community make similar choices. In these latter 
cases, a consumer’s choice generates a feedback to her through the choices of other 
consumers in the social shopping community, thereby multiplying the effect of any initial 
stimulus to this consumer (Aral 2011). In both cases, social interactions imply that the 
aggregate-level effect of marketing activity to consumers becomes much larger than just 
the sum of the individual-level effects (Hartmann et al. 2008). Therefore, identifying 
influential consumers in social shopping is of interest, since their choices may help shape 
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demand through social interactions. This dissertation is relevant because there is a 
growing debate on how to determine who the influential consumers might be in several 
social networking contexts (Iyengar et al. 2011b). On the one hand, the specialized media 
(Duffy 2011; Rosembloom 2011; Stevenson 2012) has questioned the efficacy of 
emerging tools, such as Klout, PeerIndex, and Twitter Grader, which provide “scores of 
influence” in online communities. This is because they use proprietary (hence secretive) 
algorithms. On the other hand, analytical models of influential consumers (Trusov et al. 
2010) remain largely untested in empirical online retailing settings. 
From an operations management standpoint, this investigation is of primary 
importance because social interactions may induce demand uncertainty (Economides 
1996; Granovetter and Soong 1986; Johari and Kumar 2010), which will ultimately affect 
service levels (Porteus 2002; Xu et al. 2010). In the social shopping context, service 
levels reflect inventory availability to satisfy demand during a deal. How and why social 
interactions may ultimately impact service levels reflecting inventory availability in 
social shopping is of interest because poor inventory service entails costs (Jing and Lewis 
2011; Walter and Grabner 1975), thereby leading to missed profit opportunities (Cachon 
and Kök 2007; Jing and Lewis 2011; Porteus 2002). Moreover, stockouts are a known 
source of customer dissatisfaction and lost sales in the long-run (Anderson et al. 2006; 
Schwartz 1966; Zinn and Liu 2001). The proposed investigation is relevant to the 
literature on inventory provisioning and availability in online retailing because there have 
been accounts of sub-optimal service levels in social shopping. As a result, recent articles 
in the specialized media have suggested that social shopping may be a fad (Knight 2011; 
Parr 2011), and academic studies have questioned both the efficacy and the efficiency of 
this innovative selling mechanism (Anand and Aron 2003; Jing and Xie 2011).  
  4 
Unfortunately, in the social shopping context, it is difficult to separate whether 
service levels decrease due to social interactions, an explicit scarcity strategy in supply, 
the marketing mix (i.e. product popularity, quality, and price), or a combination of some 
of these elements. Therefore, the fundamental research questions guiding this research 
are: 
In social shopping, do social interactions have an effect 
on service levels? If so, how and why? Also, under which 
circumstances do online retailers’ inventory 
management and marketing activity interfere with such 
an effect in this focused context? 
This study contributes to both the social shopping and the online retailing 
literatures. First, it provides a more comprehensive conceptualization of social 
interactions than the predominant notion of word-of-mouth (WOM) influence. Second, it 
examines the mechanisms through which social interactions induce demand uncertainty 
in social shopping by affecting a deal’s consumption rate. In turn, it investigates the 
nature of the relationship between a deal’s consumption rate and its inventory 
performance in this focused context. As such, this study overcomes limitations in extant 
stochastic inventory management literature (Agrawal and Seshadri 2000; Dana Jr and 
Petruzzi 2001; Petruzzi and Dada 1999), which has assumed independence among 
consumers when investigating optimal inventory policies in retailing contexts. In doing 
so, it empirically assesses the veracity of the assumption that social interactions affect 
consumption rates in the focused social shopping context. Third, this study challenges the 
predominant notion in the social interactions literature that increasing a deal’s 
consumption rate is always beneficial to online retailers. This is because the study 
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incorporates into the social interactions literature the fundamental inventory management 
premise that increasing a deal’s consumption rate may lead to undesired stockouts, 
thereby impacting service levels negatively. Poor inventory service is associated with 
short- and long-run costs, which are detrimental to profitability. Fourth, this study 
identifies limiting conditions in the relationships among social interaction mechanisms, a 
deal’s consumption rate, and its service level. Specifically, it assesses whether these 
relationships hold according to certain elements of the marketing mix – product 
characteristics and the commercial context – after controlling for inventory provision.  
The research methodology involves experiments as the primary source of data 
collection. Experiments may overcome common identification issues in social 
interactions studies that rely on archival panel data. These identification issues arise due 
to the challenge of separating correlations in observed consumer choice from the true 
causal effects of one consumer’s choice on another’s (Brock and Durlauf 2010; Hartmann 
et al. 2008; Manski 2000). Experimentation has been also successful in the study of social 
interactions because it allows researchers to observe differences in the ways consumers 
operate under varying conditions, and learn about the nature of social interactions among 
consumers and their outcomes under those conditions (Babbie 2007). Furthermore, there 
has been growing interest in using experiments to identify and better understand the 
behavioral factors that affect operational outcomes (Croson and Donohue 2002; 
Knemeyer and Naylor 2012) in online retailing contexts (Chen et al. 2009; Kauffman et 
al. 2010b).  
The statistical assessment of the conceptual framework uses econometrics 
techniques that deal with the common identification issues in social interactions studies 
and appropriately handle pooled cross section analysis of experimental data. The 
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statistical results provide interesting insights into how and why social interaction 
mechanisms affect consumption rates in social shopping. Specifically, the results identify 
three types of influential early buyers of a deal whose purchases influence other 
consumers to purchase that same deal, thereby increasing the deal’s consumption rate. 
Those types of influential early buyers are: (1) opinion leaders, (2) consumers highly 
integrated into the network, and (3) consumers who link groups of consumers that would 
be disconnected otherwise. Also, the findings further our understanding of the role played 
by elements of the marketing mix on such an influence. Specifically, increasing a 
product’s quality will diminish the effect of social interaction mechanisms on a deal’s 
consumption rate. Conversely, increasing a product’s price will magnify such an effect. 
Finally, this study’s findings imply that managing demand by affecting a deal’s 
consumption rate will have significant service level implications. Specifically, the results 
show that increasing a deal’s consumption rate will negatively impact its service level in 
a non-linear, monotonically decreasing fashion.  
In trying to achieve its goals, this study answers calls for integrative research in 
marketing and operations management to promote a better understanding of the interface 
between these two functional areas (Corrêa et al. 2007; Frankel et al. 2008; Ho and Tang 
2004; Karmarkar 1996; Malhotra and Sharma 2002; Rinehart et al. 1989). Specifically, 
the study performs a joint analysis of supply-related decisions and the corresponding 
demand dynamics that should allow managers to better plan operationally while targeting 
marketing efforts towards a specific set of consumers in the focused social shopping 
context. The research also follows calls for use of innovative data sources and estimation 
techniques that contribute to empirical research in operations (Banker and Khosla 1995; 
Croson and Donohue 2002; Flynn et al. 1990; Gattiker and Parente 2007; Scudder and 
Hill 1998) and marketing management in the presence of social interactions among 
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consumers (Hartmann et al. 2008; Hirano and Hahn 2010; Van den Bulte and Iyengar 
2011). 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides the 
research background. Chapter 3 develops the conceptual framework. Chapter 4 describes 
the research methodology used to test the conceptual framework and to operationalize its 
constructs. Chapter 5 presents the results of the empirical analyses. Finally, Chapter 6 
discusses the results’ implications and offers directions for future research stemming 
from this research. 
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Chapter 2 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Social interactions and consumption in online settings 
The increasing recognition of the role of social interactions among consumers as 
an important selling mechanism has spurred renewed interest in modeling and 
understanding the implications of these interactions in numerous settings, including 
online retailing. The existing literature in this area comes from a variety of academic 
disciplines, including economics (Maurer and Meier 2008), sociology (Centola 2010), 
computation (Forman et al. 2008; Hu et al. 2008; Kempe et al. 2003), and marketing 
(Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Dellarocas et al. 2007; Fleder and Hosanagar 2009). 
However, there are few social interactions studies in the discipline of operations 
management. This is surprising, since modeling demand uncertainty is fundamental in 
stochastic inventory theory (Porteus 2002), and managing demand is regarded as key for 
operational excellence in online retailing settings (Rabinovich 2007). 
Recent marketing studies have attempted to provide empirical evidence that 
social interactions may contribute to consumption in online retailing contexts by focusing 
on word-of-mouth (WOM) phenomena. For instance, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) 
found that an improvement in a book’s online reviews leads to an increase in that book’s 
online sales. Dellarocas (2006) observed that the manipulation of discussion forums to 
provide positive information regarding the quality of a product increases the likelihood of 
consumers of purchasing that product. Li and Hitt (2008) examined how idiosyncratic 
preferences of a deal’s early buyers can affect other consumers’ consumption of that deal. 
The authors provide managerial prescriptions regarding how online retailers might 
encourage those consumers who are likely to yield positive reports to generate positive 
influence for new products. Finally, Godes and Mayzlin (2009) investigated how WOM 
  9 
drives consumption and which consumers are most effective at creating this kind of 
influence. 
However, Godes et al. (2005) argue that the focus on traditional WOM, that is, 
“the one-to-one and face-to-face exchange of information about a product or service”, is a 
narrow definition of the phenomenon of social interactions in online retailing contexts. 
This is because information exchanged in online communities is one-to-many in nature, 
even though it shares many common features with traditional WOM. Also, influence does 
not require face-to-face interaction; indeed, the only precondition for influence is 
information (which allows social comparison) about the choices of other consumers 
(Godes et al. 2005; Marsden and Friedkin 1993). Influence does not require deliberate or 
conscious attempts to affect consumers’ choices. It simply involves “the spontaneous 
pickup or imitation by other consumers of a choice made by one consumer in the 
reference group, in which the initiator did not display any intention of getting the others 
to do what she did” as well as direct influence “in which the consumer makes choices 
which have the manifest objective of affecting the choices of another consumer in the 
reference group” (Lippitt et al. 1952). 
Thus, Godes et al. (2005) offer a definition of social interactions in which 
influence stems from observations of others’ actions in online communities. This research 
builds on Godes et al. (2005) to conceptualize social interactions in social shopping as 
interdependencies in which consumers’ choices influence others’ choices in a direct and 
meaningful way. This conceptualization stipulates that, in social shopping, the 
observation of other consumers’ purchases may influence a consumer to purchase a deal.  
This conceptualization leaves room for a variety of influence processes, 
including those that raise awareness of a deal or its features as well as those that 
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persuade consumers to change their expectations of the utility derived from features 
which they are already aware of. This formulation also leaves room for influence 
processes that operate on imitation (perhaps by status differences) as well as social 
learning  (Aral 2011). The conceptualization of social interactions I provide is therefore 
flexible enough to incorporate several social influence processes. 
Although this conceptualization is flexible in its view of influence mechanisms, it 
is rigid in its treatment of cause and effect. Social interactions are about how consumer 
behavior changes other consumer’s expected utility and thus change the likelihood that – 
or extent to which – this consumer will engage in the behavior. Such a conceptualization 
defines influence as causal and excludes correlated and confounding effects, making 
causal estimation essential to social interactions identification. To be influential, 
consumers must cause behavior in the online community rather than simply being 
connected to or passing information on to a significant number of consumers. This 
conceptualization also regards social interactions as part of a dynamic system in which a 
variety of feedback loops continuously affects behavior in a constantly evolving fashion. 
Endogenous link formation may drive relationship formation, which may in turn drive 
changes in behavior, which then feed back into relationship formation decisions and 
again into influence on behaviors. In this way, it is both causally driven and dynamically 
involving (Aral 2011). 
This conceptualization also allows influence to operate at social distance 
(Akerlof 1997), through connections of connections. For example, a friend of mine may 
buy a video-game deal, and although I have no interest in buying that deal, I may 
encourage others who have the same specialized interest to buy the deal based on the 
influence my friend has on my perception of its value to someone with that interest. 
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Finally, this conceptualization allows for indirect influence in cases where some subset of 
the online community is constrained in some way from buying a deal. For example, I 
may encourage my video gaming friends to buy a deal of a video-game device because 
my other video gaming friends use that device. 
The Nature of Social Shopping 
The business model of online retailers who invest in social shopping is very 
peculiar. These websites offer limited-time, limited-quantity deals of a single stock-
keeping unit (SKU) per deal. There is no replenishment involved, so deals run while 
inventory lasts or until they reach a preset deadline. On these websites, SKU selections 
range from apparel to wine, jewelry, toys, consumer electronics, and computers 
(Tedeschi 2006).  
In addition, in social shopping, online retailers sell “deteriorating inventory” at 
marked down prices (Heine 2010). Deteriorating inventory refers to perishable units that 
were leftover from previous periods. In the case of perishable SKUs, unsold units suffer a 
quality reduction and therefore affect consumer choice behavior by providing lower 
valuations to consumers (Ferguson and Koenigsberg 2007). This definition of 
deteriorating inventory encompasses, for instance, old generations of a product line, off-
season products, as well as remanufactured SKUs. 
In contrast, the limited availability of social shopping deals due to time and 
quantity restrictions affects consumer choice behavior by providing higher valuations to 
consumers through a psychological effect known as “the scarcity principle”. This 
principle posits that opportunities seem more valuable to consumers when they are less 
available, and vice-versa (Cialdini 1985). The scarcity principle derives its strength from 
two major sources. The first source is consumers’ tendency to adopt heuristics in their 
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decision-making process (i.e. whether to purchase a deal). Verhallen (1982) showed that 
consumers use purchase restrictions as informational cues to evaluate deals. Consumers 
typically evaluate better deals that are difficult to get than those that are easy to get (Lynn 
1991, 1992). Also, consumers often use a deal’s availability to quickly and correctly 
decide on its quality (Cialdini 1985).  
The second source of strength of the scarcity principle comes from the 
consumers’ desire to preserve the freedoms they already possess. Constraining the 
opportunity to own or experience a product being offered as part of a deal signifies a 
“loss of freedom”. In an attempt to negate this loss, consumers have a tendency to desire 
deals on which online retailers place such limitations (Inman et al. 1997; Verhallen 1982; 
Verhallen and Robben 1994). 
Generally speaking, by placing limitations on social shopping deals, online 
retailers are attempting to create a sense of urgency among consumers, which should 
result in increased consumption rates, shorter searches, and greater satisfaction with the 
purchase. The underlying idea is that the notion of scarcity will raise a deal’s perceived 
value, thereby influencing the consumers’ intention to purchase it. This is because the 
motivating effect to buy a deal in social shopping goes beyond its price (Schindler 1998). 
Being able to take advantage of a limited deal creates, among buyers, a sense of being 
“smart shoppers” (Babakus et al. 1988). Purchasing a deal becomes “winning” a deal, 
which provides both utility and hedonic fulfillment (Garretson and Burton 2003). 
Schindler (1998) explains that buyers of a limited deal experience this “joy-of-winning”, 
i.e. a pride-like satisfaction of having won in an implied game against other consumers. 
That is, limited deals put consumers in competition with one another. Online retailers 
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stand to benefit from such competition, because it should enhance the deals’ effectiveness 
(i.e. their ability to sell) (Aggarwal et al. 2011). 
Why are social interactions influential in social shopping? 
Social interactions may be influential in social shopping because they provide 
prospective consumers (1) information and (2) utility. These factors, in turn, enhance 
consumers’ valuation of a deal, thereby leading to more purchases and consequently 
higher consumption rates. 
First, on the Internet, consumers are only able to partially ascertain the value (i.e. 
worth) of a social shopping deal. To do so, they may use information provided by the 
online retailer (including product pictures, list of features, and description), discussion 
forums (Dellarocas 2006), other consumers’ product recommendations (Fleder and 
Hosanagar 2009; Senecal and Nantel 2004), online search engines (Brynjolfsson and 
Smith 2000), etc. Such information is incomplete, however, because social shopping 
deals offer deteriorating inventory, so consumers would need to physically inspect a 
product to fully ascertain its value. However, in online retailing contexts, consumers will 
only be able to physically inspect a product after a purchase (Rabinovich 2007; 
Rabinovich and Bailey 2004; Rabinovich et al. 2008a). In order to obtain additional 
information, consumers may rely on others’ purchases as a screening device (Nelson 
1970). Hence, social interactions are influential in social shopping because consumers 
may resort to this selling mechanism to make informed decisions. 
Second, the utility a consumer receives from purchasing a deal may depend 
directly on the purchases of other consumers (Duesenberry and Stemble 1949; 
Economides 1996; Granovetter and Soong 1986; Leibenstein 1950). This is referred to as 
the principle of network externalities (also known as “bandwagon effects”) (Katz and 
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Shapiro 1985). An example would be a deal of a videogame. The utility a consumer 
receives from purchasing such a deal increases as other consumers purchase the same 
deal because she will be able to play her videogame with them. In the presence of such 
network externalities, social interactions will induce a tendency for conformity in 
behavior across members of a reference group (Bikhchandani et al. 1998). Further, as 
described by Bernheim (1994), even when the underlying intrinsic utility from the actions 
differs widely across consumers due to heterogeneity of individual characteristics, the 
presence of this desire to conform may create either a tendency towards common 
behavior or towards a few polarized types of behavior within a reference group. Hence, 
social interactions are influential in social shopping because they enhance consumers’ 
valuations of deals by providing consumer utility. 
Social influence models and their applicability in the social shopping context 
Social influence models that provide the basis for the study of social interactions 
effects trace their origins to the sociology literature, in particular to the seminal works of 
Schelling (1971), Granovetter (1978), and Marwell et al. (1988). These models posit that 
influence flows through certain channels over time among members of a social system 
(Rogers 1995). As such, the influence process consists of four key elements: the 
influence on choice behavior, communication channels, time, and the social system. 
The communication channels are the means that transmit influence to or within 
the social system. These means are both external and internal to the social system. 
External means of influence in social shopping consist of the mass media, email blasts, or 
even software that will alert a consumer that a deal matching her requirements is on. 
Internal means of influence in social shopping consist of social interactions among 
consumers in an online community. Members of the social system (i.e. the consumers in 
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the online community) have different propensities for relying on or access to those two 
sources of influence when seeking information about a deal.  
For over forty years, marketers have been using the Bass model (Bass 1969) to 
empirically investigate influence processes in consumption. The Bass model is a 
theoretical model leading to empirical support for the existence of the S-shaped pattern of 
consumption to represent “growth” (i.e. cumulative distribution of consumption over 
time). It presents the level of spread of consumption of a deal among a given set of 
prospective consumers over time (Mahajan et al. 1990; Mahajan et al. 1995). The model 
assumes that there are no repeat buyers and purchase volume per buyer is one unit. So, 
the number of buyers defines the unit sales for the deal. In the social shopping context, 
the Bass model focuses on the development of a cumulative consumption curve and 
serves the purpose of depicting the successive increases in the number of buyers. 
In the development of his model, Bass (1969) assumes that buyers comprise two 
groups. The first group is comprised of “innovators”, who are the early buyers that 
initiate the model. These consumers will purchase a deal exclusively because of external 
sources of influence. The model posits that early buyers of a deal are the first p*m 
consumers to purchase that deal, where p is a coefficient of innovation (to be estimated 
form the data) and m is the potential number of ultimate buyers. The second group of 
buyers is comprised of “imitators”, who will purchase a deal because of internal sources 
of influence, i.e. social interactions. The number of imitators grows over time according 
to a coefficient of imitation, q (also estimated form the data). Hence, social interactions 
are important influences in determining the speed and shape of consumption processes in 
a social system (Mahajan et al. 1990; Valente 1991). The basis of the Bass model is the 
two-step flow of influence principle (Katz 1957; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955), which posits 
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that external sources will influence “innovators” to make a purchase who, in a second 
step, will influence through their purchases the “imitators” to follow suit (Marsden and 
Friedkin 1993; Valente 1996, 2005).  
However, while the Bass model finds support in numerous settings (for a 
comprehensive review see Mahajan et al. 1995), it falls short in explaining or predicting 
why both its coefficients of external and internal influence will differ across products and 
deals. This issue is addressed by network models of social influence, which postulate that 
consumers differ in the degree they influence other consumers (Granovetter and Soong 
1986). These network models posit that such differences are a cause of individual 
differences in time of consumption (Geroski 2000). For instance, some consumers 
purchase a deal when few others have done so, yet others purchase a deal only after many 
others have done so. It follows that such heterogeneity among consumers may have a 
potentially important role to play in explaining different consumption rates across deals.  
The general principle of these network models of social influence is that the 
social distance of two consumers in a social network is associated with the occurrence of 
interpersonal influence between the consumers in different degrees (Burt 1987; 
Granovetter 1973, 1983; Marsden and Friedkin 1993). Such network models of social 
influence are divided into two categories: relational models, which postulate that 
influence is determined by the directional links among consumers, and structural models, 
which postulate that influence is determined by structural characteristics of the social 
network. Both relational and structural network models of influence suggest that social 
network links and social network positions influence consumer choice behavior. In the 
next chapter, I will introduce these models to support the theoretical development of the 
conceptual model. 
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Chapter 3 
HYPOTHESES 
To answer its research questions, this dissertation builds on network models of 
social influence to hypothesize relationships between social interaction mechanisms and a 
deal’s consumption rate in the social shopping context. In addition, it builds on the 
scarcity and information economics literatures to hypothesize a moderating role of 
marketing activity on those relationships. Further, this dissertation builds on the 
behavioral operations management literature to hypothesize a relationship between a 
deal’s consumption rate and its service level in this focused context. Figure 1 depicts this 
set of high-level constructs and relationships.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: High-level set of concepts and relationships 
 
The framework (Figure 2) breaks down the high-level elements in Figure 1 into 
this dissertation’s constructs and hypothesized relationships. In this research, the level of 
analysis is the deal. Therefore, the research positions the constructs and relationships 
depicted in Figure 2 at the deal level of analysis. 
Social 
interaction 
mechanisms 
Consumption 
Rate Service level 
Marketing 
Activity 
  18 
The model depicts five social interaction mechanisms which are hypothesized to 
affect a deal’s consumption rate. They represent the main mechanisms of interpersonal 
influence flow in the sociology and marketing literatures. These mechanisms are a deal’s 
early buyers’ (1) opinion leadership, (2) network integration, (3) cohesive group 
membership, (4) network constraint, and (5) network centrality.  
In turn, the model depicts three elements of the marketing mix which are 
hypothesized to moderate the relationships between those five social interaction 
mechanisms and a deal’s consumption rate. These elements refer to a deal’s product’s 
popularity, quality, and price. These are the main elements of the marketing mix that are 
related to utility, information, and scarcity effects in the marketing literature, and 
consequently might interfere with the main effects of social interactions on a deal’s 
consumption rate. 
Finally, the conceptual model depicts the hypothesized relationship between a 
deal’s consumption rate and its service level. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual Framework 
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Social interaction mechanisms and consumption rate in social shopping 
In social shopping, a consumer is able to nominate another consumer in her 
online community by “following” her. This is done by the nominating consumer by 
allowing some digital platform (e.g. the online retailer’s website) to provide her updates 
regarding the nominated consumer’s actions (i.e. her purchases of the online retailer’s 
deals). In doing so, the nominating consumer creates a directional link to the nominated 
one. While the link is outgoing from the former, it is incoming to the latter. A link in a 
social shopping community may be bi-directional, inasmuch as two consumers are able to 
nominate each other. The collection of consumers and the links among consumers in a 
social shopping community form a social network (Wasserman and Faust 1994), in which 
social influence is likely to operate (Valente 2005) . 
In order to better understand how social influence operates in social networks, 
scholars have developed two types of network models of social influence based on the 
two-step flow of influence principle. The first type of network models of social influence 
refers to relational models. These models postulate that directional links among 
consumers determine influence. According to these models, influence flows in the 
opposite direction of the links so it matters who makes and who receives the nominations. 
That is, in the social shopping context, these models posit that influence flows from the 
nominated to the nominating consumer, as purchases made by the former influence the 
latter’s choice behavior. The second type of network models of social influence refers to 
structural models. These models postulate that structural characteristics of the social 
network determine influence. Here, the direction of the links in the social network is 
irrelevant.  
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In the social shopping context, both relational and structural network models of 
social influence suggest that social interactions influence consumer choice behavior 
according to both social network links and social network positions. In the next two sub-
sections, I will introduce these models to support the theoretical development of the 
conceptual model in Figure 2. 
Relational models of social influence 
The first relational model of social influence considered in this dissertation is the 
opinion leadership model. To the best of my knowledge, the first study to use the opinion 
leadership model to investigate social influence was Moreno (1934), even though 
Bonacich (1972) popularized it. The main idea of this model is that influential consumers 
are “prestigious”. A prestigious consumer is the one who is the object of extensive 
immediate incoming links1. This implies that the model focuses solely on the consumer 
as a recipient of immediate nominations (and, consequently, sender of influence). The 
prestige (i.e. opinion leadership) of a consumer increases as the consumer becomes the 
object of more nominations.  
Opinion leadership models are arguably the most tested models of social 
influence in marketing. However, it is striking that there is still a debate on whether the 
model’s assumptions hold (Aral 2011; Godes 2011; Iyengar et al. 2011b), since it has 
been nearly eighty years since Moreno’s (1934) seminal study. Namely, the opinion 
leadership model’s assumptions are: (1) social influence among consumers is at work, (2) 
some consumers’ purchases have a disproportionate influence on others’ purchases, and 
                                                     
1
 Immediate links are those for which the geodesic linking the consumer to her contacts is 1. The 
geodesic is the length of the shortest path of links between two consumers in an online 
community. 
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(3) observers (both scholars and managers) are able to identify and target those opinion 
leaders.  
This dissertation will join this longstanding debate. Here, I propose a 
conceptualization of social interactions that captures influence among consumers, and 
design an experiment that rigorously assesses whether purchases by identifiable opinion 
leaders have a disproportionate influence on others’ purchases. Based on the two-step 
flow of influence principle and on the Bass model, the theoretical argument put forth here 
is that opinion leaders acting as “innovators” by becoming early buyers of a deal will 
trigger consumption of that deal by “imitators”, thereby increasing the deal’s 
consumption rate. That is, when opinion leaders become early buyers of a deal, it will sell 
faster. In formal terms, I state this dissertation first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS H1A: Greater opinion leadership of early buyers of a deal is positively 
associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus.  
The second relational model of social influence considered in this dissertation is 
the network integration model. One of the main controversies surrounding the opinion 
leadership model described above is that it restricts influence flows to the immediate 
links to the influential consumers (the opinion leaders). In order to relax this limiting 
definition of who the influential consumer are, Valente and Foreman (1998) developed 
the concept of network integration, which is the degree to which a consumer links to 
other consumers in her network through received nominations. In doing so, Valente and 
Foreman (1998) provide a sociometric measure based on links beyond direct ones. 
According to those authors, an integrated consumer is that one whose nominating 
consumers are also nominated by many others, and so on. In fact, in the network of an 
integrated consumer, her nominating consumers are likely to nominate one another as 
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well (Valente and Foreman 1998). Network integration models thus purport that 
influence flows from the integrated consumer through the network via nominations. 
In the social shopping context, more nominations among consumers facilitate 
influence flow through the network, thus representing, on average, a greater likelihood 
that an integrated consumer’s purchase of a deal will influence other consumers to 
purchase it, thereby increasing the deal’s consumption rate. Therefore, based on the two-
step flow of influence principle and on the Bass model, I offer the following hypothesis 
for empirical scrutiny: 
HYPOTHESIS H1B: Greater integration of early buyers of a deal is positively associated 
with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus. 
 
Structural models of social influence 
Structural models of social influence postulate that the rate and character of 
influence are determined by structural characteristics of the social system within which 
the influence occurs. Extant social interactions literature reveals three different views of 
how consumers become influential in social networks. First, the cohesive group 
membership model stresses that influential consumers are strongly connected by having 
links to many other consumers, which promotes a normative environment that facilitates 
influence flows (Burt 1987; Coleman et al. 1966). That is, influential consumers belong 
to a strongly connected group. Second, a competing model of network constraint argues 
that influential consumers explore brokerage opportunities created by dispersed links 
among groups of consumers who are strongly connected among themselves, within their 
groups (Burt 1992, 1999). Thus, influential consumers are positioned between strongly 
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connected groups. Finally, a more traditional model of network centrality posits that 
influential consumers are closer to all other consumers in the network (Freeman 1979). 
The cohesive group membership model of social influence focuses on strongly 
connected subgroups of consumers within a network. Strongly connected subgroups are 
subsets of consumers among whom there are relatively “strong” links. That is, the links 
among consumers are intense and direct. Friedkin (1984) examines the use of cohesive 
group membership as an explanatory variable in network models of social influence: 
“[Network] cohesion models are founded upon the causal propositions that 
pressures toward uniformity occur when there are positively valued interactions 
between two persons, that these pressures may occur by being ‘transmitted’ 
through intermediaries even when two persons are not in direct contact, and that 
such indirect pressures toward uniformity are associated with short indirect 
communication channels connecting persons”. (p. 236) 
Consequently, proponents of cohesive group membership models of social 
influence expect greater homogeneity among consumers who have relatively frequent 
contact (hence end up forming links) or who are linked through intermediaries, and less 
homogeneity among consumers who have less frequent contact (hence end up not 
forming links) (Friedkin 1984). This argument is reinforced by Burt (1987), who claims 
that connection strength is important because the more tightly consumers are tied into a 
network, the more they are affected by the group.  
Strongly connected subgroups are theoretically important because of influence 
operating through (1) direct contact among subgroup members, (2) indirect conduct 
transmitted via intermediaries, or (3) the relative connection strength within as compared 
to outside the subgroup. Bringing this idea into the social shopping context, I propose that 
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consumers who are members of strongly connected groups will be able to influence other 
consumers in those groups through social interactions. Such an influence should increase 
consumption rates. Therefore, based on the two-step flow of influence principle and the 
Bass model, I propose the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS H1C: Greater cohesive group membership of early buyers of a deal is 
positively associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus. 
In turn, the network constraint model of social influence proposes an alternative 
view of the relationship between network structure and influence ability by members of 
the network. The argument here describes ability to influence as a function of 
“brokerage” opportunities (Burt 1992), and draws on network concepts that emerged in 
sociology, most notably Granovetter’s (1973) “strength of weak ties”. 
According to Granovetter (1973), “weak” links representing less intense, indirect 
links between subgroups in a social network are “holes” in the structure of the network. 
These holes in social structure – simply put, “structural holes” – create ability of 
influence for individuals whose relationships span the holes (Burt 1977, 1980, 1992). 
However, the structural hole between two subgroups does not mean that individuals in 
the subgroups are unaware of one another. It only means that the individuals are focused 
on their own activity internal to the subgroup (e.g. purchases among consumers of a same 
subgroup), such that they do not attend to the activities of individuals in the other 
subgroup. Individuals on either side of a structural hole circulate in different flows of 
influence. Structural holes are thus an opportunity to broker the flow of influence 
between individuals (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973).  
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Structural holes separate non-redundant sources of influence. That is, they 
separate sources that are more additive than overlapping. In contrast, connection strength, 
as described above, is an indicator of redundancy. Strong links are likely to have the 
same sources of influence and therefore be exposed to redundant influence.  
The network constraint principle refers to the fact that an individual is a broker in 
the network. Network constraint is the extent to which an individual’s links are redundant 
(Burt 1992). To the extent that an individual’s links are non-redundant, she is less 
constrained in the network. 
Integrating this concept into the social shopping context, an influential consumer 
will be that consumer who will occupy a structural hole. That is, she will bridge links, 
which gives her an advantageous ability to influence others. This consumer has higher 
levels of influence because she reaches more consumers indirectly. In addition, the 
diversity of her links across separate groups means that her higher level of influence 
contains fewer redundant bits of influence. Furthermore, since she is positioned at a 
“crossroads” of social organization, she is likely to learn early about purchases in diverse 
groups, and likely to pass on influence to other consumers by making purchases herself 
(Burt 1999). 
Therefore, according to the network constraint model of social influence, the 
two-step flow of influence principle, and the Bass model, it is reasonable to expect that 
early purchases of a deal by consumers who fill structural holes (hence are less 
constrained) will likely influence other consumers to purchase that deal, thereby 
increasing its consumption rate. In formal terms, 
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HYPOTHESIS H1D: Greater network constraint of early buyers of a deal is negatively 
associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus. 
The third structural model of social influence – and our final model in the 
theoretical development of relationships between social interaction mechanisms and 
consumption rates – is the network centrality model of social influence. This model is 
similar to the network integration model of social influence. However, instead of 
considering directional links, the centrality measure considers the overall pattern of links 
in the social network, irrespective of their direction, and thus represents a structural 
measure. It captures the degree to which individuals concentrate the links among other 
individuals. A centralized social network contains a few individuals who are the locus of 
contacts, whereas a decentralized social network has the connections spread among many 
of its members. Influence stemming from central individuals’ actions is therefore able to 
reach out easier to other individuals in the network than influence stemming from less 
central, more peripheral individuals (Bonacich 1987; Freeman 1979; Marsden 2002). 
Bringing this notion of network centrality to the social shopping context, we 
should expect to observe central consumers influence others through purchases and, as a 
result, increase consumption rates. In turn, when peripheral consumers make purchases, it 
takes longer to observe who is purchasing a deal, so in these cases, consumption rates 
should be lower. Hence, based on the two-step flow of influence principle and the Bass 
model, we should expect to observe higher consumption rates in deals when early buyers 
are central consumers. Therefore,  
HYPOTHESIS H1E: Greater network centrality of early buyers of a deal is positively 
associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus. 
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The moderating role of marketing activity 
The previous set of hypotheses (H1A through H1E) offers important insights into 
how and why social interaction mechanisms may influence consumption rates in social 
shopping. The theoretical argument builds on the two-step flow of influence principle and 
the Bass model to posit that purchases made early by influential consumers are likely to 
influence other consumers’ choice behavior, thereby increasing consumption rates. Each 
hypothesis offers different theoretical accounts of social interactions, each describing a 
different mechanism of social influence. However, although these social influence 
mechanisms are conceptually distinct, their expressions in data may often be 
indistinguishable, making it impossible to identify the exact nature of the mechanism at 
work (Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001).  
Unfortunately, one may confound social interactions effects with common 
contextual effects (Brock and Durlauf 2007; Manski 1993; Van den Bulte and Lilien 
2001). Classic studies (Coleman et al. 1966; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955) documented that 
awareness or an attitude toward consumption can be affected not only by social 
interactions but also by firms’ marketing efforts. More recent research (Bemmaor and 
Lee 2002; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004) has further challenged the empirical 
support for the role of social interactions in consumption by showing that S-shaped 
consumption patterns, often interpreted as evidence of social interactions, can result from 
population heterogeneity rather than influence. These results support concerns that the 
positive relationship between the prevalence of prior purchases among a consumer’s 
social network connections and the likelihood of the consumer’s future purchases – 
typically interpreted as evidence of social interactions – is often produced by factors that 
are excluded from the model. 
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However, I contend that inconclusive and often conflicting results (Marsden and 
Friedkin 1993; Valente 1996; Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001) have overlooked potential 
contextual moderators in the relationship between social interactions and consumption. 
In general terms, a moderator is a variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the 
relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable. That is, a variable 
is a moderator if the relationship between two variables is a function of its level. This 
definition indicates an interaction between the independent variable and the moderator, or 
a non-additive relation, where the dependent variable is regarded as a probabilistic 
function of the two interacting variables. Specifically within a correlational analysis 
framework, a moderator is a third variable that affects the zero-order correlation between 
two other variables. A moderator effect within a correlational framework may also be 
said to occur where the direction of the correlation changes (Baron and Kenny 1986; 
James and Brett 1984).  
Thus, instead of looking for confounds, this research will hypothesize and 
empirically assess the role played by contextual factors acting as potential moderators in 
the relationship between social interaction mechanisms and consumption rates in the 
focused social shopping context. In doing so, this research joins an ongoing debate. 
As discussed earlier, the nature of social shopping deals – i.e. they are limited 
and offer deteriorating inventory – affects consumers’ valuations by (1) affecting utility, 
(2) providing incomplete information, and (3) promoting scarcity effects. However, 
social interactions are also a source of utility, information, and scarcity effects in social 
shopping. Hence, social interactions will be more (or less) influential in social shopping 
inasmuch as the marketing mix will be less (or more) effective in affecting consumers’ 
deals valuations. 
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In order to identify which elements of the marketing mix may interfere with 
social interactions effects on consumption rates, I adopt a parsimonious approach and 
build on previous studies in the scarcity and information economics literatures (Debo and 
Van Ryzin 2009; Rabinovich et al. 2003; Tereyagoglu and Veeraraghavan 2011). Three 
primary factors in these literatures that are related to utility, information, and scarcity 
effects are a product’s popularity, quality, and price. While product popularity and 
quality correspond to attributes that reflect the level of awareness for, and the conditions 
of a particular SKU, product price captures the appreciation that the marketplace has 
assigned to the SKU. 
Product characteristics: product popularity and quality 
The first contextual factor hypothesized to moderate the effect of social 
interaction mechanisms on a deal’s consumption rate is the popularity of the product 
being offered as part of that deal. Research suggests that product popularity is associated 
with greater shopper knowledge and less willingness to search for information (Chevalier 
et al. 2000; MacDonald 2000). Thus, consumers considering buying a deal become less 
dependent on other consumers’ purchases to make informed decisions as product 
popularity increases. This is particularly heightened in online settings, as information 
pertaining to popular products is readily and extensively available (Bakos 1997; 
Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001). This availability of 
information provides cues regarding product functionality and ease of use, thus reducing 
its perceived complexity and making it easier for consumers to assess its results. Product 
popularity may also increase utility because popular products, in general, dictate or 
follow dominant standards, thus being more compatible with other products (Katz and 
Shapiro 1985). Finally, product popularity may induce scarcity effects, since consumers 
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are likely to infer that more popular products will sell faster thereby increasing the 
likelihood of becoming unavailable (Stock and Balachander 2005; Verhallen 1982).  
According to previous arguments, I expect that greater product popularity will 
convey information, provide utility, and induce scarcity effects, thus overcoming 
consumers’ needs to resort to the observation of purchases by others to make a decision 
regarding whether to purchase a deal. I expect, then, that: 
HYPOTHESIS H2A: Greater product popularity will negatively moderate the relationship 
between a deal’s consumption rate and that deal’s early buyers’ i) opinion leadership, ii) 
network integration, iii) cohesive group membership, iv) network constraint, and v) 
network centrality.  
The second contextual factor hypothesized to moderate the effect of social 
interaction mechanisms on a deal’s consumption rate is the quality of the product being 
offered as part of that deal. Consumers often rely on previous purchases as a screening 
device when shopping for experience goods (Nelson 1970). In social shopping contexts, 
ascertaining the quality of a product is very complex, since websites in this online 
retailing segment sell deteriorating inventory. However, most online retailers still provide 
cues of a product’s quality, for instance by informing consumers, on their website, 
whether the product is not “mint in box” (i.e. it has been refurbished, remanufactured, or 
retuned). It has been shown that consumers negatively react to the notion that a product 
has already been touched by another consumer (Morales and Fitzsimons 2007). Also, 
prior studies have shown significant variations in buyer experience across product 
categories for remanufactured products (Subramanian and Subramanyam 2008). That is, 
deteriorating products – i.e. of lower quality (Ferguson and Koenigsberg 2007) – are 
likely to provide consumers lower utility than those “mint in box” – i.e. of higher quality. 
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Furthermore, consumers generally conclude that high quality products are scarce, and 
vice-versa (Cialdini 1985; Stock and Balachander 2005). As already discussed, such 
scarcity effects are likely to influence consumption thereby negatively affecting the 
influence of social interactions in social shopping contexts. 
The aforementioned arguments suggest that consumers will resort less to 
observing other consumers’ purchases as the quality of the product being offered as part 
of a deal increases. In formal terms:  
HYPOTHESIS H2B: Greater product quality will negatively moderate the relationship 
between a deal’s consumption rate and that deal’s early buyers’ i) opinion leadership, ii) 
network integration, iii) cohesive group membership, iv) network constraint, and v) 
network centrality.   
Commercial context: product price 
The third contextual factor hypothesized to moderate the effect of social 
interaction mechanisms on a deal’s consumption rate is the price of the product being 
offered as part of that deal. According to the signaling literature in information 
economics, a deal’s price should be expected to signal its actual value (i.e. the deal’s 
worth). Here, such a measure of worth is based purely on the utility derived from the 
purchase of a deal. That is, utility derived value allows us to measure a deal in terms of 
the outcomes of its purchase (Tirole 1988). Value signaling is relevant in this study 
because it affects consumer choice behavior by providing valuation information to 
consumers (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Wolinsky 1983). A consumer should be expected 
to resort less to observing others’ purchases in order to purchase a deal the closer that 
deal’s valuation gets to her own reservation value. 
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Unfortunately, extant literature provides mixed results on the extent that prices 
indeed signal value. Bagwell-Riordan’s (1986) model of intertemporal pricing suggests 
that online retailers offering high-value products would signal the products’ value 
through high prices. This is because a high-value product is more costly to source than a 
low-value product. Hence, online retailers offering a high-value product as part of a deal 
have incentive to signal value with a high price instead of a low one. 
However, it may be the case that a low price may signal a high product value. 
This is because high-value products generate more repeat purchases (Nelson 1974). By 
consistently offering high-value products at low prices, online retailers attract and/or 
retain consumers. This in turn, yields profits in the long-run. Hence, they have incentive 
to signal value with a low price instead of a high one. Simply put, online retailers are 
telling the market that making low profits by offering high-value products at low prices 
as part of a deal in the short-run is a strategy. This is because they are confident their 
consumers will be satisfied with their purchases, and as a result will come back for future 
purchases.  
Thus, the circumstances under which a low or a high price signals high-value 
differ. Such differences are likely to blur the informational content of prices in social 
shopping, so it is unclear whether consumers would resort to observing purchases of 
others to make a decision. 
A closely related issue is that online retailers tend to overprice deals, given 
inherent scarcity (Lynn 1991, 1992) in social shopping. Indeed, it has been shown that, in 
some contexts, scarcity may signal value (Debo and Van Ryzin 2009; Debo and 
Veeraraghavan 2010), which may command higher prices (Milgrom and Roberts 1986; 
Wolinsky 1983). Moreover, consumers may be tempted to buy a scarce/highly priced 
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product because of desire for “exclusivity” (Leibenstein 1950). Such psychological 
effects imply that consumers would buy more as fewer consumers are present in the 
market when prices become too high. That is, according to scarcity literature, an increase 
in prices would change the sign and the magnitude of the direction of the relationship 
between social interactions and consumption rate. 
However, recall that consumers in social shopping are in general bargain hunters. 
Bargain hunting may be related to a number of motivations that provide utility, such as 
role enactment, which describes normative economic behavior, including finding a real 
bargain and searching for the optimum value (Westbrook and Black 1985), price 
consciousness, which involves purchasing the cheapest products and saving money by 
shopping for bargains (Donthu and Garcla 1999), and value shopping, which refers to 
shopping for sales, looking for discounts, and hunting for bargains (Arnold and Reynolds 
2003). Knauth (1949) explains that consumers inspecting a deal may be induced to 
purchase that deal if they are in a “bargain-hunting mood”.  
In fact, recent studies have documented impulse buying in online retailing (Ahuja 
et al. 2003; Jeffrey and Hodge 2007; Parboteeah et al. 2009). In the social shopping 
context, such behavior may be induced when the online retailer sets prices that appear to 
be below consumers’ reservation values. Hence, according to the bargain hunting 
literature, a decrease in prices would decrease the impact of social interactions on 
consumption rates. Conversely, higher prices should induce bargain hunters to rely more 
on social interactions to make consumption decisions. 
In sum, the aforementioned arguments offer different predictions for the effects 
of prices on the relationship between social interactions and consumption rate. While 
there is no clear prediction on the informational content of prices, it appears that high 
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prices may induce scarcity and desirability effects, while low prices may provide bargain 
hunters high utility. Thus, it is unclear whether consumers would resort more or less to 
others’ purchases to make a consumption decision as prices increase/decrease. There are 
justifiable arguments for both directions of moderating effects of prices on the 
relationship between social interactions and consumption rate. In order to unveil the 
actual role played by product price in the social shopping context, I offer the final set of 
alternative hypotheses for empirical scrutiny: 
HYPOTHESIS H2C-1: Greater product price will positively moderate the relationship 
between a deal’s consumption rate and that deal’s early buyers’ i) opinion leadership, ii) 
network integration, iii) cohesive group membership, iv) network constraint, and v) 
network centrality.   
HYPOTHESIS H2C-2: Greater product price will negatively moderate the relationship 
between a deal’s consumption rate and that deal’s early buyers’ i) opinion leadership, ii) 
network integration, iii) cohesive group membership, iv) network constraint, and v) 
network centrality.    
Consumption rates and service levels 
We turn now our attention to the fundamental relationship between demand and 
supply in social shopping. So far, the theoretical argument has centered on demand 
management. However, what are the business outcomes of managing demand in the 
presence of social interactions among consumers?  
In this research, we are particularly interested in the effects on service levels of 
consumption rate increases. Building on extensive literature on operations and inventory 
management, this research conceptualizes a deal’s service level in social shopping as the 
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probability that a demand is met directly from inventory (or, conversely, the maximum 
acceptable probability that a demand is not met from inventory) during the deal. That is, 
the service level represents the probability of no stockout in a deal, being a stockout the 
occasion when the on-hand inventory drops to the zero level. This definition of service 
level is commonly referred to as “P1 service”, “type 1 service”, or “cycle service level” 
(Nahmias 2004; Porteus 2002; Silver et al. 1998). 
Assessing the demand-related factors that impact a deal’s service level is 
important because online retailers facing stockouts incur costs (Jing and Lewis 2011; 
Walter and Grabner 1975) including both the lost profits from the immediate lost sale, 
and the long-run costs if stockouts reduce the likelihood of future purchases. For online 
retailers, the choice of service level is usually based on the underlying stockout costs, but 
such costs are very hard to obtain (Anderson et al. 2006; Schwartz 1966; Zinn and Liu 
2001). 
Unfortunately, when demand varies substantially, as is the case across social 
shopping deals, it may become very expensive to maintain high service levels (Agrawal 
and Seshadri 2000; Schwartz 1970). So, I contend that increasing a social shopping deal’s 
consumption rate will ultimately affect its service level negatively, which may be 
detrimental to an online retailer’s profitability. In doing so, I dispute the largely accepted 
assumption, in social interactions studies, that suggests that increasing the consumption 
rate will always be beneficial to online retailers. This is because of the fundamental 
principle, in operations management, that, under specific conditions, an increase in the 
consumption rate may lead to a disproportionate decrease in the service level. In the 
theoretical development that follows, I put forth arguments that support the notion that an 
increase in a deal’s consumption rate will lead to a much higher decrease in the deal’s 
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service level. That is, I hypothesize that the relationship between a deal’s consumption 
rate (demand) and its service level (probability of stockout) is non-linear, monotonically 
decreasing. 
The newsvendor model literature provides both theoretical and empirical 
guidance in the development of this dissertation’s final hypothesis. The newsvendor 
model is certainly among the most important models in operations management and 
inventory theory. In this model, a manager sells a single SKU during a short selling 
season with stochastic demand. The manager has one opportunity to order inventory 
before the selling season, and no further replenishments are possible. If the order quantity 
is greater than the realized demand, the manager must dispose of the remaining stock at a 
loss. If the order quantity is lower than the realized demand, the manager forgoes some 
profit. Therefore, in choosing an order quantity, the manager must balance the costs of 
ordering too little against the costs of ordering too much. 
The newsvendor model applies in a broad array of settings. For instance, fashion 
apparel retailers often must submit orders well in advance of a selling season, without 
opportunity for replenishment during the season. Social shopping deals usually present a 
similar problem: order too little and the online retailer may face irate consumers, but 
order too much and the online retailer incurs additional inventory holding costs as it 
slowly sells the excess inventory. 
Formally, in the newsvendor model, a decision maker chooses an order quantity, 
q, which arrives before the start of a single selling period, i. Let A be stochastic demand 
during this period, described by the strictly increasing, continuously differentiable 
cumulative probability function, F(a), on the interval ,   , with strictly positive 
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probability density function, f(a). Let  	 
   denote the expected value of 
demand A. The decision maker purchases each unit for cost c and sells each unit at price 
p>c. When q > A, the decision maker can salvage each unit remaining at the end of the 
period for s< c. It is well known that the optimal (and unique) order quantity that 
maximizes the expected profit, q*, is given by F-1(ξ). Here, F-1 is the inverse cumulative 
distribution function of demand, and ξ ≡ (p-c)/(p-s) is the “critical fractile”. The critical 
fractile is the probability of satisfying all the demand during deal i if q* units are 
provisioned at the start of the deal, i.e., ξ ≡ F(q*) ≡ Pr[A≤ q*] (see Figure 3). Therefore, 
1–ξ ≡ (c-s)/(p-s) is the optimal stockout probability reflecting the optimal service level 
for deal i (for a comprehensive review refer to Khouja 1999 and Petruzzi and Dada 
1999). 
 
 
Figure 3: Determination of optimal order quantity for the newsvendor model 
 
Traditional literature on the newsvendor model is based primarily on the 
paradigm of perfect rationality. In existing models, the inventory manager is a perfect 
µ                           q* 
f(a) 
Shaded Area = Pr(A≤q*) = ξ 
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optimizer: she will always choose order quantities that attain the maximum possible level 
of expected profits. Many results – and implications – are based on such paradigm.  
However, a growing body of analytical literature investigating the newsvendor 
model has suggested that, in general, managers facing demand uncertainty tend to order 
less than the optimal order quantity, q*, because they are boundedly rational (Loch and 
Wu 2007; Su 2008). The first study to provide support for this claim was Eeckoudt et al. 
(1995). Based on the rational expectations framework (Muth 1961), the authors found 
that a risk-averse newsvendor will systematically order less than the optimal quantity. 
Also based on the rational expectations framework, Wang and Webster (2009) showed 
that the order quantity decreases as risk-aversion increases, whereas Wang et al. (2009) 
found that the order quantity decreases as the selling price increases. Agrawal and 
Seshadri (2000) also found that a risk-averse newsvendor will order less than the optimal 
order quantity under the assumption of a multiplicative demand distribution. However, 
the ordered quantity will depend on the demand sensitivity to the selling price under the 
assumption of an additive demand distribution and known demand sensitivity. Based on 
the rational expectation equilibrium analysis, Wang and Hu (2011) concluded that a risk-
averse newsvendor will order less than the optimal order quantity in the presence of 
forward-looking (i.e. strategic) consumers who anticipate future sales and choose 
purchasing timing to maximize their expected utility. Finally, based on a min-max 
approach, Perakis and Roels (2008) identified that a newsvendor will order less than the 
optimal quantity in order to minimize his maximum “regret” of not acting optimally. 
Empirical evidence provides support to the analytical results outlined above. For 
instance, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), Brown and Tang (2006), and Benzion et al. 
(2008) conducted experiments to investigate ordering decisions in the newsvendor 
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context. The three studies observed a bias between practical ordering decisions and the 
newsvendor solution. That is, when facing uncertain demand, managers are likely to 
order less than the optimal quantity. 
Su (2008) and Bendoly et al. (2010) explain that data of limited validity based on 
environmental or situational factors that, in theory, should not matter, lead to such 
ordering distortion. This is because decision makers make subjective judgments which 
are processed according to heuristic rules. They “anchor” their decisions unduly on 
otherwise irrelevant past observations and experiences. If decision makers are susceptible 
to anchoring, then unrelated but mentally available factors will influence their decisions. 
However, adjustments of these “anchored” estimates to the current context are typically 
insufficient. That is, different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased 
towards the initial values (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). In fact, anchoring is likely to 
influence inventory managers’ ordering decisions (Bendoly et al. 2010; Loch and Wu 
2007; Su 2008). And because adjustments are typically insufficient, this procedure should 
lead to underestimation (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and consequently lower service 
levels. 
The trick with using anchoring models for prediction of demand is that one needs 
to know what the anchor is, which influences the decision at hand (Bendoly et al. 2010). 
One available factor that boundedly rational inventory managers often use as an anchor 
when determining next periods’ ordering is previous periods’ demand. Based on the 
seminal study of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) on judgment under uncertainty, Su 
(2008) identifies two underlying effects of ordering distortion based on such an anchoring 
approach: (1) the midpoint bias and (2) the rare-event bias.  
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First, when managers are boundedly rational, they tend to distort order quantities 
toward the midpoint of the range of possible demand realizations. This is called “the 
midpoint bias”. When the demand density f(a) has support ,   , so that  and  
are the smallest and largest possible demand realizations, the midpoint is m≡(  )/2 
(Su 2008).  
Second, when managers are boundedly rational, they tend to distort order 
quantities in the direction of low-probability demand realizations. This is called the “rare-
event bias”. One potential behavioral explanation is that managers tend to place excessive 
weight on rare low demand occurrences. That is, because of anchoring, managers tend to 
underestimate the magnitude of demand probabilities (as in the bias in the evaluation of 
conjunctive and disjunctive events, as explained by Tversky and Kahneman 1974:1128-
1129).  
Bringing together these two underlying behavioral effects of ordering distortion 
(i.e. the midpoint bias and the rare-event bias) and the formulation of the newsvendor 
model, the notion that the relationship between consumption rates and service levels will 
be non-linear, monotonically decreasing becomes quite intuitive. I will provide an 
example to illustrate the rationale. 
Recall that the inventory manager stipulates the order quantity prior to the 
beginning of the deal. The perfect optimizer inventory manager will choose an order 
quantity, q*, which is depleted in some time τ* ≤ τ, where τ is the deal deadline. Suppose 
that the solid curve in Figure 4 represents the cumulative consumption (i.e. inventory 
depletion) over time during the deal. 
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Figure 4: Cumulative consumption over time 
 
The dashed-dotted curve in Figure 4 (whose tipping point occurs slightly earlier 
than the tipping point in the solid curve) might well represent the cumulative 
consumption over time during the deal, in which inventory is completely depleted at time 
τ
*
. As the boundedly rational inventory manager orders q instead of the optimal quantity 
q*, the deal will sell out at time τ2 < τ*, and a demand equal to q* – q will be left 
unfulfilled. Notice that, in the case of the cumulative consumption represented by the 
dashed-dotted curve, the deal will sell out at time τ1 ≤ τ2, and the unfulfilled demand will 
be equal to q* – q as well. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that cumulative consumption curves whose 
tipping point will occur earlier than the tipping point in the solid curve will resemble 
more the dashed curve than the dashed-dotted one. This is because curves that “tip” 
earlier are more likely to represent higher consumption rates (Mahajan et al. 1990), which 
imply higher levels of demand. Thus, in our example, the dashed curve implies a 
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cumulative demanded quantity at time τ* of q' >> q*. Based on this notion, as the 
boundedly rational inventory manager orders q, we might expect a deal exhibiting a 
consumption pattern similar to the dashed curve to sell out at time τ1' << τ1 ≤ τ2. 
Correspondingly, in this example, the unfulfilled demand would be q'-q >> q*-q. 
Such an increase in unfulfilled demand due to underordering should be expected 
to be more salient at higher consumption rates than at lower consumption rates. This is 
because lower consumption rates imply lower levels of demand and consequently, less 
room for error due to underordering. Conversely, even small differences in consumption 
rates at higher levels should lead to large levels of unfulfilled demand due to 
underordering, and consequently, sharp decreases in service levels. 
We may formally demonstrate such an intuitive idea. At the beginning of the 
deal, the inventory manager faces an ordering decision. Her inventory level choice 
depends on the sequence of past demands representing a sample drawn from the same 
distribution that governs the future demands. The inventory manager will attempt to 
maximize the minimum expected profit for all demand distributions (Scarf 1958). 
Deals that face high levels of consumption rate usually display monotonically 
increasing demand probability density, f(a). This is because increasing density suggests 
that demand is more likely to be high (Su 2008). That is, the expected demand, E[A]=µ, is 
high for deals that face high consumption rates. However, because the inventory manager 
is boundedly rational, the rare-event bias may distort order quantities (decided prior to the 
beginning of the deals) toward low demand probabilities when a deal is more likely to 
face a high consumption rate. Moreover, the midpoint bias may distort order quantities 
toward the midpoint of those low demand probabilities rather than to the midpoint of the 
high demand probabilities (Su 2008). So, as the actual demand realization will be high 
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due to a high consumption rate, the likelihood that a boundedly rational manager has 
underordered will be high. As the actual demand level becomes much higher, being 
reflected by a higher consumption rate, it is reasonable to expect that such underordering 
behavior will become more salient due to those managerial heuristics and biases. As a 
result, we should observe much worse service levels at higher consumption rates than at 
lower consumption rates. 
Consider the cumulative demand distribution, F(a). The expected probability that 
the ordered inventory quantity, q, will be able to satisfy demand, A, i.e. the service level, 
φ(q,a), is given by (Dana Jr 2001; Dana Jr and Petruzzi 2001; Deneckere and Peck 1995):  
,  	   ,  	  min!, "#"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Since the service level depends on q and a through the stocking factor, z=q/F(a) 
(Petruzzi and Dada 1999), we can rewrite φ(q,a) as: 
) 	 1 $ %& $ )(  
Since %& $ )( 	 
  $ ) 	+ 
 %1 $ "(+ , the service level is a 
strictly positive, continuous function of the stocking factor with derivative ′) 	
,-.+/ . 
Clearly, the service level will decrease in a non-linear fashion as the actual mean 
demand, µ, which is defined by the deal’s consumption rate, will increase. Such an effect 
should be expected to be stronger as a decision-maker decreases the stocking factor due 
to the rare-event bias, which may distort inventory order quantities down away from the 
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actual mean demand, µ. So, based on the aforementioned arguments, we should expect to 
observe service levels to decrease at a faster pace as the mean demand shifts upward due 
to higher consumption rates. Therefore, I submit the last hypothesis to empirical scrutiny. 
In formal terms: 
HYPOTHESIS H3: Increasing the consumption rate in a deal will decrease the service 
level in the deal, after controlling for initial inventory provision. This relationship is 
monotonically decreasing. 
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY 
The two goals of this research are to determine (1) how and why social 
interactions affect inventory performance in the social shopping context and (2) how 
online retailers can explore such an effect in order to achieve superior inventory 
performance by offering products with certain characteristics and setting prices 
accordingly. Therefore, the investigation will center on endogenous social effects, 
wherein the propensity of a consumer to make a purchase will likely vary with other 
consumers’ purchases in her social shopping community. Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
consensus in the academic community about the existence of such endogenous effects. 
Many economists and marketers regard social interactions to be spurious phenomena 
explainable by processes operating entirely at the level of the individual consumer 
(Durlauf and Ioannides 2010; Iyengar et al. 2009; Van den Bulte and Iyengar 2011). Even 
among sociologists, there is still a lack of consensus on the nature of social interactions 
(Lee et al. 2011). 
Why does the academic community seem unable to converge to common 
conclusions about the channels through which a reference group influences a consumer’s 
choice? In a seminal paper, Manski (1993) argued that this is because empirical analyses 
of social interactions present severe identification problems, since peer influence is 
typically endogenous. According to Manski (1993), these identification problems arise 
due to the challenge of separating correlations in observed consumer choice from the true 
causal effects of one consumer’s choice on another’s. Only causal effects can result in a 
social interaction effect (Manski 2000).  
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The primary confounding factors that are sources of bias in social interactions 
analysis are endogenous group formation, correlated unobservables, and simultaneity 
(Manski 1993, 2000). The endogenous group formation problem arises because 
consumers with similar tastes and preferences may tend to form social groups, hence, 
subsequent correlation in their choices may reflect those common tastes and preferences, 
and not a causal effect of one’s choice on another’s. For instance, correlations in 
observed online purchasing activity between two consumers in a website specialized in 
videogames may simply be driven by common tastes for videogames that induced those 
consumers to navigate in the website in the first place. Therefore, a researcher cannot 
conclude directly from observation in choices that there exists a causal effect of a 
consumer’s purchase on purchasing decisions of others in her reference group. 
A second source of endogeneity corresponds to correlated unobservables (to the 
inventory manager and to the researcher) that drive similar consumption patterns across 
all consumers in a reference group. These are exogenous effects (also known as 
“contextual” effects), wherein the propensity of a consumer to make a purchase varies 
with exogenous characteristics of the reference group. For instance, there is an exogenous 
effect if purchases tend to vary with the socio-economic composition of the reference 
group. 
Finally, a simultaneity problem arises due to the potentially simultaneous nature 
of decisions by the focal consumer and others in her reference group. Due to 
simultaneity, correlation in subsequent purchases could simply reflect the fact that a 
consumer’s choice affects her group’s choices, and at the same time, the group’s choices 
affect the consumer’s choice. This has been referred to as the “reflection problem” 
(Manski 1993). The reflection problem is similar to the problem of interpreting the 
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almost simultaneous movement of a person and her reflection in a mirror. That is: does 
the mirror image reflect the person’s movements or cause them?  
Each of the aforementioned three factors, if not controlled for, could generate 
spurious correlation in observed purchases, which might lead to misattribution of 
correlated choices to causal social interaction effects, biased parameter estimates, or 
highly unreliable standard tests and confidence sets of such causal effects (Durlauf and 
Blume 2010). Based on my literature review, I want to emphasize that these issues are 
pervasive in all empirical settings that try to assess social interactions effects using 
behavioral data across many disciplines. 
One commonly used solution to identification problems in studies of causal 
social interactions includes the availability of panel data (Blume and Durlauf 2005; Brock 
and Durlauf 2007; Hartmann et al. 2008; Manski 1993). With panel data, one can control 
for some of the aforementioned identification problems via fixed or random effects, or by 
including a rich specification for heterogeneity. Both fixed and random effects here serve 
the role of picking up common aspects of group preferences and tastes. These random 
effects may also control for time-invariant aspects of unobservables driving consumers’ 
choices (Batalgi 2001; Durlauf and Blume 2010; Greene 2003; Wooldridge 2002). Also, 
exclusion restrictions may be imposed. That is, one can use instrumental variables that 
affect a focal consumer’s choice, but can be a priori excluded from the choice of others in 
her reference group (Blume and Durlauf 2005; Hartmann et al. 2008). Unfortunately, 
while the use of panel data can clearly avoid the issues of correlated unobservables and 
simultaneity, it falls short of solving the issue of endogenous group formation. This poses 
a severe threat for the validity of this research.     
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Neither of these identification issues arises in randomized experiments (Godes et 
al. 2005; Hartmann et al. 2008; Manski 1993), which allocate consumers into different 
groups. This eliminates the problem of consumers selecting each other based on 
observable and unobservable characteristics. Random assignment implies that a 
consumer’s own characteristics are uncorrelated with other consumers’ characteristics. 
Moreover, in setting up randomized experiments, we can affect the relational and 
structural characteristics of the social network in randomly selected experimental groups. 
This makes it possible for us to evaluate the impact of such an intervention on the 
selected experimental groups’ consumption rates, which would be direct evidence of 
social interactions effects. Furthermore, the proposed randomized experiment (described 
below) will subject all consumers to the same set of deals. This eliminates the self-
selection problem of consumers choosing which deals to inspect based on observable and 
unobservable characteristics. The self-selection problem stems from the fact that self-
interest drives consumers to choose to inspect those deals that are more likely to yield the 
highest utility for them, even though, in principle, every consumer can inspect any deal. 
Finally, another attractive feature of a random sample generated by the known rule that 
all consumers are equally likely to be sampled is that it becomes increasingly accurate in 
describing a population’s characteristics as a sample size increases. Heckman (2010) 
explains: 
“A sample selected by any rule not equivalent to random sampling produces a 
description of the population distribution of characteristics that does not 
accurately describe the true population distribution of characteristics no matter 
how big the sample size. Unless the rule by which the sample is selected is 
known or can be recovered from the data, the selected sample cannot be used to 
produce an accurate description of the underlying population”. (p. 242) 
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Indeed, because of the aforementioned arguments, randomized experiments have 
been considered to be one of the most effective ways to obtain unbiased estimates of 
causal social interactions (Banerjee and Duflo 2008; Duflo et al. 2007; Hirano and Hahn 
2010; Sacerdote 2001). Thus, it is not surprising that social interactions studies have been 
increasingly using this approach to investigate causal relationships. For instance, Chen et 
al. (2011) used a unique natural experimental setting resulting from information policy 
shifts at the online retailer Amazon.com to conduct experiments aimed at investigating the 
effects of social interactions on consumption. In another recent study, Goette et al. (2012) 
conducted an experiment to compare social interactions effects within randomly assigned 
groups to those effects within randomly assigned groups involving social links such as 
kinship (i.e. groups with social context). 
For the purposes of this research, an experiment is also useful because it allows 
us to gauge the extent to which consumers’ choices cause empirical regularities in 
operations. By conducting an experiment, we can control the environment each consumer 
faces. Also, an experiment can help us understand the relative strength of multiple 
sources of social interactions among consumers in social shopping in the empirical data. 
Moreover, we can use an experiment to test operations theory, much as many scholars 
have used experiments to test economic and marketing theory (Gattiker and Parente 
2007). Indeed, marketing studies have largely used experiments to investigate the effects 
of social interactions on consumption in contexts that are similar to those in this research 
(Hartmann et al. 2008; Hirano and Hahn 2010). Furthermore, an experiment may help us 
uncover the often complex social and behavioral elements involved in operations 
management (Boyer and Swink 2008; Croson and Donohue 2002). More specifically, it 
may help us understand how and why social interactions and online retailers’ inventory 
management and marketing activity in social shopping induce demand uncertainty, which 
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is widely recognized to be a fundamental driver of inventory performance. Finally, we 
can use an experiment to measure the impact on inventory performance of varying supply 
and marketing factors in the presence of consumer choice. Experimental work is thus an 
important complement to theoretical work  in operations research (Croson and Donohue 
2002). Therefore, this study will conduct an experiment to empirically assess the 
hypothesized relationships H1A through H3.  
The unit of analysis of the current research is a deal. Therefore, the conceptual 
framework, depicted in Figure 2, refers to constructs and relationships at the deal level. 
The conceptual framework consists of two endogenous variables related to observed 
outcomes in a single deal (deal consumption rate and deal service level), five independent 
variables related to both relational and structural properties of early buyers of the deal 
(opinion leadership, integration, cohesive group membership, network constraint, and 
network centrality), and three moderating variables related to the product characteristics 
and the commercial context of the deal (product popularity, quality, and price). Since 
there are five independent and three moderating variables, this study consists of eight 
factors. 
The randomized experiment consisted of a 2-level (high and low) full factorial 
design. Because there are eight factors, this is a 28 experiment. In a full factorial design 
(also known as “fully crossed” design), each factor level is combined with each other 
factors’ levels. That is, the observational units (i.e. deals) take on all possible 
combinations of the factor levels across all such factors. In doing so, a full factorial 
experiment allows studying the effect of each factor on the response variables of interest, 
as well as the effects of interactions among factors on those response variables (Fisher 
1935; Hicks 1963). In his classical “The Design of Experiments” book, Fisher (1935) 
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argued that complex experimental designs, such as a full factorial one being employed 
here, are advantageous because (1) they are more efficient than one-factor-at-a-time 
experiments, and (2) all data are used in computing all effects. Thus, a full factorial 
design allows the effect of several factors and even interactions between them to be 
determined with the same number of trials as are necessary to determine any one of the 
effects by itself with the same degree of accuracy. This is appropriate for the current 
research, since the investigation here relies on direct effects of independent variables as 
well as moderated effects, which are best represented by interactions between the 
independent and the moderating variables (Baron and Kenny 1986; James and Brett 
1984). 
I recursively designed the 28 full factorial experiment. First, I created the 25 (=32) 
possible combinations among the five independent variables, as presented in Table 1. 
Then, for each of those 32 combinations, I assigned 5*23 (=40) replications of deals. This 
replication procedure allows for estimation of measurement error in a very reliable way 
(Fisher 1935). I replicated 5 times each of the 23 (=8) possible deal types (see Table 2) in 
order to increase the power of the statistical analysis. This yielded 40 different deals for 
each of the 32 combinations of independent variables, which resulted in 1280 deals 
overall. 
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Combination Opinion Leadership 
Network 
Integration 
Cohesive 
group 
membership 
Network 
Constraint 
Network 
Centrality 
1 Low Low Low Low Low 
2 Low Low Low Low High 
3 Low Low Low High Low 
4 Low Low Low High High 
5 Low Low High Low Low 
6 Low Low High Low High 
7 Low Low High High Low 
8 Low Low High High High 
9 Low High Low Low Low 
10 Low High Low Low High 
11 Low High Low High Low 
12 Low High Low High High 
13 Low High High Low Low 
14 Low High High Low High 
15 Low High High High Low 
16 Low High High High High 
17 High Low Low Low Low 
18 High Low Low Low High 
19 High Low Low High Low 
20 High Low Low High High 
21 High Low High Low Low 
22 High Low High Low High 
23 High Low High High Low 
24 High Low High High High 
25 High High Low Low Low 
26 High High Low Low High 
27 High High Low High Low 
28 High High Low High High 
29 High High High Low Low 
30 High High High Low High 
31 High High High High Low 
32 High High High High High 
Table 1: Thirty-two combinations of independent variables in the factorial design for the 
randomized experiment 
 
Product 
Popularity 
Product 
Quality 
Product 
Price 
Low Low Low 
Low Low High 
Low High Low 
Low High High 
High Low Low 
High Low High 
High High Low 
High High High 
Table 2: Eight types of deals in the randomized experiment  
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Data collection 
Experimental grounding 
To ground the randomized experiment, I collected data from the “daily deals” 
online retailer Woot.com! and developed a web-based application with similar appearance 
and “feel” to that website. The reason to choose Woot.com! as the focal online retailer 
and the basis for the experiment is generalizability. First, Woot.com! was the pioneer in 
social shopping (Heine 2010). The website debuted on July 12, 2004, and it remains very 
popular to date – currently, it is ranked 174th in online traffic in the United States (Alexa 
2012). This has caused several other online retailers to mimic the industry pioneer in 
many business aspects, including designing websites similar in appearance to 
Woot.com!’s and offering daily and limited-quantity deals. 
Second, Woot.com! often sells a piece of computer hardware or an electronic 
gadget as part of every deal (Woot 2011). This restricts the sample of products to similar 
categories for the deals in our experiment. Also, Woot.com! usually offers products that 
are of older generations. Hence, information regarding the functionality of the products 
and their respective features is largely available online through search mechanisms, other 
online retailers’ websites, product recommendations, etc. Such a large availability of 
information should preclude consumers resorting to observing others’ purchases (i.e. 
social interactions) to make informed decisions. Thus, if we are able to observe peer 
effects in the Woot.com! data, this would allow us to infer that the results would be 
generalizable to other categories of products for which information is narrowly available 
and for which consumers are more willing to rely on social interactions to make 
consumption choices. 
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Third, approximately seventy percent of the deals offered by Woot.com! to date 
sold out, and there is considerable variability in products’ popularity, quality, and price 
across deals offered in this website. This provides us a rich dataset to sample from, since 
it exhibits large variability among main constructs. 
Finally, Woot.com! provides a discussion forum, in which consumers may 
discuss issues pertaining to the deal being currently offered or just chat about random 
topics. As explained below in the operationalization of measures, it is important to 
control for the potential influence that stems from the interactions among consumers 
through discussion forums. This research will use actual data of posts to control for such 
potential confounding factor. 
Deal selection 
Data pertaining to deals offered by Woot.com! from Feb 22nd, 2006 to Mar 10th, 
2012 were available directly from the online retailer’s website. Specifically, for each 
deal, Woot.com! disclosed the name of the product being offered, a full description of the 
product features, condition (refurbished or “mint in box” – i.e. new), price, as well as the 
contents of the discussion forum. Overall, there were 4893 distinct deals among all 9494 
offered in that period2. However, this study only used data from the 469 deals offered by 
Woot.com! in 20123. This was necessary to ensure proper operationalization of both 
popularity and price constructs, which depended on time sensitive data. The collection of 
                                                     
2
 The number of distinct deals is smaller than the total because there are some repeated deals that 
are offered at different dates. Woot.com! frequently reserves some days to offer flash sales (known 
as “woot offs”), when leftover SKUs from previous deals (known as “woots”) are salvaged. 
Contrary to common “woots”, which last for 24 hours, “woot offs” have no set expiration time. 
They may last for seconds, or hours, while there is remaining stock. This information of how long 
a woot off may last and how many units are made available is undisclosed to consumers. 
3
 In spite of the fact that there are 70 days from January 1st, 2012 to the last day data were gathered 
(March 10th, 2012), there are 469 deals in the sample because Woot.com! offered woot-offs (i.e. 
several deals in a same day) between January 17th and 19th, and between February 21st and 23rd. 
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recent (i.e. “fresh”) data was necessary to reflect actual attributes of the products being 
offered as part of deals during the experimentation, since a product’s popularity and price 
tend to follow trends over long periods of time. Moreover, relying on recent data avoided 
the introduction of bias in the research due to seasonality. For instance, a product’s 
popularity and price may oscillate considerably during the end of year’s holidays. 
I then classified the 469 deals into eight categories, according to their products’ 
price, popularity, and quality. This classification schema corresponds to the eight possible 
deal types depicted in Table 2. I classified a deal as “low price” if its product’s price was 
below the mean price across all 469 deals, otherwise, I classified it as “high price”. 
Analogously, I used the mean products’ popularity across all 469 deals to classify the 
deals according to their products’ popularity. I classified a deal as “low popularity” if its 
product’s popularity was below the mean popularity across all 469 deals, otherwise, I 
classified it as “high popularity”. It was unnecessary to follow a similar procedure for 
classifying deals according to their products’ quality, since the measure is binary – 
Woot.com! informs consumers whether a product being offered as part of a deal is 
refurbished (“low quality”) or new (“high quality”). So, eventually, I classified each of 
the 469 deals into a unique category among the possible eight deal categories. Finally, for 
each of the eight deal categories, I selected five deals classified in it, in order to satisfy 
the full factorial design described at the beginning of this chapter. This procedure yielded 
the 40 (=5*8) deals used in the randomized experiment. 
Web-based application development 
The web-based application displayed information in a similar fashion to that 
displayed at Woot.com! (see Figure 5). By emulating an actual online retailer’s website, 
this research avoided introducing bias due to the use of an experimental platform. This is 
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because website characteristics such as appearance, ease of use, and “friendliness” may 
introduce interactive testing effects by interfering with a consumer’s decision-making 
process (Boyer and Olson 2002; Mollenkopf et al. 2007). 
The application displayed, on the central portion of the screen, a picture of the 
product, its name, condition, price (including $5 shipping, irrespective of the product, 
which is standard at this online retailer), and a brief description of the product’s features. 
Also, on the right portion of the screen, the application displayed the discussion forum 
with a scroll bar, thus allowing subjects to browse it before making a decision. 
Furthermore, at the top of the screen, the application displayed the remaining time of a 
current deal. When a deal was over, the application automatically refreshed the subjects’ 
screens to display a new deal and reset the countdown clock.  
In addition, the application displayed in real time, on the left portion of the 
screen, the names of the subjects who had bought the deal being offered. This is a feature 
that is available in most social shopping websites, and is central to this research. This is 
because, by definition, social interactions’ influence stems from observation of others’ 
purchases. Hence, in our experiment, subjects should be able to observe others’ 
purchases. 
Subjects had the option to click one of two buttons: (1) to make a purchase (“I 
want one”) or (2) to balk (“I don’t want one”). When a subject “purchased” a deal, the 
application decreased his/her allowance by the amount of the price charged in that deal. It 
also decreased the amount of available inventory by one unit. The button to balk had the 
purpose to keep subjects focused on the task throughout the entire experiment. This is 
because only those subjects who clicked either button in all 40 deals were entitled to the 
participation benefits of the experiment (I explain this in more detail in the next section). 
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Finally, in the case that a deal sold out, the application no longer allowed subjects to 
make a purchase; they had to wait until the beginning of the next deal. 
Prior to running the experiment, I validated the experimental platform in several 
ways. First, I wrote and tested controls to curb subjects’ inconsistent behavior that might 
generate spurious data. This included, among others, forbidding consumers to click both 
available buttons during a same deal or opening multiple sessions (windows) of the 
experiment. Second, I performed stress tests on the portion of the application code that 
handled simultaneous purchases of multiple subjects. For instance, only one subject was 
allowed to buy a unit of inventory at a time, which avoided inconsistency in the database. 
Third, I tracked database updates as I performed multiple purchases during test trials, and 
confirmed that the application was handling data accordingly. Finally, I ran two complete 
experimental sessions (i.e. 40 deals) with the programming team that involved 5 people 
overall, and another complete experimental session with 25 guest subjects – who were 
not selected to join the actual experiment – to ensure that the application could handle 
multiple consumers properly. I observed that the application behaved as expected before 
running the actual experiment. 
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Figure 5: Screen shot of the application displaying one of the deals actually offered. 
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Subjects recruitment, selection and experimental assignment 
I recruited subjects to participate in the experiment among a pool of 
undergraduate students enrolled in supply chain management (SCM) courses at the 
W.P.Carey School of Business at Arizona State University during the Spring 2012 
semester. This research complied with the university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), 
which reviews all proposed research involving human subjects to ensure that they are 
treated ethically and that their rights and welfare are adequately protected. The approval 
procedure involved providing the IRB the background, purpose, and design of the 
research, description of the tests, instruments, and measures, description of the 
recruitment process, and stipulating the number of participants, among other 
requirements. 
The use of departmental subject pools has emerged as one strategy for 
minimizing volunteer bias (Chastain and Landrum 1999). Volunteer bias may arise 
because subjects may be motivated to participate in an experiment by a desire to 
contribute to the advancement of science (Orne 1962). If that is the case, then participants 
may act as “good subjects” who will do what is necessary to help the experimenter 
accomplish the research’s scientific goals. Such a desire will lead participants not only to 
be receptive to the presence of task-orienting cues but also motivated to use these cues to 
map out their subsequent behaviors in ways that will presumably advance scientific 
knowledge. Volunteer bias also may arise because subjects may be motivated to 
participate in an experiment to “look good” rather than to promote scientific knowledge 
(Rosenberg 1969). When participants enter an experimental situation, they know that 
their behavior will be under scrutiny. This awareness arouses anxiety in participants who 
then look for cues on how to elicit a favorable evaluation. In situations in which these 
two desires conflict, the desire to look good seems to prevail (Rosnow et al. 1973). 
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Participation incentives had four objectives. The first objective was to gather a 
large pool of subjects which I could sample from, so that I could build the 32 
experimental groups as designed. The second objective was to ensure that selected 
subjects would show up to participate at the experiment at their allocated place and time. 
The third objective was to ensure that participating subjects would attempt to make 
rational and informed consumption decisions, rather than just purchase deals randomly. 
Finally, the fourth objective was to ensure that participating subjects would engage and 
keep focused on the task at hand. 
In order to achieve those four objectives, I offered extra course credit for all 
students who volunteered to participate. Participating students also qualified for financial 
compensation, as well as to have their names entered into a random drawing for one 
“mint in box” IPad 2. Finally, participating subjects who attempted to purchase one of the 
products that I actually displayed during the experiment had their names entered into a 
random drawing for that product. However, I only let participating subjects know which 
product I would randomly draw after all 32 experimental groups performed the 
experiment. This procedure avoids bias toward purchase because subjects’ virtual 
allowance was limited, as explained in the previous section. Moreover, statistical tests 
(see Experimental Validity below) suggest the absence of bias toward purchase in our 
experiment. 
Those subjects who volunteered to participate but whom I dropped from the final 
sample automatically received the extra credits. However, those subjects whom I selected 
to participate only received the extra credits and qualified for the additional benefits if (1) 
they indeed showed up at their allocated place and time and (2) engaged and stayed 
focused on the task at hand by clicking either button (“I want one”/“I don’t want one”) 
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during each of the 40 offered deals. Table 3 depicts the participation incentives structure 
and the goals I attempted to achieve by offering each of them. 
Extra course credit (1),(2) Financial 
compensation(2) Mint in box IPad 2
(2)
 
Product actually offered in 
one of the deals(3) 
Gain access to a large 
pool of subjects 
Ensure subjects would 
show up 
Ensure subjects would 
show up 
Ensure participating subjects 
would attempt to make 
informed and rational decisions 
(1) All subjects who volunteered to join the experiment but were not selected to participate received extra course 
credits. 
(2) Participating subjects only qualified for these benefits if they clicked either button (“I want one” / “I don’t want 
one”) during each of the forty offered deals. 
(3) Participating subjects only qualified for this benefit if they actually attempted to purchase the offered product. 
Table 3: Goals of the participation incentives 
 
I recruited all subjects via verbal announcements in front of their classes. In 
addition, I posted electronic messages that explained the experiment in the courses’ 
educational platform (Blackboard). This recruitment approach is consistent with a large 
body of research in operations and marketing research (e.g. Wu and Katok 2006, Carter 
and Stevens 2007, Gattiker et al. 2007, Mantel et al. 2007). A total of 849 undergraduate 
students volunteered to join the experiment. The sample consisted of 447 males (52.65%) 
and 402 females (47.35%). The mean age of the sample was 22.23 years (standard error = 
5.33).  
The experiment proceeded in two steps. In the first step of the experiment, 
subjects filled out a confidential form to provide individual information.  In the form, 
subjects named a maximum of twenty fellow students who might be enrolled in their 
same SCM courses with whom they had had contact during their academic life, in any 
capacity, in the recent past. Specifically, I asked subjects: 
Looking back over the past six months, who are the students that may be 
enrolled in any session of this course with whom you shared any experience at 
Arizona State University, such as working together in academic projects or 
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laboratory assignments, being members of the same fraternity or student 
association, being roommates, etc? 
Subjects also provided their own nickname and an alternative name by which 
their fellow students might recognize them. This allowed me to correctly match subjects 
when someone did not know other one’s real name.  
I assigned each subject a number from 1 to 849. Then, based on the information 
that the subjects provided, I built a local (also known as ego-centered) social network 
consisting of all 849 subjects. A local social network consists of a focal respondent (ego), 
a set of alters who have links to the ego, and measurements of the links from ego to alters 
and on the links between alters (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Chen and Chen (2008) 
showed that this procedure is feasible and much more effective than randomized 
sampling for reconstruction of social networks when complete information is not 
available (Kossinets 2006; Marsden 1990; McCallister and Fischer 1978). 
Next, I computed all 849 subjects’ individual scores for opinion leadership, 
network integration, cohesive group membership, network constraint, and network 
centrality in the social network. I used the mean of each of the five scores across all 849 
subjects as a reference to classify participant subjects as either “high” or “low” in the 
respective score as I built the 32 experimental groups. 
To build the 32 experimental groups, I partitioned 480 subjects into 32 smaller 
networks of 15 subjects each in an interactive manner. These 480 subjects were the 
individuals whom I eventually invited to participate in the experiment. Building the 32 
experimental groups was a cumbersome procedure. It required adding/removing subjects 
to/from groups in an interactive way. I started with the 849 subjects and segregated them 
based on patterns I found in the network (by observing the network diagram) and on their 
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individual scores. As I made changes to groups, the individual scores changed, of course. 
This recursive procedure lasted until I eventually was able to form 32 distinct groups of 
15 subjects. So, in the end, I dropped 369 subjects from the sample.  
There are no systematic differences between the 480 subjects I selected to 
participate in the experiment and those 369 subjects whom I dropped from the final 
sample. First, there are no significant demographic differences between both groups (at 
the .05 level). Table 4 depicts the statistical analysis results. Based on the Pearson chi-
squared test (χ2) for a 2X2 two-way contingency table for large sample sizes (greater than 
10) and categorical variables, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the probability of a 
being a male (or female) in the group of 480 participants is equal to the probability of 
being a male (or female) in the group of 369 dropped subjects (at the 0.05 level). Also, 
based on the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (also known as Mann-Whitney U tests), we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that both samples have equal distributions for age (at the 0.05 level). 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are non-parametric tests that make no assumption in regard to 
the distribution of the population, in contrast to the paired Student’s t-test, which assumes 
normality (Gehan 1965; Wilcoxon 1945). Under the null hypothesis, the distributions 
across both groups are equal.  
Demographics 480 selected participants 369 dropped subjects Statistical test 
Gender Males (256 = 53.33%) Females (224 = 46.66%) 
Males (191 = 51.76%) 
Females (178 = 48.23%) Pearson χ
2
 test: p-value = .21 
Age Mean: 21.59 Standard deviation: 4.98 
Mean: 23.06 
Standard deviation: 5.61 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equal 
distributions: p-value = .08 
Table 4: Demographics comparisons between samples of subjects 
 
Second, there are no significant relational or structural differences between both 
groups in the original network consisting of 849 subjects (at the .1 level). Table 5 depicts 
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the results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for equal distributions. The tests suggest that there 
are no statistical differences among the distributions of opinion leadership, network 
integration, network constraint, and network centrality (at the 0.1 level) across both 
groups of participating and dropped subjects in the original network consisting of 849 
subjects. Moreover, a Pearson chi-squared test for a 2X2 two-way contingency table for 
large sample sizes and categorical variables shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the probability of a being a member of a cohesive group among the 480 participating 
subjects is equal to the probability of being a member of a cohesive group among the 369 
dropped subjects (at the 0.1 level). 
Relational 
or structural 
property 
480 participating 
participants 369 dropped subjects Statistical test 
Opinion 
leadership 
Mean: .19 
Standard deviation: .14 
Mean: .18 
Standard deviation: .13 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
equal distributions: p-value = .23  
Network 
integration 
Mean: .18 
Standard deviation: .13 
Mean: .17 
Standard deviation: .13 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
equal distributions: p-value = .21 
Network 
constraint 
Mean: .28 
Standard deviation: .14 
Mean: .30 
Standard deviation: .16 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
equal distributions: p-value = .16 
Network 
centrality 
Mean: .23 
Standard deviation: .12 
Mean: .21 
Standard deviation: .13 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
equal distributions: p-value = .20 
Cohesive 
group 
membership 
Members (53 = 11.04%)  
Non-members (427 = 88.96%)  
 
Members (29 = 7.86%)  
Non-members (340= 92.14%)  
 
Pearson χ2 test: p-value = .12 
Structural 
equivalence 
Mean: 3.89 
Standard deviation: 1.97 
Mean: 3.65 
Standard deviation: 1.76 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 
equal distributions: p-value = .10 
Table 5: Comparison of relational and structural properties between samples of subjects 
 
In addition, there are no significant differences among subjects in both groups in 
regards to the patterns of the links that the subjects have formed with others in the 
original network consisting of 849 subjects. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the 
distribution of the measures of structural equivalence among participating subjects and all 
other subjects is no different from the distribution of measures of structural equivalence 
among dropped subjects and all other subjects (at the 0.1 level). As I explain in more 
detail in the measures operationalization section, structural equivalence is a mathematical 
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property of subsets of subjects in a network (Lorrain and White 1971), in the sense that 
two subjects are structurally equivalent if they have identical links to and from all other 
subjects in the network. To the extent that exact structural equivalence is very difficult to 
obtain, subjects will be more similar (in the sense that their patterns of connections in the 
network are akin) as their structural equivalence measure becomes smaller. 
I required that each experimental group had a set of subjects consisting of three 
individuals whose relational and structural characteristics matched the requirements of a 
distinct configuration among those 32 depicted in Table 1. This was a parsimonious 
approach to ensure that, for each configuration in Table 1, there was a unique network 
with three subjects (later assigned as “early buyers”, as described below) displaying 
altogether high/low scores of opinion leadership, network integration, cohesive group 
membership, network constraint, and network centrality. For instance, I deemed an 
experimental group to have low opinion leadership among early buyers when the 
corresponding aggregate score for opinion leadership among three subjects in that group 
was below the mean opinion leadership score initially computed among the 849 subjects 
in the complete social network of subjects.  
Selecting three subjects to act as early buyers in each experimental group allows 
the aggregate scores of opinion leadership, network integration, network constraint, 
cohesive group membership, and network centrality to adequately reflect the respective 
characteristics of a group of influential consumers in this research setting. This is because 
smaller numbers of subjects acting as early buyers would cause aggregate scores to 
reflect the characteristics of a single individual or a couple of individuals at most – hence 
not a group’s. Conversely, larger numbers of subjects (four and above) acting as early 
buyers would cause aggregate scores to reflect the characteristics of the larger group of 
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buyers of a deal, rather than the characteristics of a select group of potential influential 
ones only (i.e. the “innovators”). Moreover, inventory availability was limited, so 
increasing the number of early buyers would restrict considerably the number of potential 
“imitators”, whose behavior we are interested in.  
Experimental protocol 
In the second step of the experiment, I invited subjects to use the web-based 
application. I contacted by email each of the 480 selected subjects to require confirmation 
of presence at a specific date/time at a computer laboratory at W.P. Carey School of 
Business. Each email ratified the subject’s importance to the experiment and the benefits 
of showing up – i.e. I reminded the subjects of the participation incentives. I sent four 
follow-up emails, including one email on the eve and another email at the beginning of 
the day of the experiment. Both this procedure and the participation incentives were 
effective in securing the presence – and consequently participation – of all 15 subjects 
allocated to each experimental group on her corresponding experimental trial.  
Upon arrival to the computer laboratory, I briefed participating subjects on how 
the experiment would run. I also explained how to use the web-based application. To 
reduce interviewer bias, I read instructions from a script and avoided interacting with 
participants during the experiment. In addition, to reduce interactive testing effects, all 
participating subjects used identical hardware and software.   
Prior to the beginning of each experimental session, I picked as “confederates” 
those three subjects who matched the expected relational/structural characteristics for 
early buyers in their respective experimental group. That is, I “planted” those subjects as 
“early buyers” and instructed them to buy the products in the deals as soon as the 
experimental application made the deals available. In doing so, I attempted to enforce 
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that the set of early buyers of each deal exhibited the expected relational/structural 
characteristics matching the corresponding configuration among those listed in Table 1. 
To reduce testing effects, I performed this procedure unbeknownst to the other subjects 
(i.e. the “non-confederates”). 
When non-confederate subjects gained access to the online application, they also 
received a virtual allowance of $1500 to make their purchases. This limited subjects’ 
ability to purchase many deals, so it reinforced the priming effect of social interactions 
and the marketing mix. This is because limiting subjects’ ability to purchase many deals 
provided them an incentive to make rational choices based on utility, information, and 
scarcity effects, so that they only would attempt to purchase those deals whose products 
they actually wanted to possess. Recall that subjects were unaware of which product 
being offered would be actually given away at the end of the experiment. However, 
subjects were aware that only those who attempted to purchase that product would have 
their names entered into the drawing. 
For each experimental group, I offered the same 40 deals sampled from 
Woot.com!, as described above. Thus, the task was identical for all the groups. Each deal 
lasted for 3 minutes, so overall each experimental session lasted for two hours. I allowed 
participants to search for product information in external sources, such as Amazon.com 
and Walmart.com. In fact, this procedure mimics what happens in real life when 
consumers buy at Woot.com! 
Experimental validity 
One of the primary advantages of experiments is the degree of control we may 
obtain in identifying the causal relationships between dependent variables and the 
covariates (i.e. treatments) (Babbie 2007). However, researchers have largely recognized 
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the important trade-offs that exist between experimental control and outside realism 
(Altman 2006; Cook and Campbell 1976, 1979). In this section, I focus on these trade-
offs by examining the types of validity that may be used to interpret experimental results 
– internal, external, and construct validity – and issues related to realism. 
Internal validity refers to the structure of the experiment itself and the extent to 
which we may infer causal relationships from the results. A cause-and-effect relationship 
can only be asserted if there is true covariation between the variables under investigation, 
the procedures used to gather the data demonstrate that the cause preceded the effect, and 
that alternative explanations have been ruled out. Internal validity asks the question “to 
what extent are the covariates (i.e. treatments) the sole source of the distribution of the 
dependent variables?” The key in assessing internal validity is to examine the experiment 
to identify aspects of the decision environment, beyond the covariates, that could 
influence the experimental results. A good experiment makes use of the ability to observe 
behavior and decision making in a controlled environment, controlling the variation 
between treatments to ensure that participants receive the same stimuli and experience the 
same conditions. As a result, the differences in observed behavior and the outcomes of 
such behavior can be attributed to the differences participants encounter in the treatments 
(Babbie 2007; Cook and Campbell 1976). 
The internal validity of an experiment is often questioned when there is noise in 
the experimental protocol or there are uncontrolled stimuli affecting participants’ 
decisions in the experiment, which does not seem to be the case in the current study. In 
order to obtain internal validity, this research took advantage of an experiment’s ability to 
eliminate confounding factors that affect behavior, as already described in the 
experimental protocol section above, thereby limiting differences between experimental 
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groups and deals to a selected number of treatments. In this way, I could neatly identify 
the effect of the treatments on subjects’ decision making in the absence of confounds by 
other mitigating factors. 
In addition, a critical tool for achieving internal validity is random assignment. 
That is, if individuals are randomly assigned, as it is the case in this dissertation, then ex 
ante heterogeneity among the population of participants is controlled for insofar as there 
are no other factors that may directly differ between the experimental groups. Thus, given 
a properly designed experiment in which only the covariates differ across experimental 
groups, random assignment solves the problem of internal validity. 
External validity addresses the extent to which the causal relationship identified 
in the experimental setting can be generalized to other populations, measures, times, 
places, and contexts. More subtly, external validity refers to the particular causal 
relationship gleaned from an experiment and the extent to which this relationship is 
robust in other environments (Babbie 2007; Cook and Campbell 1976). 
Questions of external validity often revolve around the participant pool used in 
the experiment. Indeed, a longstanding criticism of the social interactions experiments 
conducted in sociology, psychology, and more recently in the social sciences, is that the 
groups whose interactions are observed are formed artificially for the sake of the 
experiment. This raises obvious questions about the generalizability of the research 
(Flynn et al. 1990; Meredith 1998). It is often suggested that experimental research would 
be much more generalizable if the experiments were performed on randomly selected 
subjects (Knemeyer and Naylor 2012). This can be difficult to achieve because studies of 
social interactions require characteristics of the individuals and the reference group which 
they are embedded in, not only the individual that comprises the group. 
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However, it is worth asking here how important external validity is to behavioral 
operations management. In some sense, research in behavioral operations management 
has been founded on the desire to develop a richer theory of decision making, building on 
classical models but incorporating insights from research in psychology and sociology 
(Loch and Wu 2007; Su 2008). Thus, many of the experiments in operations management 
were devised to test existing theory and models rather than to make generalizations that 
might inform, for instance, inventory policy (Bendoly et al. 2010; Bendoly et al. 2006). 
Indeed, as explained by Knemeyer and Naylor (2012), “using undergraduate students as 
subjects [in behavioral operations management experiments] may be appropriate if 
researchers are interested in fundamental human processes”. This argument is supported 
by Bendoly et al. (2006), who argue that well-designed experiments do not test how 
students act in certain contrived situations. They explain: 
“[Experiments] test whether representative humans react in a predictable manner to 
controlled stimuli. Properly designed experiments are used to test and develop general theories. It 
is these theories, not the ‘specific’ experimental scenarios themselves, which are intended for 
application. If the theory is accurate, then it should hold in the laboratory. If it does hold, then the 
theory gains support and evidence.” (p. 739) 
Construct validity challenges neither the internal consistency of an experiment 
nor the causal relationship between the variables inferred from the experiment’s results. 
Rather, construct validity explores how these variables are measured in an individual’s 
decision making and looks at the underlying relationship between these variables. That is, 
it concerns how well the measures employed fit the theories for which a test is designed. 
Measures and manipulations must be faithful (or valid) representations of constructs in 
order for us to make valid inferences. A natural way to think of construct validity is in 
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terms of how the variables are factored into an individual’s decision calculus (Babbie 
2007; Cook and Campbell 1976). 
One concern in this research is that the experimental procedure could not ensure 
that the picked confederates would be the only early buyers of each deal, since anyone 
was allowed to buy a deal as soon as it began. In order to assess if this issue posed a 
threat to this research’s construct validity, I performed a statistical analysis and found no 
significant differences in terms of relational/structural properties between the actual 
group of early buyers and the group of “confederates” (at the .05 level). Table 6 depicts 
the results of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for equal distributions. The tests suggest that there 
are no statistical differences among the distributions of opinion leadership (p-value = 
.19), network integration (p-value = .11), cohesive group membership (p-value = .09), 
network constraint (p-value = .14), and network centrality (p-value = .13) across both 
groups of actual early buyers and confederates. 
Measure Confederates Actual early buyers Statistical test 
Opinion 
leadership 
Mean: .23 
Standard deviation: .09 
Mean: .21 
Standard deviation: .14 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equal 
distributions: p-value = .19  
Network 
integration 
Mean: .24 
Standard deviation: .10 
Mean: .20 
Standard deviation: .13 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equal 
distributions: p-value = .11 
Cohesive 
group 
membership 
Mean: .39 
Standard deviation: .24 
Mean: .43 
Standard deviation: .35 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equal 
distributions: p-value = .09 
Network 
constraint 
Mean: .26 
Standard deviation: .11 
Mean: .23 
Standard deviation: .18 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equal 
distributions: p-value = .14 
Network 
centrality 
Mean: .25 
Standard deviation: .11 
Mean: .22 
Standard deviation: .17 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for equal 
distributions: p-value = .13 
Table 6: Comparison between the groups of confederates and actual early buyers 
 
Another concern in this research is whether the experimental treatments are 
effective, in the sense that the measures reflecting the three deal-specific attributes (i.e. 
popularity, quality, and price) accurately represent subjects’ perceptions. In this regard, 
treatment checks are essential in order to demonstrate the validity of the experiment 
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carried out (Perdue and Summers 1986). Without checks to validate such treatments, the 
conclusions drawn with respect to the impact of the treatment classes acting upon key 
dependent variables may become suspect (Bacharach and Bendoly 2011). As a result, the 
credibility of this experiment hinges on such validation, particularly because we intend to 
extrapolate our results toward practical application and subsequent theory development.  
To address this concern, I surveyed a sample of non-confederates after the end of 
the experiment. 172 respondents indicated their perceptions regarding the levels 
(low/high) of the three deal-specific attributes (i.e. popularity, quality, and price) of each 
of the 40 offered deals. Then, I performed manipulation and confounding checks to 
assess the ability of the treatments to characterize different levels of the three attributes. 
Manipulation checks focus on the convergent validity of the treatments. They test 
whether the participating subjects accurately perceive the appropriate levels of the deal-
specific attribute being manipulated (Perdue and Summers 1986; Wetzel 1977).  
Table 7 displays the results of a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
comparing subjects’ perceptions to the actual levels of the attributes. The diagonal 
elements of the table (in bold) provide evidence of convergent validity. All three χ2 
results are significantly different from zero (at the 0.01 level), meaning that subjects’ 
perceptions regarding popularity, quality, and price are accurate. 
I also performed confounding checks to ensure that individual treatments do not 
confound other theoretically independent issues of interest. Confounding checks focus on 
discriminant validity. They test whether the treatment levels inadvertently impact 
participating subjects’ perceptions of other supposedly independently controlled issues 
(Wetzel 1977). As explained by Perdue and Summers (1986) , 
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“What if, however, the manipulation themselves are confounded (i.e. manipulations that 
are meant to represent a particular variable can be interpreted plausibly in terms of more than one 
construct, each at the same level of reduction)? In such a situation, confidence in the investigator’s 
causal explanation (expressed in theoretical terms) of the experimental results is greatly reduced 
because the construct validity of the manipulation as operationalization of the variables would be 
questionable.” (p. 317) 
In situations in which the main effects of manipulated factors have statistically 
significant effects on other manipulated factors, discriminant validity turns out to be 
unsure (Perdue and Summers 1986). The off-diagonal elements on Table 7 table provide 
evidence of discriminant validity. All six χ2 results are not significantly different from 
zero (at the 0.1 level), meaning that subjects’ perceptions regarding each deal-specific 
attribute (i.e. popularity, quality, and price) are not affected by each other. 
The results of the MANOVA (Table 8) relating treatments that subjects faced in 
their corresponding experimental groups (i.e. opinion leadership, network integration, 
group membership, network constraint, and network centrality of early buyers) to their 
perceptions regarding deal-specific attributes (i.e. popularity, quality, and price) provide 
further evidence of discriminant validity. All fifteen χ2 results are not significantly 
different from zero (at the 0.01 level), meaning that subjects’ perceptions regarding 
popularity, quality, and price are not affected by the treatments the subjects were exposed 
to. 
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Actual 
measure 
Perceived popularity Perceived quality Perceived price 
Low High 
χ2 
Low High 
χ2 
Low High 
χ2 
Popularity 
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ 
0.44 0.50 0.57 0.50 <0.01 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.13 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.47 
Quality 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.69 0.06 0.24 0.94 0.24 <0.01 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.76 
Price 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.28 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.36 0.48 0.62 0.49 <0.01 
Table 7: Convergent and discriminant validity of manipulation and confounding checks (moderating 
variables) 
 
 
Actual 
measure 
Perceived popularity Perceived quality Perceived price 
Low High 
χ2 
Low High 
χ2 
Low High 
χ2 
Opinion 
Leadership 
µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ 
0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.82 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.97 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.68 
Network 
Integration 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.96 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.32 
Group 
Membership 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.91 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.31 
Network 
Constraint 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.84 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.91 
Network 
Centrality 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.19 
Table 8: Discriminant validity of confounding checks (independent variables) 
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Finally, an important issue that we must consider in performing experiments is 
what would be casually referred to as realism (Altman 2006). Due to the conditions of an 
experiment and the desire to control for outside influences on behavior, experiments 
often lack mundane realism in that the circumstances individuals are encountering are 
unlike to arise in the real world (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968). From this research’s 
perspective, mundane realism may not be the most important aspect of the 
experimentation procedure, since I grounded the experiment on Woot.com! Rather, in the 
interest of bringing psychological insights into the realm of behavioral operations 
management, this research is more concerned with experimental realism and 
psychological realism.   
Experimental realism is defined as the extent to which the situations constructed 
in the experiment actively engage participants. In turn, psychological realism refers to the 
extent to which the psychological processes occurring in an experiment are comparable 
with the psychological processes occurring in ordinary decision making (Aronson and 
Carlsmith 1968). 
With respect to experimental realism, the main criticism of experiments centers 
on the fact that individuals’ behaviors and decision making are not motivated by adequate 
incentives or deception was employed. The results obtained from experiments with 
insufficient incentives may be suspect, as individuals may not be able to “put their money 
where their mouth is” and their decisions had no consequences. That is, the behavior 
observed in such experiments may be only “cheap talk” and an inadequate reflection of 
what individuals would do if real incentives or costs were involved. Similarly, if 
participants believe that they may be deceived in an experiment, they have no reason to 
try to make an optimal choice. Given that participants may be wary of the decision 
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environment in the experiment, deception may imply that they do not even know how to 
make an optimal choice in that environment (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968). So, since we 
are interested in studying decision making in this research, the experiment employed here 
gave participants accurate (although maybe not all) information necessary for them to 
engage in good decision making, and allowed participants to freely look for additional 
information as they found fit. 
With respect to psychological realism, the fact that the actual benefits in an 
experiment are delivered by the experimenter may alter the way individuals think in the 
experiment. Thus, experiments may lack psychological realism in that the type of 
decision making that participants display in the experiment may be very different from 
that employed in real-world situations. Moreover, there may be strong interactions 
between incentives and personal or social motivations. So, I use caution when 
interpreting the experimental results as directly testing the psychological processes 
utilized in decision making taking place beyond the laboratory. 
Based on my literature review, I deem that the incentives and the experimental 
protocol used in this research are adequate. However, in order to further strengthen this 
judgment, I performed a parsimonious investigation to assess whether there might have 
been bias in the selected participants’ behavior. To that end, I inspected the data to 
investigate whether any non-confederate participant might have been clicking randomly 
without making rational decisions. Recall that I required all participants to click either 
button (“I want” or “I don’t want one”) during each deal. This allowed me to capture the 
time it took for each participant to make a choice regarding each deal (i.e. to make a 
purchase or to balk). For each of the 1280 deals, I computed the average time it took for 
the non-confederate participants to make a choice. Then, I found which participant 
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subject’s choice times (i.e. the time to click during a deal) were consistently beyond one 
standard deviation from the group’s mean choice time. My investigation revealed that 
three subjects consistently made choices (either to make a purchase or to balk) later than 
one standard deviation from the group’s mean choice time. However, it appears that those 
subjects were not following a random choice pattern. This is because all of them made 
purchases later than the group’s mean time in some cases only, which suggests that they 
were spending time gathering enough information to make rational decisions. Moreover, 
none was consistently deciding to make a purchase or to balk towards the end of the 
deals, which suggests that they were not waiting to click just for the sake of qualifying to 
the participation benefits. 
My investigation also revealed that five subjects consistently made choices 
(either to make a purchase or to balk) earlier than one standard deviation from the 
group’s mean choice time. However, it appears that none was following a random choice 
pattern either. This is because all of them made purchases earlier than one standard 
deviation of the group’s mean choice time in few cases only. Moreover, none was 
consistently deciding to make a purchase or to balk early in the deals. In fact, while some 
of them chose “to balk” only a few times earlier than all confederates had made their 
purchases, all of those five subjects always chose to “make a purchase” later than all 
confederates had made their purchases. This suggests that the individuals were indeed 
spending some time gathering enough information to make rational decisions. 
In sum, based on the aforementioned arguments, I am confident that the way I 
sampled subjects and conducted the experiment will not pose a threat to the validity of 
this research. First, the use of undergraduate students is adequate in the current research’s 
context. Second, I conducted extensive checks and found no evidence of significant 
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threats to this research’s internal and construct validity. Finally, I found no evidence of 
biased behavior among participating subjects. 
Measures 
Whenever possible, I grounded measures in existing literature in the disciplines 
of marketing, sociology, economics, and operations management. Table 9 provides a 
summary of the measures used in this research, their nominal description, and source of 
reference. 
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Measure Nominal description Source 
Endogenous variables   
Service level The probability that a demand is met directly 
from inventory. 
Nahmias 
(2004), Porteus 
(2002), Silver et 
al. (1998)  
Consumption rate (ti*) The time into the deal at which the consumption 
rate is faster. It is the tipping point of the 
cumulative curve of consumption, computed 
from the Bass model. 
Bass (1969) 
Independent variables   
Opinion leadership of 
early buyers (OLi) 
The average number of received nominations by 
early buyers.  
Freeman (1979) 
Network integration of 
early buyers 
(integrationi) 
The average of the extent to which early buyers 
link to other consumers in their network through 
received nominations only. 
Valente and 
Foreman (1998) 
Cohesive group 
membership of early 
buyers (cohesioni) 
The relative number of early buyers who are 
members of a 2-clan. 
Adapted from 
Wasserman and 
Faust (1994) 
Network constraint of 
early buyers 
(constrainti) 
The average of the extent to which early buyers 
link to consumers in their network who, in turn, 
are already linked to each other.  
Burt (1992), p. 
55, eq. 2.4 
Network centrality of 
early buyers (centralityi) 
The average distance from early buyers to all 
other consumers in the social network. 
Freeman (1979) 
Moderating variables   
Product popularity 
(popularityi) 
The product’s position at Amazon.com’s sales 
ranking. 
Li and Hitt 
(2008), 
Rabinovich and 
Bailey (2004), 
Rabinovich et 
al. (2003), 
Rabinovich et 
al. (2008a) 
Product quality 
(qualityi) 
The product is remanufactured (low quality) or 
“mint in box” (high quality). 
 
Product price (pricei) The relative magnitude of the markdown offered 
with respect to the manufacturer’s suggested 
retail price. 
Rabinovich 
(2007), 
Rabinovich et 
al. (2003), 
Rabinovich et 
al. (2008a) 
Control variables   
Discussion forum tone 
(tonei) 
The average sentiment across all posts in the 
discussion forum. 
Shin et al. 
(2008, 2010) 
Structural equivalence 
(SEi) 
The extent to which all buyers of a deal have 
identical links to and from all other consumers 
in the social network. 
Burt (1987) 
Initial inventory 
provision (Qi) 
The amount of inventory available at the 
beginning of a deal. 
 
Table 9: Measures 
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Endogenous variables  
Researchers typically measure consumption rate by first estimating a specific 
consumption model, and then using one or more of the parameter estimates as an 
indication of consumption rate.  
Related research has consistently stipulated that the cumulative pattern of deal i’s 
consumption follows a growth pattern approximated by a simple one-parameter logistic 
function, such as:  
01,2 	 31,4  11  -56,72 (1.1) 
where yi,t is the proportion of consumers who bought deal i at time t, βi,0 is the 
intercept, and βi,1 is the consumption rate parameter to be estimated. We can use this 
simple model to compare consumption rates for various deals. However, the model is 
extremely limited in its applicability.  
Bass (1969) and many others (for a review please refer to Mahajan et al. 1990) 
considerably improved the logistic model in equation (1) by creating a two parameter 
model: 
01,2 	  31,4  !31,, $ 31,4#91,2-, $ 31,, 91,2-,:  (1.2) 
where yi,t is the proportion of consumers who bought deal i at time t 
(t=0,1,…,179), Yi,t-1 is the cumulative (total) number of consumers of that deal at the end 
of time t-1, m is the total number of consumers who eventually bought that deal, βi,0 is the 
coefficient of external influence (the innovation rate), and βi,1 is the coefficient of social 
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influence (the imitation rate)4. In this model, the parameters βi,0 and βi,1 provide us 
information about the consumption rate in deal i. A high value for βi,0 indicates that the 
consumption has a quick start but also tappers off quickly. A high value of βi,1 indicates 
that the consumption is slow at first but accelerates after a while. Once one estimates βi,0 
and βi,1, it is possible to calculate the time ti* at which the consumption rate is faster, i.e. 
when the peak number of buyers per time occurs (Mahajan et al. 1990): 
;1< 	 $ ln >
31,,31,4?31,4  31,, 
(1.3) 
This research uses the measure ti* to assess a deal i’s consumption rate. The 
interpretability of results is straightforward, since an increase in 1 unit in ti* means that 
the tipping point increases by 1 unit of time (that is, the consumption rate decreases).  
Ultimately, we are concerned with the deal i’s service level. As I explain below 
in the statistical analysis section, to assess a deal i’s service level, this research uses the 
time the last unit is sold during the deal, ts,i, in the estimation of a hazard model. This 
measure is right censored, since a deal may end with leftover inventory. In case deal i 
ends with leftover inventory, we consider ts,i to be the duration of that deal. As I explain 
in detail in the statistical analysis section, the estimation procedure takes care of this 
issue.  
Independent variables  
This study has five independent variables. They refer to relational and structural 
properties of early buyers of each deal, and represent mechanisms through which social 
interactions may influence consumer choice. The five independent variables are: opinion 
                                                     
4
 There are 180 intervals of time t during a deal, each corresponding to 1 second. 
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leadership, network integration, cohesive group membership, network constraint, and 
network centrality of a deal’s early buyers. I grounded all measures in extant social 
network analysis literature.  
One of the primary uses of social network analysis is the identification of the 
most influential (i.e. prominent) consumers in a reference group (e.g. a social shopping 
community). All measures used here attempt to describe and measure properties of 
“consumer location” in the social network. Consumers who are the most influential (or 
prominent) are usually located in strategic locations within the network (Bonacich 1987; 
Freeman 1979).  
I begin by assuming that one subject has measurements on a single, dichotomous 
relation with another subject. I consider a subject to be influential (or prominent) if 
his/her links make him/her particularly visible to the other subjects in the social network. 
Knoke and Burt (1983) were the first to equate influence to prominence. Marsden and 
Friedkin (1993) noted that we should measure influence by looking not only at direct or 
adjacent links, but also at indirect paths involving intermediaries. That is, to determine 
which subjects are influential in a social network, one needs to examine not only all 
recommendations made by a consumer (outward links) and all nominations received 
(inward links), but indirect links as well. 
For each deal i (i=1,2, …, 1280), I find who its actual early buyers are according 
to the following procedure proposed by Bass (1969). First, I estimate the coefficients of 
innovation, βi,0. Next, I obtain the total number of buyers of each deal, mi, by counting the 
number of units sold in each deal5. I multiply βi,0 by mi, and round the results to the 
nearest integer to estimate the total number of early buyers of each deal, bi. Finally, I take 
                                                     
5
 Each buyer is allowed to purchase only one unit of inventory. 
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the first bi subjects who bought deal i as its early buyers. Based on this procedure, only 
54 out of the 1280 deals (i.e. 4.22% of the observational units) had more actual early 
buyers than the planted confederates. Among those 54 deals, 47 had 4 early buyers (i.e. 
the confederates plus an additional buyer) and 7 had 5 early buyers (i.e. the confederates 
plus two additional buyers). As explained in the experimental validity section, this will 
not pose a threat to this research’s construct validity. 
Then, for each early buyer, I operationalize his/her individual-level measures of 
opinion leadership, network integration, cohesive group membership, network constraint, 
and network centrality. All five individual-level measures are deal invariant. They refer 
to relational and structural properties of each subject in his/her corresponding social 
network. 
Finally, for each deal i, I take the average of each individual-level measure of its 
bi early buyers to obtain group-level measures that are deal-dependent. For instance, to 
obtain a measure of deal i’s early buyers’ opinion leadership, I compute individual-level 
opinion leadership measures for all deal i’s early buyers and then take the average of 
these measures.  
The first independent variable in this study is the measure of opinion leadership 
of deal i’s early buyers, OLi. The individual early buyer n’s measure of opinion 
leadership, Pn, also known as “degree centrality” in social network analysis parlance, 
posits that an influential subject must be prominent in the sense that he/she receives 
relatively many nominations from other consumers in the network. This is very easy to 
see in Figure 6. In this small social network, 6 subjects nominated subject 444. In turn, no 
subject nominated subject 684. Subject 444 is clearly very prominent, and one could view 
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this high level of prominence as a large potential to influence. This very prominent 
subject should thus have a large individual opinion leadership index, P444.  
 
Figure 6: Exemplary small network of 15 participants 
 
In order to increase the interpretability of the measure, I standardize it based on 
the size of the network, g. That is, I divide the measure by g-1. Such standardization 
gives us the proportion of subjects in the network who nominated early buyer n, which is 
called a “relative indegree”. The larger this index is, the more influential the early buyer 
is. Maximum individual opinion leadership occurs when Pn=1, that is, when all subjects 
in the network nominate early buyer n. Conversely, minimum opinion leadership occurs 
when Pn=0, that is, when early buyer n has zero nominations (Freeman 1979). In our 
example using Figure 6, P444=6/14= .429 and P684=0/14=0. 
The measure of opinion leadership of early buyers of deal i, OLi, is the average of 
the individual opinion leadership measures Pn of all early buyers of that deal. The index, 
which will always be between 0 and 1, is: 
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OLi	 ∑ ABC6BD7E6 , (2) 
where bi is the number of early buyers of that deal.  
The second independent variable in this study is the measure of integration of 
deal i’s early buyers, integrationi. The individual early buyer n’s measure of integration, 
dn, refers to the extent to which the early buyer links to many and diverse others in the 
network through incoming links only. An integrated early buyer can be reached by many 
others rapidly. 
We can measure integration by using a distance measure such as the directional 
geodesic. The directional geodesic indicates the length of the shortest path linking two 
subjects through unidirectional links in their social network. Here, we use the directional 
geodesic and reverse it. For instance, subject 785 is two steps apart from subject 684 in 
Figure 6. The maximum directional geodesic length of this social network, i.e. its 
directional diameter, is seven. To compute the reverse directional geodesic between both 
subjects, we add one to the value of the directional diameter before subtracting the 
directional geodesic (so that zero can represent the measure of subjects who received zero 
nominations). This procedure yields a measure of six.  
To further increase interpretability of results, I standardize each individual 
measure of integration based on the size of the network, g. Thus, the equation  
dn= 
∑ FGHBHIBJ-,  (3.1) 
gives us early buyer n’s individual measure of integration, where RDjn is the 
reverse distance computed from the directional geodesic between subjects j and n. 
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The measure of integration of early buyers of deal i, integrationi, is the average 
of the individual integration measures dn of all early buyers of that deal (from equation 
3.1). The index, which will always be between 0 and 1, is: 
integrationi	 ∑ KBC6BD7E6 , (3.2) 
where bi is the number of early buyers of that deal.  
The third independent variable in this study is the measure of cohesive group 
membership of deal i’s early buyers, cohesioni. The individual early buyer n’s measure of 
cohesive group membership, nclann, is a binary measure that holds the value of 1 if the 
early buyer is a member of a 2-clan, or 0 otherwise. 
By definition, all n-clans are n-cliques. An n-clique is a maximal subset of 
subjects in a social network in which the largest geodesic distance between any two 
subjects is no greater than n. An n-clan is an n-clique in which the geodesic distance, 
d(i,j), between all subjects in it is no greater than n for paths within it. We can find the n-
clans in a social network by first examining all n-cliques and then excluding those that 
include pairs of subjects whose geodesics require non-members (i.e. other subejcts that 
are not in the n-clique). For instance, in Figure 6, consumers 785, 443, 444, 684, 656, and 
754 form a 2-clan. 
Given the small size of each social network in this study (15 subjects), I set n=2 
to limit cohesive group membership to a few subjects only. Having most subjects in our 
sample belonging to an n-clan was undesirable, since this would preclude us from having 
variability in the measure of cohesive group membership among early buyers.  
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Specifically, 42 subjects across the 32 experimental groups (i.e. 8.75% of the 
sample) were deemed to belong to a 2-clan. On average, there were 1.31 subjects 
belonging to a 2-clan per experimental group. Setting n to larger values would lead to 
scenarios in which most subjects in the social network would become members of n-
clans. Specifically, 153 subjects across the 32 experimental groups (i.e. 31.88% of the 
sample) would be deemed to belong to a 3-clan, had I set n=3. In turn, 233 subjects 
across the 32 experimental groups (48.54% of the sample) would be deemed to belong to 
a 4-clan, had I set n=4. Under such scenarios, on average, there would have been 4.78 
subjects belonging to a 3-clan and 7.28 subjects belonging to a 4-clan per experimental 
group6.  
The measure of cohesive group membership of early buyers of deal i, cohesioni, 
is the average of the individual cohesive group membership measures nclann of all early 
buyers of that deal. The index, which will always be between 0 and 1, is: 
cohesioni=
∑ LMNLBC6BD7 E6 , 
(4) 
where bi is the number of early buyers of that deal. For instance, when only one 
early buyer of a deal i belongs to a 2-clan, our measure of cohesive group membership 
for that deal, cohesioni, is equal to 1/3 (assuming a set of three early buyers in the deal).  
The fourth independent variable in this study is the measure of network 
constraint of deal i’s early buyers, constrainti. The individual early buyer n’s measure of 
network constraint, SHn, refers to the extent to which the early buyer links to others who, 
in turn, are already linked to each other. The more “constrained” the subject, the fewer 
                                                     
6
 A post-hoc analysis showed that setting n=3 or n=4 would not change significantly the results of 
the statistical analysis. 
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the opportunities to broker influence flows. The idea of network constraint is an 
important one because it points out that subjects who have many links to others may 
actually limit the flow of influence, rather than facilitate it, as discussed in the theoretical 
development. 
If the early buyer’s links in the social network all have one another as links, then 
the early buyer is highly constrained. The “constraint” is characterized by a lack of 
structural holes around each of her neighbors. However, if the early buyer’s links have a 
few other links, then they are unable to “constrain” the early buyer to broker influence 
flows. In this case, we say that the early buyer “fills a structural hole” by linking two 
subgroups that would be disconnected otherwise. This is because a structural hole refers 
to the absence of links between two parts of a network (Burt 1980, 1992). For instance, 
subject 785 in Figure 6 fills a structural hole by linking groups of consumers that would 
be otherwise disconnected.  
This study uses Burt’s (1992:55) equation 2.4 to operationalize the individual 
early buyer’s measure of constraint:  
SHn=∑ OLP $ ∑ OLQOPQQRP,L :PRL  (5.1) 
where pnq=
!+BS+SB#∑ !+BH+HB#H  , (j≠n), is the proportion of a subject n’s links also linked to 
subject q (znq=1 if subject q nominates subject n, znq=0 otherwise). That is, pnq is the 
proportional strength of subject n’s relationship with subject q. In Equation (5.1), the 
contact specific constraint, OLP $ ∑ OLQOPQQRP,L  :, (j≠n), varies from 0 to 1 with the 
extent to which subject n’s relations are concentrated in a single contact (pnj) or subject 
n’s contacts concentrate their relations in one single contact (∑ OLQOPQQRP,L ). That is, the 
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contact specific constraint measures the extent to which subject n’s connections strength 
depends directly or indirectly on subject j’s connections strength.  
The measure of network constraint of early buyers of deal i, constrainti, is the 
average of the individual network constraint measures SHn of all early buyers of that deal 
(from equation 5.1). The index, which will always be between 0 and 1, is: 
constrainti	 ∑ TUBC6BD7E6 , (5.2) 
where bi is the number of early buyers of that deal.  
The fifth independent variable in this study is the measure of network centrality 
of deal i’s early buyers, centralityi. The individual early buyer n’s measure of network 
centrality, cn, refers to the extent to which the early buyer is close to the other consumers 
in the network. This type of centrality depends not only on direct links, but also on 
indirect links, especially when any two consumers are not adjacent7. We define the 
standardized individual early buyer’s measure of network centrality as: 
cn=
J-,∑ GBVWVD7  (6.1) 
where Dnk is the geodesic linking consumers n and k, and g is the size of the 
network.  
The measure of network centrality of early buyers of deal i, centralityi, is the 
average of the individual centrality measures cn of all early buyers of that deal (from 
equation 6.1). The index, which will always be between 0 and 1, is: 
                                                     
7
 While there are other measures of centrality (Bonacich 1987, Freeman 1979), closeness 
centrality is the most adequate measure for the purposes of this study. This is because closeness 
centrality directly relates to a particular consumer’s distance to other consumers, which allows us 
to relate this measure to the two-step flow of influence principle. 
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centralityi	 ∑ MBC6BD7E6 , (6.2) 
where bi is the number of early buyers of that deal.  
Moderators 
This study requires the popularity of each product. Unfortunately, Woot.com! is 
unable to provide information on how popular a product is. However, most of the 
products once sold by Woot.com! are still available at its parent company, Amazon.com. I 
used a product position at Amazon.com’s sales ranking in its respective product category 
(at the same quality offered by Woot.com!, i.e. refurbished or “mint-in-box”) as a 
measure of a deal’s product popularity (popularityi). The operationalization of this 
measure assumes that the higher in the ranking (i.e. the higher the popularity), the smaller 
the ranking number. For instance, Kindle, which is currently the most popular product in 
the electronic tablets category (Amazon.com 2012), occupies the position number 1 in its 
respective ranking. I captured the sales ranking of a deal’s product at its Amazon.com’s 
corresponding category one day prior to the beginning of the experiment for all 40 
products offered as part of a deal in the experiment. I took the natural log of sales ranking 
to correct for skewness in the measure, since its distribution has a very long tail. This 
operationalization is consistent with studies using a product’s ranking to assess its 
popularity (Li and Hitt 2008; Rabinovich and Bailey 2004; Rabinovich et al. 2003; 
Rabinovich et al. 2008a). 
The deal’s product quality (qualityi) is a categorical measure. I set it to 0 to 
represent low quality (i.e. the product is remanufactured) and 1 to represent high quality 
(i.e. the product is “mint in box”).  
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Finally, the deal’s price (pricei) is a normalized measure. It captures how large 
the mark down offered in deal i is. I operationalize the measure as:  
pricei	 XY,6-XZ[\]6XZ[\]6  (7) 
where pd,i is the deal i’s charged price, and pMSRP is the manufacturer’s suggested 
retail price, which is also obtained from Amazon.com. 
Control variables 
The first control variable is the deal’s discussion forum tone (tonei). Prior studies 
have identified that the nature of the posts in an online discussion forum can influence 
consumer choice (Dellarocas 2006) and as such may be a confounding factor in our 
assessment of social interactions effects. A distinction must be clearly made: the potential 
influence of a deal’s discussion forum tone on consumer choice would refer to WOM 
influence, whereas social interactions would refer to the influence on consumer choice 
stemming from observation of other’s choices (i.e. purchases), according to the definition 
of social interactions put forth in this research. 
In fact, some discussion forum posts at Woot.com! suggest that the discussion 
forum tone might be influential. Here are some examples of posts at Woot.com! on Feb 
28th, 2012: 
OGauge4Me: THX for all the positive comments. I am in for one. I have an 
older Sony that does not support internet streaming. Looks like this box will do 
the job and then some. 
Gina3graces: Everyone's helpful posts convinced me this would make a great 
gift for a friend's birthday, in for 1. 
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Clemel1: the negative comments about speed make me question whether it is 
reliable. I'm still debating on it though... 
A deal’s discussion forum tone is a normalized measure ranging from -1.0 (very 
negative tone) to 1.0 (very positive tone). It refers to an aggregate measure reflecting how 
positive, negative, or neutral all posts in that deal’s discussion forum are altogether. 
Unfortunately, reading posts is an extremely time consuming task, and the measures 
obtained are very noisy, as argued by Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) and shown by Godes 
and Mayzlin  (2004). Thus, to operationalize the measure, I will adopt a parsimonious 
approach, based on the notion of online consumer “sentiments” (Shin et al. 2008, 2010).  
The first step in operationalizing this measure was to consider all posts in the 
actual discussion forum of Woot.com! of each of the 40 deals in our sample. Overall, 
there were 3,825 posts in our dataset. Then, three raters assessed independently the tone 
of each actual post (negative, neutral, or positive) conveying a consumer’s “sentiment”. 
These raters were United States based, native English speakers raters hired from 
VWorker.com, a crowdsourcing website that allows tasks to be distributed to a large 
group of people. Overall, nine raters performed the rating tasks, each rating 1,275 posts.  
I asked raters to judge whether the tone of a post reflected positive, negative, or 
neutral “sentiments”. Thus, in this research, ratings take the form of judgments of kind, in 
which a rater answers the following question: in which category does this unit belong? To 
make their assessment, I provided raters a list of subjective positive and negative 
adjectives defined in the General Inquirer (http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer) 
(Kennedy and Inkpen 2006; Stone et al. 1966). For instance, these are examples of posts 
deemed to convey positive sentiments: 
TJFoxxxx: These seem like pretty good gadgets. I'm in for one! 
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Ralf32: I love using my Roku (with NetFlix on my older) TV. I wish I had gotten 
one sooner. 
Coreylamb: wow.. What a buzz kill.. I have ordered & installed 2 Roku 2 XS's & 
a Roku LT in the last couple weeks. All so I can stream from Plex.. This deal 
would have saved me a big chunk of change. 
Syninthecity: if you've got kids, i cannot in good conscience recommend getting 
anything but an XS. with rapidly expanding, dirt cheap games, the 1 xs i have 
gets more use than any of the other 3 older models. Several flavors of angry 
birds, some tower defense, regular updates and under 5 bucks, they're a nice 
addition to what's otherwise still a solid deal for a high quality netflix box. I 
heard from torrentfreak scene releases will now be coming in mp4...which the 
roku plays natively, so local streaming should get a whole lot easier shortly as 
well.  If you don't have one, but want to see what cutting the cable might feel 
like, pick up one of these, and grab a netflix trial membership. it's a cheap 
investment compared to a monthly cable bill, (i saved enough to get faster 
internet for better streaming) (did i mention it gets free internet grown up 
videos, via private roku channels?)  I'm not a schill, just a Roku convert. 
In turn, the following are examples of posts deemed to convey negative 
sentiments:  
Kitepower: I bought one of these (XDS) after reading everyone here rave over theirs, 
when they were on woot about a month or so ago and have been quite disappointed with 
the speed of it steaming via wifi. Plugged in direct via ethernet has been better but it still 
takes a really long time to start the stream going. In comparison to the Apple TV, the 
Apple TV streams a lot faster (even on wifi compared to the Roku over ethernet). I love 
the ability to add channels (but I found out that it very quickly ran out of space to add 
more channels) which the Apple TV doesn't have. Being able to stream news networks 
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like Russia Today, and Al Jazeera are a big plus. So all in all where it is a really cool 
piece of kit, it just doesn't work as smoothly as I would like, but still its handy to be able 
to have another tv access Netflix. Maybe if it were $10-15 cheaper then it would really be 
a great deal. 
RickDuhrkopf: I was all set to do this. Then I went to the Roku site. The new Roku 2 XD 
(new and newer model) is $10 off making it $69.99 and free shipping. For $5 more, I get 
the newer model and it is not a refurb. 
Richspirit: I'm always leery of refurbished products when they don't have full warranties. 
What's the likelihood this will be ok/or fail right after the 90 days? 
twig123: I had a Roku XDS that I purchased from Amazon last year... I found that the 
menu transitions were horrendously slow, in addition no local network streaming 
(without a bunch of work), no local storage and just overall was very disappointing and 
had buyers remorse within a couple hours. I gave it a go for a couple days, but the 
promptly returned it to Amazon and purchased the WD TV Live Hub. I was instantly 
impressed how much faster the device was, it also supports more services than Roku. In 
addition it also has 1TB of storage and supports a vast array of file types and codecs. For 
streaming to the Roku, you need a PC running with a transcoder and a special app 
installed on the device itself. Trying to get 1080p to stream to the Roku is a joke, and you 
would be lucky if you can play 720p smoothly. Take my advice, skip the buyers remorse 
and just buy the WD TV Live Hub instead! 
Finally, the next posts are examples of posts deemed to convey neutral 
sentiments: 
Worldwidewebfeet: Wooted the Roku XD in December, overall happy with it but 
far from perfect. Graphical user interface is slow. Channels are so-so, many 
interesting channels are pay for.   Free channels like Crackle (movies) some 
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good choices, but will drive you crazy with the same ads over and over, and they 
interrupt program at stupid points.   Hulu Plus, pay for, I had 1 month trial but 
cancelled after 2 weeks, horrible movie selection, horrible user interface, 
streaming would lock up on occasion requiring hard reboot of Roku. Terrible 
selection of sports and news channels. Yes did require credit card to start Roku 
setup. 
Lintball: If I'm not mistaken, this model also has 5GHz WIFI for dual-band 
routers. The newest models dropped the 5GHz radio (only 2.4). 
jasonking0351: Keep in mind that since this is the XDS model that can connect 
to either a 2.4ghz or 5.0ghz networks if you have that type of router. In my case I 
have one of these ROKU's from Woot and I connect it using the 5ghz network 
which has far fewer devices in my home connected to it (very nice feature). 
However (and there is always a gotcha), there is one small thing to consider. If 
you are using the official ROKU IOS app 
(http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/roku/id482066631?mt=8) to control your 
ROKU, it uses the SSID of the wireless connection that your iPhone uses. Since 
my iPhone 4s can only see 2.4ghz networks, the IOS app is useless unless I 
switch the ROKU to use the same 2.4ghz network...which defeats the dual band 
benefit. 
The second step in operationalizing the tonei measure was to obtain a measure of 
sentiment for each post by averaging its three ratings. Finally, to compute a deal i’s 
discussion forum tone, tonei, I averaged the sentiment of all posts in that deal’s 
discussion forum. 
When relying on human raters, one concern is the reliability of the data. 
Reliability is the extent to which the scores remain consistent over repeated ratings of the 
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same subject (i.e. a post) under identical conditions (Crocker and Algina 1986; Spitzer et 
al. 1967). This implies that a test is reliable if it yields constant results for the same 
measure. Another interpretation is that there is lack of random error in measurement. In 
this research, we expect that the data being used in the analysis reflect properties of the 
posts and are not the result of irreproducible human idiosyncrasies. 
Among the kinds of reliability – stability, accuracy, and reproducibility – the 
latter is arguably the strongest and most feasible kind to test (Hayes and Krippendorff 
2007). It amounts to evaluating whether a coding instrument, serving as common 
instructions to different raters of the same set of posts, yields the same data within a 
tolerable margin of error. The key to reliability is the agreement observed among 
independent raters. The more raters agree on the data they generate, the more comfortable 
we can be that their data are exchangeable with data provided by other set of raters, 
trustworthy, and reproducible. 
We may estimate reliability through a variety of indices. In this study, I used 
three of the most commonly used reliability indices in social sciences: Cronbach’s alpha, 
Fleiss’s kappa, and Krippendorff’s alpha. Cronbach’s (1951) alpha (αC) is a statistic for 
interval or ratio-level data that responds to the consistency of raters when numerical 
judgments are applied to a set of units. It quantifies the consistency by which a set of 
raters judge units on an interval scale without being sensitive to how much the raters 
actually agree in their judgments. It is appropriate as a measure of the reliability of an 
aggregate measure across raters, such as the arithmetic mean judgment, even though it 
does not directly index the extent to which raters actually agree in their judgments. 
In turn, Fleiss’s Kappa (κF) is a measure of inter-rater agreement (Fleiss et al. 
1969; Fleiss et al. 2003). Contrary to Cohen’s (1960) Kappa, which has shortcomings – 
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including being limited to the percent agreement between two raters, Fleiss’s Kappa 
indeed constitutes a numerical scale of agreement among 2 or more raters, whereas 
perfect agreement is set to 1.000 (or 100%), while the absence of agreement, typically 
indicated by .000, represents a situation in which the posts bear no statistical relation to 
how they end up being identified, coded, or described.  
Finally, Krippendorff’s (2004) Alpha (αK) defines a large family of reliability 
indices. It calculates disagreements instead of correcting percent agreements, avoiding 
shortcomings faced by other indices. In its two-rater ordinal data version, αK is identical 
to Spearman’s rank correlation index ρ. Its extension to many observers is stated in 
analysis of variance terms (Krippendorff 1970).  
As a rule of thumb, a reliability of .70 of higher is deemed to be acceptable. 
However, given the nature of the rating employed in this research – raters that possibly 
lacked familiarity with the subject were hired through a crowdsourcing tool, it is 
reasonable to demand that reliability must not be below .8.  
Table 10 provides the results for the reliability tests. It can be noticed that all 
three reliability indices - αC, κF, and αK, are well above the required .80 level. In fact, αK, 
arguably the best suited among all three indices for this research’s ordinal data (Hayes 
and Krippendorff 2007), is .85, so the risk of accepting the data as reliable when they are 
not is quite low.  
Index Estimate Source 
Cronbach’s Alpha (αC) .869 Cronbach (1951) 
Fleiss’s Kappa (κF) .860 Fleiss et al. (1969) Fleiss et al. (2003) 
Krippendorff’s Alpha (αK) .851 Krippendorff (1970,2004) 
Table 10: Reliability indices for the discussion forum posts ratings 
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The second control variable in this study is the structural equivalence among all 
consumers who bought a deal i, SEi. Structural equivalence is a mathematical property of 
subsets of consumers in a network (Lorrain and White 1971). In short, two consumers are 
structurally equivalent if they have identical links to and from all other consumers in the 
network. Thus, in this research’s context, it is a measure of similarity between two 
consumers in an online community. Structurally equivalent consumers are posited to have 
similar behavior and as such are likely to have similar purchase times (Burt 1987). 
Therefore, structural equivalence among consumers is likely to influence consumption 
rates (Valente 2005) in social shopping and act as an undesirable confounding factor to 
social interactions effects. Structural equivalence among buyers of a deal is a control 
rather than an independent variable in this study because it is unrelated to the two-step 
flow of influence principle.  
Structural equivalence is a mathematical property that is actually difficult to 
obtain in a set of social network data. For various reasons, including measurement error 
and variability in respondents’ answers, it is unlikely that two consumers will be exactly 
structurally equivalent in a set of network data. Analytical methods based on structural 
equivalence, therefore, seek to locate and identify subsets of consumers who are 
“approximately” structurally equivalent (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  
Burt (1987) developed a measure of structural equivalence based on the 
Euclidean distance. Let zjk be the value of the link from consumer j to consumer k on a 
single relation, where zjk=1 if the link is present and zjk=0 otherwise. We define a distance 
measure of structural equivalence for consumers j and p as the Euclidean distance 
between the links to and from these consumers: 
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for j≠k, p≠k. 
If consumers j and p are structurally equivalent, then the Euclidean distance 
between them will be equal to 0. To the extent that two consumers are not structurally 
equivalent, the Euclidean distance between them will be greater than 0. The Euclidean 
distance has the properties of a distance metric: the distance from an object to itself is 0 
(SEjp=0), it is symmetric (SEjp= SEpj), and all distances are greater than or equal to 0 
(SEjp≥0 for all j,p).  
To compute the final measure of structural equivalence among all deal i’s buyers, 
SEi, I first computed the structural equivalence for each pair of consumers in each 
experimental group. Then, for each deal i, I averaged the structural equivalence among all 
pairs of consumers who bought that deal. 
The third control variable is the deal’s initial inventory provision, Qi. It is a 
measure of the number of units made available at the beginning of deal i in respect to the 
size of the network of consumers. Thus, initial inventory provision is operationalized as a 
percentage, rather than as an absolute measure, to increase the interpretability of the 
statistical results.  
I set the deal’s initial inventory provision according to the following procedure: 
unbeknownst to the participants to avoid “end-of-game” behavior, I drew a random 
number, OU, uniformly distributed between N/3 and 2N/3, where N=15 is the total 
number of participating subjects in each experimental trial, at the beginning of each deal. 
I then used such drawn random number as the mean of a normal distribution with 
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standard deviation N/10 (N=15). A new random number, ON, was then drawn from this 
normal distribution. I rounded this number up to the nearest integer, and then used this 
rounded integer value as the deal’s initial inventory provision. 
The initial inventory provision was never exceedingly low or high. The 
assumption behind this approach is that all participants in the controlled experiment were 
aware of each deal when it was taking place (which is usually not the case in actual 
online communities). As such, initial inventory provision should be at most N, otherwise, 
the experiment would induce overstocking. Moreover, the initial inventory provision 
should ideally reflect available inventory for the fraction of those N consumers who 
might be interested in the purchase. Very low levels of inventory (close to 0 units) would 
induce stockouts even if a small fraction of consumers might be interested in the 
purchase. Hence the sampling of OU from either low- or high-mid ranged uniform 
distributions in respect to the total number of participants, N. The normal distribution 
introduced additional “uncertainty” to the “decision-making process”. This was aimed at 
capturing the bounded rationality of inventory managers. That is, in face of uncertain 
demand due to social interactions, inventory managers will provide ON units of inventory, 
which is unlikely to be an optimal quantity. In the statistical analysis, I multiplied the 
absolute number of units offered at each deal by 100/N (where N=15), so that Qi reflects 
the desired percentage. This increases the interpretability of the results. 
Statistical analysis  
To empirically assess the conceptual model (Figure 2Error! Reference source 
not found.), I developed an econometric model consisting of two equations. The first 
equation in the econometric model assesses the relationship between a deal’s 
consumption rate and the social interaction mechanisms (hypotheses H1A through H1E), 
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as well as the moderation effects of product characteristics and the commercial context 
on such a relationship (hypotheses H2A through H2C-2). The second equation in the 
econometric model assesses the relationship between a deal’s service level and its 
consumption rate (hypothesis H3). I used functions and customized macros in the 
software package SAS 9.3 to perform the statistical analysis. 
The relationship among consumption rate, social interactions, product 
characteristics, and the commercial context 
To assess hypotheses H1A through H2C-2, we express the consumption rate, t*, 
measured as the inflection point of the cumulative consumption curve computed from the 
Bass model in equation (1.3), as an unobserved effects model (also known as a 
hierarchical linear model):  
;< 	 3b,4  c3b,,d   3,:e f  gb,,d < f  hb,i  jk  l (9) 
where w represents the vector of social interactions variables (opinionleadership, 
integration, cohesion, constraint, and centrality), m represents the vector of moderators 
(popularity, quality, price), x represents the vector of control variables (tone, SE, and Q), 
and e1 represents measurement errors, while u controls for unobservable effects due to 
clustering in my dataset. Note that a multidimensional vector of coefficients is assigned 
to each multidimensional vector of variables. 
In this research, data are clustered because the forty deals are repeated across 
thirty-two groups of participants. Consequently, observational units are correlated as a 
result of unobserved cluster effects. This issue is somewhat easy to handle. While we 
allow the units within each cluster to be correlated, we assume interdependence across 
clusters. When the explanatory variables are exogenous, as it is the case in equation 14, 
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the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal. 
However, we need to adjust the asymptotical covariance matrix (Greene 2003; 
Wooldridge 2002).  
This research uses the the robust “sandwich” covariance matrix estimator (White 
1980) to perform such an adjustment. This matrix differs from the typical ordinary least 
squares (OLS) covariance matrix, in the sense that it uses the regression’s residuals as its 
diagonal elements to adjust for potential distinct variances – hence the commonly used 
term “heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors” that describes their purpose. This 
estimator is valid in the presence of any heteroskedasticity (including homoskedasticity) 
or serial correlation in this research, since each cluster here consists of relatively few 
units compared with the overall sample size of 1280 observational units (White 1980; 
Wooldridge 2002).  
The relationship between a deal’s service level and its consumption rate 
To assess hypothesis H3, I conducted a survival analysis. Survival analysis is the 
name for a collection of statistical techniques used to describe and quantify time to event 
data. In survival analysis, we use the term “failure” to define the occurrence of an event 
of interest – i.e. stocking out in a deal. Here, the term “survival time” measures the 
duration of time, from the beginning of a deal (at time zero), until it stocks out, and the 
set of covariates hypothesized to be associated with the failure time variable. The purpose 
of survival analysis is to model the underlying distribution of the failure time variable and 
to assess the dependence of the failure time variable on the covariates of interest 
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Maddala 1983). 
An intrinsic characteristic of survival data is the possibility for censoring of 
observations. That is, the actual time until the event may not be observed. Such censoring 
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arises in this research since all the deals in my experiment have a limited preset time.  
Because the dependent variable is the actual duration of a deal, some of the possible 
failures may not occur when deals terminate at their limited time. We say that these 
observations are right censored. One may not ignore censored data because, among other 
considerations, deals that last long until they stock out are generally more likely to be 
right censored. Thus, the method of analysis employed in this research takes censoring 
into account and correctly uses the censored observations as well as the uncensored 
observations. I explain the procedure that accounts for the right censoring in our data in 
the Appendix. 
The distribution of survival times is characterized by three functions: (1) the 
survivorship function, (2) the probability density function, and (3) the hazard function. 
Let T denote the survival time. The survivorship function, S(t), which is the probability of 
“surviving” past time t, is defined as S(t) ≡ 1 – F(t) = P(T > t), where F(t) is the 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of T. S(t) = 1 when t=0, and S(t) = 0 when t=∞. 
The graph of S(t) is known as the survival curve, which begins at S(0)=1 and decreases to 
0 as t increases to infinity. It is assumed here that T is continuous – and, in fact, has 
differentiable cdf – because this assumption simplifies statements of certain probabilities. 
The probability density function, defined as f(t) = dF/dt(t) = lim∆t→0P(t < T < 
t+∆t)/∆t, gives the unconditional failure rate. In turn, the hazard function, defined as h(t) 
= f(t)/[1-F(t)] = lim∆t→0P(t < T < t+∆t | T > t)/∆t, gives the conditional failure rate8. It is a 
measure of the propensity to failure as a function of the time elapsed during a deal, in the 
sense that the quantity ∆t * h(t) is the expected proportion of deals lasting until time t that 
will stock out (i.e. a failure) in the short interval from t to t + ∆t. Obviously, the three 
                                                     
8
 The hazard function is also known as instantaneous failure rate, or conditional mortality rate. 
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functions are mathematically related. If one of them is known, the other two can be 
derived. Specifically, h(t) = f(t)/S(t).  
Understanding the hazard function 
In the simplest case, the hazard function is constant, that is, h(t) = λ, for all t ≥ 0. 
This function means that the process driving T is memoryless. That is, the probability of 
failure in the next time interval is a random event independent of how much time has 
been spent in the initial state, when there is inventory to be sold. It can be shown that F(t) 
= 1 – exp(-λt), which is the cumulative distribution function of the exponential 
distribution. Conversely, if T has an exponential distribution, it has a constant hazard.  
We say that the process exhibits duration dependence when the hazard function is 
not constant. Assuming that h(t) is differentiable, there is positive duration dependence at 
time t if dh(t)/dt>0, if dh(t)>0 for all t>0, then the process exhibits positive duration 
dependence. With positive duration dependence, the probability of stocking out (i.e. 
exiting the initial state) increases the longer a deal lasts (i.e. it is in the initial state). If the 
derivative is negative, then there is negative duration dependence. That is, the probability 
of stocking out decreases the longer a deal lasts. Table 11 lists five commonly used 
distributions in survival analysis with their density, f(t), survival function, S(t), and 
hazard function, h(t). In the next few lines, I provide a cursory review of the remaining 
four distributions, besides the exponential, that will help us interpret the results presented 
in the next chapter. 
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Distribution Parameter Density and survival 
functions 
Hazard function 
Exponential λ > 0 f(t) = λ exp(-λt) 
S(t) = exp(-λt) 
 
h(t) = λ 
Weibull λ,γ > 0 f(t) = λγtγ-1 exp(-λtγ) 
S(t) = exp[-(λt) γ] 
 
h(t) = λγtγ-1 
Generalized 
Gamma 
λ,γ > 0 f(t) = [λα / Γ(γ)] (λt)αγ-1 
exp[-(λt)α] 
S(t) = ∫f(x)dx 
 
h(t) = f(t)/S(t). Note: The hazard 
function does not have a closed 
form. 
 
Lognormal µ,σ > 0 
a = exp(-µ) 
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Log-logistic λ,γ > 0 f(t) = λγtγ-1 [1+ λtγ]-2 
S(t) = [1+ λtγ]-1 
 
h(t) = λγtγ-1 [1+ λtγ]-1 
 
Table 11: Commonly used distributions in survival data analysis 
 
The Weibull distribution is characterized by two parameters, γ (shape) and λ 
(scale). When γ=1, the hazard rate remains constant as time increases, which is equivalent 
to the exponential case. The hazard rate increases when γ>1, and decreases when γ<1. 
Thus, we may use the Weibull distribution to model the survival distribution of a 
population with increasing, decreasing, or constant hazard, and therefore has a broad 
application. Graphical representations of log S(t) = -(λt)γ will assist us to determine 
whether the data came from a Weibull distribution. When γ>1, the survivorship function 
is a straight line with a negative slope. In turn, when γ<1, the survivorship function 
decreases very slowly from zero and then approaches a constant value. Finally, when 
γ>1, the survivorship function decreases sharply from zero as t increases.  
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The generalized gamma distribution is also characterized by two parameters, γ 
(shape) and λ (scale)9. When 0<γ<1, the hazard rate decreases monotonically from 
infinity to λ as time increases from zero to infinity. When γ>1, the hazard rate increases 
monotonically from zero to λ as time increases from zero to infinity. When γ=1, the 
Weibull distribution is implied if λ≠1, otherwise, when γ=λ=1, the hazard rate equals λ, a 
constant, as in the exponential case. Finally, when γ=0, the lognormal distribution is 
implied. Thus, a nice characteristic of the generalized gamma distribution is that it nests 
some of the other parametric approaches as special cases, which is useful for adjudicating 
between some competing models when testing specification. 
We can define the lognormal distribution as the distribution of a variable whose 
logarithm follows the normal distribution. Consider the random variable T such that log T 
is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2. The hazard function increases 
initially to a maximum and then decreases, almost as soon as the median is passed, 
toward zero as time approaches infinity. Thus, the lognormal distribution describes a first 
increasing and then decreasing hazard rate. 
Similar to the lognormal distribution, if the variable log T has a logistic 
distribution, the variable T follows the log-logistic distribution. The log-logistic 
distribution also has two parameters, γ and λ. When γ<1, the hazard rate decreases from 
infinity toward zero, when γ=1, it decreases from λ toward zero, and when γ>1, it 
increases from 0 to a maximum and then decreases toward zero. The special features of 
the hazard function of the log-logistic distribution provide a good alternative to the 
Weibull, generalized gamma, and lognormal distributions.  
                                                     
9
 The generalized gamma is not the standard gamma distribution. 
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The hazard function conditional on time-invariant covariates 
In this research, we are interested in a hazard function conditional on a set of 
covariates. Since these are time-invariant, the hazard is simply defined conditional on the 
covariates. Thus, the conditional hazard is h(t)=lim∆t→0P(t < T < t+∆t | T > t,x)/∆t, where 
x is the vector of covariates.  
An especially important class of models with time-invariant covariates consists 
of proportional hazard (PH) models. We can write a proportional hazard as:  
h(t|x) = h0(t).φ(x, β) (10a) 
where βi indicates the effect of the covariates (qi and Qi) on the hazard rate, and 
h0(t) is the baseline hazard function. The baseline hazard is common to all observational 
units and it captures the longitudinal effects associated with the duration dynamics, while 
the function φ(x, β) adjusts h0(t) up or down proportionately to reflect the effect of 
measured covariates.  
Unobserved heterogeneity 
When observational units are naturally or artificially clustered, as it occurs in the 
current research’s survival analysis, the failure times of observational units within a 
cluster are correlated. Thus, modeling unobserved heterogeneity is an important 
consideration in survival analysis, since the failure to do so can seriously bias parameter 
estimates. 
This research follows the traditional approach of using a shared frailty model, in 
which we incorporate into the model unobserved heterogeneity due to cluster effects by 
using a random component for the hazard function. The inclusion of the random term 
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allows for the possible correlation between the failure times within a cluster. In the 
context of the PH model, we incorporate heterogeneity as follows: 
h(t|x) = h0(t).φ(x, β).ψ(τ) (10b) 
The function ψ(τ) models the functional form for random effects representing 
unobserved heterogeneity (Lancaster 1979, 1990). Thus, this approach captures the logic 
that some deals are intrinsically more (or less) likely than others to stock out, i.e. those 
who are most “frail” will experience failure earlier than others. The estimation of the 
model allows us to test for duration dependence conditional on observed covariates as 
well as unobserved heterogeneity. We can then perform a Wald chi-square test of the null 
hypothesis that the effect of unobserved heterogeneity is equal to zero, in which case 
there is no difference between the shared frailty model and the model without unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
Semiparametric estimation: Cox’s Regression Model 
One way to assess the hypothesized relationship in H3 is to investigate how the 
covariates shift the hazard function, in which case estimation of the baseline hazard, h0(t), 
is unnecessary. Cox (1972) obtained a partial maximum likelihood estimator for β that 
does not require estimating the baseline hazard.  
The strength of Cox’s semiparametric approach is that it estimates the effects of 
covariates very generally, provided that the hazard is of the form of equations 10a or 10b. 
Typically, one would parameterize φ(x, β) in equations 10a and 10b as φ(x, β) = exp(x, 
β), in which case the equation 
h(t|x) = h0(t).exp(x, β) (11a) 
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gives the hazard function of the survival time without unobserved heterogeneity, 
whereas the equation 
h(t|x) = h0(t).exp(x, β,τ) (11b) 
gives the hazard function that incorporates unobserved heterogeneity.  
This approach lends itself to a simple interpretation for the parameter estimates: 
as the value of a covariate increases by one unit, the hazard rate changes by [exp(β)-1] * 
100 percent. This is important, because the estimation allows us to capture a non-linear 
relationship between the covariate (consumption rate) and the dependent variable (service 
level) of interest in H3. 
Parametric estimation 
The estimation of parametric models with a flexible baseline hazard offers an 
alternative to the Cox model. These models follow the parameterization: 
y = xβ + σe (12) 
where y is usually the log of the failure time variable, x is the vector of 
covariates, β is the vector of unknown parameters, σ is an unknown scale parameter, and 
e is the error term. We specify the baseline distribution of the error term as one of the 
several possibilities, as discussed above (see Table 11).  
These models are known as “accelerated failure time (AFT) models”. Here, we 
use the word “accelerated” to describe these models, because the parameter θ = exp(-xβ) 
acts like a time-scaling factor. If θ>1, the failure accelerates because the time passes more 
quickly (i.e. the survival time decreases). Conversely, if θ<1, the failure decelerates 
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because the time passes more slowly (i.e. the survival time increases). Finally, if θ=1, the 
survival time passes at a normal rate.  
The specification of the functional form of the baseline hazard function (also 
known as the duration dependence) is an important issue in many empirical applications, 
including the current research. If the characterization of the underlying duration 
dependence is accurate – i.e. if we use the right distributional function – then the 
resulting estimates of the parameters are more efficient (in the sense of having smaller 
standard errors than those in semiparametric models, in which the underlying duration 
dependence is left unspecified). In addition, full likelihood estimation results in more 
precise statistical inferences. Finally, interpretability of the results is also simple, and 
even more intuitive than the results obtained in the semiparametric approach: as the value 
of a covariate increases by one unit, the expected time for stocking out increases to 
exp(log(t)+β) for deals expected to stock out in time t.  
So, there can be advantages to using parametric models. Problems arise, 
however, if we choose the “wrong” parametric function. In the next chapter, I will detail 
how I evaluated the choice for the parametric function (i.e. the shape for the duration 
dependence). I should note that, based on my literature review, scholars often provide 
little justification for the particular parametric model they use. 
Estimation of the econometric model 
The econometric model of this research consists of an unobserved effects model 
(equation (9)) and a hazard model (equations (10a) and (10b)). We assess the dependence 
of a deal’s consumption rate, t*, on a set of covariates, moderators, and control variables. 
In addition, we assess the dependence of the duration of time until a deal stocks out (the 
“failure time”) on the consumption rate, t*, and the initial inventory level at the beginning 
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of the deal. Thus, in our estimation, we face a situation in which two variables might be 
jointly determined by a system of equations, also known as a simultaneous equation 
model (SEM). 
Simultaneity bias is a major concern in the estimation of any SEM (Greene 2003; 
Wooldridge 2002). Simultaneity arises when at least one of the explanatory variables is 
determined simultaneously along with a dependent variable. If some explanatory variable 
is determined partially as a function of the dependent variable, then the explanatory 
variable and the error term are generally correlated. Ignoring such fact yields inconsistent 
(biased) parameter estimates. Conceptually, simultaneity is difficult to analyze, because 
we must be able to think of a situation in which we could vary that explanatory variable 
exogenously, even though both variables are generated simultaneously in the data that we 
collect. 
However, for suitable application of true SEMs, we must understand the kinds of 
situations suitable for SEM analysis. A classical example of a legitimate SEM application 
is labor supply and wage offer. Labor supply functions usually describe individuals’ 
behavior, and they are derivable from basic economic principles of individual utility 
maximization. Holding other factors fixed, labor supply functions in economics give the 
hours of labor supply at any potential wage facing the individuals. In turn, wage offer 
functions usually describe firm behavior, and, like labor supply functions, are self 
contained (Wooldridge 2002). 
As Wooldridge (2002) explains, each equation in an SEM should represent a 
causal relationship. We should be interested in varying each of the explanatory variables 
– including any that are endogenous – while holding all the others fixed. That is, each 
equation in an SEM should represent some underlying conditional expectation that has a 
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causal structure. Here, conditional expectations are in terms of counterfactuals. For 
instance, in the above labor supply example, if we could run a controlled experiment, in 
which we exogenously varied the wage offer across individuals, then we would be able to 
estimate labor supply functions without ever considering the wage offer functions.  
Generally, supply and demand examples satisfy the causality requirement, and 
simultaneous equations systems were originally developed for such applications. 
However, in our research, there is nothing “structural” about the proposed analysis. The 
choices made by consumers, which will determine a deal’s consumption rate, are 
completely unrelated to the stockout probability in that deal. That is, there is no causality 
implied in our demand function by any factor that determines the supply function (the 
hazard model).  Specifically, the consumption rate, t*, has causal interpretations 
(hypotheses H1A through H2C-2), which do not include stockout probability on the right-
hand side. 
Any attempt to estimate our econometric model by an SEM application would 
represent a misperception that “structural” and “simultaneous” are synonymous. As 
explained above, our simultaneous system is not structural because one equation violates 
the causality requirement. As a result, we may (and should) estimate the unobservable 
effects and the hazard models separately. 
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Chapter 5 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics for the set of measures: means, standard 
errors, and correlations. The results show no correlation among the eight experimental 
factors (i.e. the five independent variables and the three moderators). This should be 
expected, since we have a full factorial design (“fully crossed) in which we obtain all 
possible combinations among factors holding low/high values. Moreover, the results in 
Table 12 show that a deal’s consumption rate is correlated with the following 
independent variables: opinion leadership, network integration, network constraint, and 
network centrality. However, it is not correlated with cohesive group membership. The 
results also show that a deal’s consumption rate is correlated with product quality and 
price, but not with product popularity. In addition, a deal’s consumption rate is correlated 
with its duration. 
The results also show that five experimental factors – representing three 
independent variables and two moderators – are correlated with a deal’s duration. 
Specifically, a deal’s duration is correlated with opinion leadership, integration, 
constraint, product quality and popularity. 
Regarding the control variables, structural equivalence is correlated with a deal’s 
consumption rate, whereas initial inventory provision is correlated with a deal’s duration. 
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics 
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The effects on consumption rate of social interactions and marketing activity 
Table 13 reports the results for the OLS using the robust covariance matrix 
estimator of Equation (9), in which a deal’s consumption rate is the dependent variable, 
five variables representing social interaction mechanisms are predictors (OL, integration, 
membership, constrain, and centrality), three variables representing marketing activity 
are moderators (popularity, quality, price), and three variables are controls (tone, SE, and 
Q).  
Parameter Hypothesis tested Model 1(a) Model 2(a) Model 3(a) 
Intercept  66.64 (19.91)** 18.773 (5.61)** 10.849 (3.22)** 
     
Opinion leadership (OLi) H1A  -70.428 (32.43)* -50.489 (23.53)* 
Integration (integrationi) H1B  -33.435 (15.88)* -25.217 (11.30)* 
Cohesive group 
membership (cohesioni) 
H1C  -16.118 (11.32) -13.733 (10.15) 
Network constraint 
(constrainti) 
H1D  20.341 (8.15)* 14.109 (6.70)* 
Network centrality 
(centralityi) 
H1E  43.122 (24.77) 32.901 (18.11) 
     
Popularity (popularityi)    .813 (.638) 
Quality (qualityi)    -5.112 (3.845) 
Price (pricei)    -8.749 (5.941) 
     
OLi * popularityi H2A-i   1.685 (1.869) 
integrationi * popularityi H2A-ii   .610 (.582) 
cohesioni * popularityi H2A-iiii   1.120 (1.215) 
constraint * popularityi H2A-iv   -.162 (.112) 
centralityi * popularityi H2A-v   2.747 (2.00) 
     
OLi * qualityi H2B-i   24.508 (10.82)* 
integrationi * qualityi H2B-ii   1.264 (.48)* 
cohesioni * qualityi H2B-iiii   2.308 (1.69) 
constrainti * qualityi H2B-iv   -0.983 (.40)* 
centralityi * qualityi H2B-v   45.708 (25.09) 
     
OLi * pricei H2C-1-i and H2C-2-i   -27.553 (12.15)* 
integrationi * pricei H2C-1-ii and H2C-2-ii   -3.010 (1.24)* 
cohesioni * pricei H2C-1-iii and H2C-2-iii   -5.345 (3.69) 
constrainti * pricei H2C-1-iv and H2C-2-iv   3.331 (1.56)* 
centralityi * pricei H2C-1-v and H2C-2-v   -24.682 (15.24) 
     
Discussion forum tone 
(tonei) 
 - 15.08 (4.51)* -1.634 (0.82)* -.724 (.431)* 
Structural equivalence 
(SEi) 
 1.44 (1.12) .020 (.18) .011 (.01) 
Initial inventory provision 
(Qi) 
 .276 (.22) .088 (.06) .053 (.03) 
     
R2 (adjusted)  0.224 0.412 0.529 
N  1280 1280 1280 
(a) Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
Table 13: OLS estimation of consumption rate, t*, using a robust covariance matrix 
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The estimation proceeded as follows. First, I introduced the three control 
variables (Model 1). This first step provides an initial understanding of which control 
variables might be relevant in our estimation. The results in Model 1 show that the 
estimate for tonei is significant (at the .05 level). This result agrees with a large body of 
research in social interactions that posits that a discussion forum tone is a significant 
predictor of consumption rates. Omitting this relevant predictor would misspecify the full 
model (below), thereby leading to biased parameter estimates. Interestingly, the estimates 
for both SEi and Qi are non-significant. 
Next, I introduced the five predictors (Model 2). In this new model, the estimate 
for tonei became borderline significant (at the .05 level). The estimates for three 
predictors (OLi, integrationi, and constrainti) are significant (at the .05 level). However, 
the estimate for cohesioni and centralityi are non-significant. 
Model 3 in Table 13 incorporates the direct effects of the moderating variables, 
as well as their interactions with the predictors. Adjusted R-square statistics for Model 3 
suggest that moderation effects were important factors contributing to consumption rates. 
The inclusion of interaction terms representing such moderation effects increased the 
amount of variance explained, as measured by the adjusted R-square statistics, as well as 
the fit of the model. Variance inflation factors range from 1.349 to 3.350, all below the 
usual threshold of 10, so there is no evidence that multicollinearity has a significant 
impact on the results.  
The results suggest that early buyers’ opinion leadership is a predictor of a 
consumption rate. The parameter estimate for OLi is negative and significant at the .05 
level (β11,1=-50.489). This means that a deal’s consumption rate will increase (i.e. the 
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tipping point, ti*, will decrease) as the aggregate opinion leadership of early buyers will 
increase. This result provides support for H1A. 
The results also suggest that early buyers’ integration into their social network is 
a predictor of consumption rate. The parameter estimate for integrationi is negative and 
significant at the .05 level (β11,2=-25.217). In line with the above analysis, this suggests 
that increasing the integration of early buyers into their social network will increase 
consumption rate of a deal (i.e. decrease the tipping point, ti*). This result provides 
support for H1B. 
In addition, the results suggest that early buyers’ network constraint is a predictor 
of consumption rate. The parameter estimate for constrainti is positive and significant at 
the .05 level (β11,4=14.109). Notice that low levels of constraint imply high levels of 
ability to broker. So, as early buyers’ constraint increases (i.e. their ability to broker 
decreases), the tipping point also increases (i.e. the consumption rate decreases). This 
means that a deal’s consumption rate will increase when early buyers are less 
constrained. This result provides support for H1D. 
Regarding the effects of marketing activity, the results in Model 3 suggest that 
increasing quality will negatively moderate the relationship between consumption rate 
and early buyers’ opinion leadership. The parameter estimate for the interaction between 
OL and quality is positive and significant at the .05 level (γ11,6=24.508). This means that, 
as the product quality increases, the overall effect of early buyers’ opinion leadership on 
consumption rate (i.e. direct plus moderated) will still be positive yet not as large as the 
direct effect, since (β11,1<β11,1+γ11,6<0). Therefore, the results provide support for H2B-i. 
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Similarly, the results suggest that quality will negatively moderate the 
relationship between consumption rate and early buyers’ integration. The parameter 
estimate for the interaction between integration and quality is positive and significant at 
the .05 level (γ11,7=1.264). Akin to the above results, this suggests that, as product quality 
increases, the overall effect of early buyers’ network integration on consumption rate (i.e. 
direct plus moderated) will still be positive yet not as large as the direct effect, since 
(β11,2<β11,2+γ11,7<0). Therefore, the results provide support for H2B- ii. 
In addition, the results suggest that quality will negatively moderate the 
relationship between consumption rate and early buyers’ constraint. The parameter 
estimate for the interaction between constraint and quality is negative and significant at 
the .05 level (γ11,9=-0.983). This suggests that, as product quality increases, the overall 
effect of early buyers’ network constraint on consumption rate (i.e. direct plus 
moderated) will be negative yet not as large as the direct effect since (β11,4> β11,4+γ11,9>0). 
Again, notice that increases in constraint imply decreases in the ability to broker. 
Therefore, the results provide support for H2B- iv. 
In regards to the role played by price, the analysis provides interesting insights. 
First, the parameter estimate for the interaction between OL and price is negative and 
significant at the .05 level (γ11,11=-27.553). This result suggests that, as prices increase, 
the effect of opinion leadership on consumption rate will be larger in magnitude. That is, 
consumers will resort even more to opinion leaders to make an informed decision 
(β11,1+γ11,11<β11,1<0). Therefore, the results provide support for H2C-1-i. 
Similarly, the parameter estimate for the interaction between integration and 
price is negative and significant at the .05 level (γ11,12=-3.010). This implies that early 
buyers’ integration is very important when prices become higher. At higher prices, 
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consumers will resort even more to observation of integrated early buyers’ purchases to 
make informed decisions (β11,2+γ11,12<β11,2<0). Therefore, the results provide support for 
H2C-1-ii. 
Finally, the parameter estimate for the interaction between constraint and price is 
positive and significant at the .05 level (γ11,12=3.331). This result suggests early buyers’ 
constraint is less influential on consumption rates as prices increases. That is, as prices 
increase, consumption rates will increase in the presence of less constrained early buyers 
(β11,4+γ11,14> β11,4>0). Therefore, the results provide support for H2C-1-ii. 
The effects on service level of consumption rate 
As discussed earlier, an important issue in the estimation is the specification of 
the functional form for φ(x, β). The estimation proceeded as follows. First, I estimated 
the PH model (Equation 11a) using the semiparametric partial likelihood procedure 
suggested by Cox (1975). I then estimated a PH model (Equation 11b) using the 
penalized partial likelihood approach for fitting shared frailty for clustered data models. 
Amemiya (1985) and (Lancaster 1990) suggested this approach for treatments of the 
Cox’s partial likelihood estimator, in order to account for the influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Next, I tested different parametric models (equation 12) using the different 
functional forms listed in Table 11: Weibull, generalized gamma, exponential, lognormal, 
and log-logistic. I contrasted the results of the parametric models without unobserved 
heterogeneity with those of models including random effects for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Finally, I selected the functional form that provided the best model fit.  
Semiparametric estimation of Cox models 
Table 14 reports the results for the Cox PH model without unobserved 
heterogeneity (model 1) and the shared frailty model for clustered data with unobserved 
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heterogeneity (model 2). Notably, the introduction of random effects to account for 
unobservable heterogeneity in model 2 slightly alters the parameter estimates in model 1. 
In addition, a Wald chi-square test (H0:τ=0) suggests that the random effects are 
significantly different than zero at the .01 level. Moreover, a goodness-of-fit assessment 
using the likelihood test suggests that model 2 provides a better fit than model 1. This is 
because the difference between 958.803 (model 1) and 924.738 (model 2), ∆=34.065, is 
greater than the critical value 6.64, the chi-square statistic for 1 degree of freedom (at the 
.01 level). In all, the results suggest that not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
yields biased parameter estimates. However, the small difference in the magnitude of the 
parameter estimates between both models is remarkable. Also, the signs direction in 
model 1 remains unaltered in model 2, when unobservable heterogeneity is accounted for. 
Thus, I will use the results of model 2 to assess hypothesis H3. 
 
 Cox PH model  
(Model 1) 
Cox PH model with unobserved 
heterogeneity (Model 2) 
Parameter Estimate(a) Hazard Ratio(b) Estimate(a) Hazard Ratio(b) 
Initial inventory provision (Q) -.085 (.008)** .919 (.904, .934) -.091 (.009)** .914 (.898,.929) 
Consumption rate (t*) -.039 (.017)* .962 (.930, .995) -.021 (.005)** .979 (.969,.989) 
Wald test (H0:τ=0)   p < .01  
-2 Log-likelihood 958.803  924.738  
(a) Standard errors in parentheses.  
(b) 95% Wald confidence limits in parentheses. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
Table 14: Semiparametric estimation of Cox’s models 
 
In support of H3, the result for the consumption rate variable, t*, suggests that a 
faster deal’s consumption rate (i.e. a lower t*) will increase the deal’s stockout likelihood 
(i.e. decrease its service level). The hazard ratio (i.e. the impact on the hazard of stocking 
out) estimate from the PH model with unobserved heterogeneity suggests, for instance, 
that decreasing the tipping point of a deal by 1 second increases its stockout likelihood by 
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2.1% (=e[-.021*(-1)]-1=.021). In turn, decreasing the tipping point by 10 seconds would 
increase the stockout likelihood by 23.4% (=e[-.021*(-10)]-1), while decreasing it by 20 
seconds would increase that likelihood by 52.2% (=e[-.021*(-20)]-1). Clearly, as the 
consumption rate increases, the stockout likelihood increases faster. That is, the service 
level decreases at a faster pace than the consumption rate does. 
For better interpretability of results, it may be useful to investigate what happens 
when the tipping point increases (i.e. the consumption rate decreases). For instance, based 
on the analysis results, increasing the tipping point of a deal by 1 second would decrease 
the stockout likelihood by 2.1% (.979-1=-.021). In turn, increasing the tipping point by 
10 seconds would decrease that likelihood by 23.4% (=e(-.021*10)-1), while increasing it by 
20 seconds would decrease that likelihood by 34.3% (=e(-.021*20)-1). That is, the service 
level decreases at a slower pace than decreases in the consumption rate.  
It is also noticeable the effect of the initial inventory provision on a deal’s service 
level. Recall that the measure is operationalized as a percentage of the size of the network 
of consumers. Thus, increasing the initial inventory provision by 10% of the network of 
consumers’ size would reduce a deal’s stockout likelihood by 59.4% (=e(-.091*10)-1). In 
turn, increasing initial inventory provision by 25% of the network’s size would reduce the 
stockout likelihood by 89.5% (=e(-.091*25)-1), while increasing initial inventory provision 
by 50% of the network’s size (which is around the average initial inventory provision in 
our sample) would reduce that likelihood by 98.9% (=e(-.091*50)-1).  
Parametric estimation of AFT models 
Table 15 reports the results of estimating the parametric models without 
unobserved heterogeneity, while Table 16 reports the results of the estimation of 
parametric models with unobserved heterogeneity.  
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In agreement with the results of the semiparametric estimation, it is notable that 
the introduction of random effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity slightly 
modifies the parameter estimates obtained when unobserved heterogeneity is 
unaccounted for. In addition, a Wald chi-square test (H0:τ=0) suggests that the random 
effects are significantly different than zero at the .01 level, irrespective of the chosen 
distribution. Moreover, a goodness-of-fit assessment using the likelihood test suggests 
that model 2 provides a better fit than model 1, irrespective of the chosen distribution. 
For instance, for the generalized gamma distribution, the difference between 560.615 
(model 1a) and 552.601 (model 2a), ∆=7.914, is greater than the critical value 6.64, the 
chi-square statistic for 1 degree of freedom at the .01 level. Once again, the results 
suggest that not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity yields biased parameter 
estimates. Therefore, the issue here is to choose the model that accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity with the “right” distribution to assess hypothesis H3. 
As described earlier, the generalized gamma model nests several other parametric 
models and can, therefore, be used to adjudicate between them. However, a limitation of 
the generalized gamma for adjudicating between parametric models is that it is only 
helpful for distinguishing between those parametric models that are nested within it. For 
non-nested parametric models, we might use Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) 
(Akaike 1974) to distinguish between different parametric models. Typically, we would 
look for a model whose AIC is the smallest.  
Based on the results reported in Table 16, it appears that the generalized gamma 
model is a reasonable model for the data. The likelihood ratio test indicates that the 
Weibull model is also acceptable, and the exponential model is equally good. However, 
there are two reasons to take the exponential model as the final model. First, it exhibits 
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the smallest AIC value among all five models (i.e. 548.771). Second, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that both shape and scale parameters in the generalized gamma are equal to 1. 
The 95% confidence limits for the scale parameter λ are (.633, 1.067), and the 95% 
confidence limits for the shape parameter γ are (.465, 1.250). Thus, the results for the 
generalized gamma distribution suggest that the hazard function follows an exponential 
distribution. Likewise, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the shape parameter γ of the 
Weibull distribution is equal to 1. Its confidence limits are (.925, 1.228), which also 
implies the exponential distribution. Therefore, I will use the results of the parametric 
model on the basis of the exponential distribution with unobserved heterogeneity (model 
2c in Table 16) to further assess hypothesis H3. 
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Distribution Generalized 
Gamma 
(Model 1a) 
Weibull 
(Model 1b) 
Exponential 
(Model 1c) 
Lognormal 
(Model 1d) 
Log-logistic 
(Model 1e) 
Parameter AFT 
 metric(a) 
AFT 
metric(a) 
AFT 
metric(a) 
AFT 
metric(a) 
AFT 
metric(a) 
Initial inventory provision (Q) .083 (.003)** .084 (.003)** .085 (.003)** .095 (.089)** .088 (.003)** 
Consumption rate (t*) .027 (.005)** .028 (.004)** .029 (.005)** .026 (.002)** .031 (.004)** 
Scale parameter .993 (.102) .898 (.061) 1.000 (.000) 1.594 (.122) .740 (.060) 
Shape parameter .867 (.166) 1.113 (.105) 1.000 (.000) (b) (b) 
-2 Log-likelihood 560.515 561.086 561.828 590.887 562.628 
(a)  Standard errors in parentheses. 
(b) Not provided 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
Table 15: Parametric estimation of AFT models without unobserved heterogeneity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution Generalized 
Gamma 
(Model 2a) 
Weibull 
(Model 2b) 
Exponential 
(Model 2c) 
Lognormal 
(Model 2d) 
Log-logistic 
(Model 2e) 
Parameter AFT  
metric(a) 
AFT 
metric(a) 
AFT 
metric(a) 
AFT 
metric(a) 
AFT 
metric(a) 
Initial inventory provision (Q) .055 (.003)** .054 (.003)** .059 (.004)** .064 (.003)** .051 (.003)** 
Consumption rate (t*) .037 (.004)** .038 (.005)** .039 (.005)** .038 (.002)** .043 (.005)** 
Scale parameter .821 (.110) .938 (.068) 1.000 (.000) 1.338 (.107) .647 (.054) 
Shape parameter .858 (.200) 1.066 (.077) 1.000 (.000) (b) (b) 
Wald test (H0:τ=0) p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 p < .01 
AIC 560.601 559.030 557.302 579.324 559.970 
-2 Log-likelihood 552.601 553.030 553.302 573.324 553.970 
∆ 7.914 8.056 8.526 17.563 8.658 
(a) Standard errors in parentheses. 
(b) Not provided 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
Table 16: Parametric estimation of AFT models with unobserved heterogeneity 
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In further support of H3, and in agreement with the results of the semiparametric 
approach, the result for the consumption rate variable, t*, suggests that a faster deal’s 
consumption rate (i.e. a lower t*) will decrease a deal’s time to stocking out; i.e. it will 
decrease its service level. The parameter estimate is significantly different than zero at 
the .01 level (β2 = .039). This result suggests, for instance, that decreasing the tipping 
point of a deal by 1 second would decrease the expected stockout time to 
exp[ln(100)+.039(-1)] = 96.18 seconds for deals expected to stock out in the 100th 
second. In turn, decreasing the tipping point by 10 seconds would decrease the expected 
stockout time to exp[ln(100)+.039*(-10)] = 67.71 seconds for deals expected to 
understock in the 100th second. To the extent that a deal’s consumption rate is a constant, 
such non-linear decreases in the expected stockout times imply non-linear increases in the 
stockout likelihood (or, conversely, non-linear decreases in service levels).  
The results of model 2c in Table 16 also provide interesting insights into the 
effects on the service level of initial inventory provision. The results suggest that 
increasing the initial inventory provision, for instance, to 10% of the network of 
consumers’ size, would increase the expected understocking time to 
exp[ln(100)+.059*10] = 180.40 seconds for deals expected to understock in the 100th 
second. In turn, increasing the initial inventory provision to 25% of the network of 
consumer’s size would increase the expected understocking time to 
exp[ln(100)+.059*25] = 437.10 seconds for deals expected to understock in the 100th 
second. 
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Results summary 
 
Table 17 provides a summary of the hypothesis testing. The results suggest that 
opinion leadership of early buyers, network integration of early buyers, and network 
constraint of early buyers positively influence consumption rates. Hence, they provide 
support to H1A, H1B, and H1D. In addition, the results suggest that a product’s quality 
negatively moderates the effects on consumption rates of opinion leadership of early 
buyers, network integration of early buyers, and network constraint of early buyers. 
Hence, they provide support to H2B-i, H2B-ii, and H2B-iv. Moreover, the results suggest 
that a product’s price positively moderates the effects on consumption rates of opinion 
leadership of early buyers, network integration of early buyers, and network constraint of 
early buyers. Hence, they provide support to H2C-1-i, H2C-1-ii, and H2C-1-iv. Finally, 
the results suggest that the relationship between consumption rates and service level is 
non-linear, monotonically increasing. Hence, they provide support to H3. 
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Hypothesis Hypothesis statement Supported 
H1A Greater opinion leadership of early buyers of a deal is positively 
associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus.  
Yes 
H1B Greater network integration of early buyers of a deal is positively 
associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus. 
Yes 
H1C Greater cohesive group membership of early buyers of a deal is positively 
associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus. 
No 
H1D Greater network constraint of early buyers of a deal is negatively 
associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus. 
Yes 
H1E Greater network centrality of early buyers of a deal is positively 
associated with greater consumption rate in that deal, ceteris paribus. 
No 
H2A-i Greater product popularity will negatively moderate the relationship 
between the consumption rate and opinion leadership of early buyers.  
No 
H2A-ii Greater product popularity will negatively moderate the relationship 
between the consumption rate and network integration of early buyers.  
No 
H2A-iii Greater product popularity will negatively moderate the relationship 
between the consumption rate and cohesive group membership of early 
buyers.  
No 
H2A-iv Greater product popularity will negatively moderate the relationship 
between the consumption rate and the network constraint of early buyers.  
No 
H2A-v Greater product popularity will negatively moderate the relationship 
between the consumption rate and network centrality of early buyers.  
No 
H2B-i Higher product quality will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and opinion leadership of early buyers.  
Yes 
H2B-ii Higher product quality will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and network integration of early buyers.  
Yes 
H2B-iii Higher product quality will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and cohesive group membership of early buyers.  
No 
H2B-iv Higher product quality will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and the network constraint of early buyers.  
Yes 
H2B-v Higher product quality will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and network centrality of early buyers.  
No 
H2C-1-i Greater product price will positively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and opinion leadership of early buyers.  
Yes 
H2C-1-ii Greater product price will positively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and network integration of early buyers.  
Yes 
H2C-1-iii Greater product price will positively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and cohesive group membership of early buyers.  
No 
H2C-1-iv Greater product price will positively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and the network constraint of early buyers.  
Yes 
H2C-1-v Greater product price will positively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and network centrality of early buyers.  
No 
H2C-2-i Greater product price will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and opinion leadership of early buyers.  
No 
H2C-2-ii Greater product price will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and network integration of early buyers.  
No 
H2C-2-iii Greater product price will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and cohesive group membership of early buyers.  
No 
H2C-2-iv Greater product price will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and the network constraint of early buyers.  
No 
H2C-2-v Greater product price will negatively moderate the relationship between 
the consumption rate and network centrality of early buyers.  
No 
H3 Increasing the consumption rate in a deal will decrease the service level in 
the deal, after controlling for initial inventory provision. This relationship 
is monotically decreasing. 
Yes 
 
Table 17: Results summary
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Chapter 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Discussion of results 
Social shopping revolves around social interactions among consumers in online 
communities. Both scholars and managers have traditionally assumed that social 
interactions influence consumption rates in social shopping. As a result, online retailers 
have made large investments to encourage consumers to join online communities linked 
to their websites, in the hope that social interactions among those consumers will help 
foster sales.  
This dissertation empirically investigates the mechanisms through which social 
interactions influence consumption rates in social shopping. Moreover, it theorizes and 
empirically assesses a moderating role of marketing activity on such an influence. 
Finally, it challenges the predominant assumption in social interactions studies that 
increasing consumption rates will always yield desirable business outcomes to online 
retailers. This is because those studies have largely ignored common knowledge in the 
operations management literature, which posits that deals that have higher consumption 
rates are more likely to understock, which is an undesirable inventory performance 
outcome.  
The effects on consumption rates of social interaction mechanisms 
This study uses models of social influence based on the two-step flow of 
influence principle (Katz 1957; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955) to theorize relationships 
between social interaction mechanisms and consumption rates in social shopping. Such 
models posit that influential consumers occupy “prominent” positions in the social 
network of consumers. When influential consumers are early buyers of a deal, other 
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consumers in their social network observe their purchases and thus are more likely to buy 
that deal, thus increasing consumption rates. 
In line with hypothesis H1A, the empirical results provide support to the opinion 
leadership model of social influence. Opinion leadership is the most basic model of 
social influence (Bonacich 1987; Freeman 1979; Marsden 2002). It posits that a deal’s 
purchases by consumers who receive the most nominations in a social network are likely 
to influence other consumers to purchase that deal (Godes 2011; Iyengar et al. 2011b; 
Valente and Davis 1999). Most social shopping communities allow consumers to 
nominate others by “following” or “liking” them. Also, they usually display the number 
of nominations a consumer receives, and give prominence on their websites to those 
consumers with the most nominations. For instance, social shopping website 
MyITThings.com features the “top 50” members of its online community (in terms of 
nominations) on its opening page. So, based on this study’s empirical results, we should 
expect to observe marketing messages aimed at those “top 50” consumers to diffuse 
through the social network of consumers in MyITThings.com’s online community 
through social interactions. That is, the results suggest that purchases of a deal by 
members of the “top 50” group at MYITThings.com might influence other consumers in 
its online community to purchase that deal.   
In addition, in line with hypothesis H1B, the empirical results provide support to 
the network integration model of social influence. This hypothesis posits that a deal’s 
purchases of consumers who are well connected in the network are likely to influence 
other consumers to purchase that deal. This is a more comprehensive approach than the 
opinion leadership model, which only characterizes a consumer’s immediate environment 
(Valente and Foreman 1998). This result is important, since it shows that influence flows 
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through relations beyond first-order ties. Marketing messages directed to consumers with 
high integration might be more effective than those directed to consumers who only 
receive more nominations.  
Finally, in line with hypothesis H1D, the empirical results provide support to the 
network constraint models of social influence based on the principle of structural holes. 
This hypothesis posits that consumers on either side of a structural hole become exposed 
to different flows of influence. Consumers filling structural holes have opportunity to 
broker the flow of influence among consumers. These brokers reach more people 
indirectly. The diversity of their contacts among separate groups of consumers means that 
they are responsible for the spread of new ideas and behaviors (Burt 1999). This finding 
provides an interesting alternative to the predominant use in academia and practice of the 
opinion leadership model. This is because the constraint model is based on structural, 
rather than relational, characteristics of influential consumers. In many circumstances, the 
nature of the relationship between two consumers may not be obvious, or may be 
erroneously assessed. For instance, I may nominate a close friend of mine in a social 
shopping community (e.g. by “following” her) without being nominated by her. Even 
though my purchases in this social shopping community might influence my close 
friend’s decision making, I would not be considered influential, according to relational 
models of social influence. Conversely, I would be classified as influential in the 
constraint model of social influence.  
The effects on the relationship between social interaction mechanisms and 
consumption rates of marketing activity 
This study builds on the scarcity and information economics literatures to 
theorize the moderating role played by the marketing activity on the relationship between 
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social interaction mechanisms and consumption rates. In line with hypotheses H2B-i, 
H2B-ii, and H2B-iv, the empirical results suggest that a product’s quality will negatively 
moderate the relationship between social interaction mechanisms and a deal’s 
consumption rate. As discussed in the previous sub-section, a deal’s consumption rate 
will increase when its early buyers will be opinion leaders, integrated, or least 
constrained. However, when the quality of a product being offered as part of a deal is 
high, the magnitude of such positive effects on a deal’s consumption rate will be smaller 
than when that quality is low. All things being equal, consumers are less likely to 
purchase products of inferior quality (Ferguson and Koenigsberg 2007; Morales and 
Fitzsimons 2007; Subramanian and Subramanyam 2008). However, when an online 
retailer offers a low-quality product as part of a deal, consumers are more likely to resort 
to other consumers’ purchases to infer the deal’s value. As a result, if influential 
consumers are early buyers of a deal offering a low-quality product, then other consumers 
are less likely to react negatively to it (i.e. they are more likely to purchase that deal).  
Conversely, when an online retailer offers a high-quality product as part of a 
deal, consumers are less likely to resort to other consumers’ purchases to infer the 
product’s value, because quality is a strong screening device (Nelson 1970). Also, high-
quality products are usually regarded as scarce (Cialdini 1985; Stock and Balachander 
2005). As a result, consumers tend to purchase early a deal of a high-quality product – 
hence increasing its consumption rate – in order to avoid missing the opportunity to do so 
later due to a stock out.   
The implication of this finding is significant to inventory provisioning and 
availability. The amount of inventory that online retailers make available during each 
social shopping deal varies considerably. This is because online retailers source products 
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that are usually overstocked from other retailers. So, for instance, online retailers may 
commit to make early sales to influential consumers (Tang et al. 2004) and thus explore 
social interactions effects in order to sell large amounts of low-quality inventory. In fact, 
making such commitments is a common approach in social shopping websites that offer 
overstock fashionable products, including MYITThings.com. Such online retailers often 
allow a select (and small) group of consumers to make purchases in the deals’ first hours. 
Our empirical results suggest that these retailers might be more effective in selling deals 
of low-quality products if they made early sales to influential consumers (i.e. opinion 
leaders, integrated, and least constrained). 
Interestingly, in line with hypotheses H2C-1-i, H2C-1-ii, and H2C-1-iv, the 
results suggest that a product’s price will positively moderate the relationship between 
social interaction mechanisms and a deal’s consumption rate. The conceptual framework 
(Figure 2) put forth theoretical arguments for both positive and negative moderating 
effects of a product’s price on such a relationship. The results of this dissertation imply 
that consumers will resort less to observing others’ purchases to make an informed 
decision when prices are low. This finding supports the fact that, in social shopping, most 
consumers are bargain hunters. That is, when online retailers offer low-price products as 
part of a deal, consumers will tend to purchase that deal irrespective of other consumers’ 
purchases. 
Conversely, as prices increase, social interactions become more influential. This 
is an interesting result, because it shows that online retailers can sell deals of more 
expensive products by encouraging influential consumers to purchase those deals early. 
In fact, this is a practice that is becoming increasingly popular. For instance, Magazine 
Luiza, a leading bricks-and-clicks retailer who explores social shopping in Brazil, offers 
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rebates to consumers who purchase deals of certain expensive products (usually home 
appliances) and whose Facebook friends also purchase those deals. 
The effects on service levels of consumption rate 
This study finds support to hypothesis H3, which builds on the behavioral 
operations management literature to theorize a non-linear, monotonically decreasing 
relationship between a deal’s consumption rate and its service level. This finding is a 
major contribution of this dissertation. This is because it challenges the predominant 
notion that increasing consumption rates is always beneficial to online retailers in social 
shopping. Also, it provides a much better understanding on the sources of demand 
uncertainty that affect service levels in social shopping.  
Analytical models in the economics literature (Economides 1996; Granovetter 
and Soong 1986) suggest that the inventory outcomes of a social shopping deal become 
very unpredictable in the presence of social interactions. This is because social 
interactions induce demand uncertainty. This implies that it becomes harder for online 
retailers to achieve desired service levels in social shopping as social interactions effects 
become stronger. Therefore, social interactions are a source of inefficacy in this focused 
context. 
When social interactions are negligible, managers may use the newsvendor 
model in order to clear markets. This is reasonable, since they may rely on their 
knowledge of the demand distribution, and  hence approximate the optimal inventory 
quantity and price, according to the newsvendor model (Dana Jr and Petruzzi 2001; 
Petruzzi and Dada 1999). However, when social interactions are not negligible, it 
becomes difficult to obtain a nice specification of the demand distribution (Granovetter 
and Soong 1986). As a result, the basic newsvendor model becomes no longer a useful 
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tool for inventory provisioning (and pricing) decisions. To cope with bounded rationality, 
managers should make adjustments in their decision making process – and rely on strong 
assumptions – in order to approximate the optimal inventory quantity and price (Su 
2008). In line with the theoretical argument put forth in the development of H3, the 
results suggest that managers will err by increasingly undersupplying the market as social 
interactions effects become stronger. That is, the tendency of inventory managers to 
safeguard from uncertainty by underordering is likely to lead to stockouts when social 
interactions are at play. And, as our results show, as deals’ consumption rates will 
increase, their service levels will decrease even faster.  
Academic Contribution 
This dissertation investigates social influence in social shopping above and 
beyond the effects of word-of-mouth by providing a conceptualization of social 
interactions – i.e. “interdependencies in which consumers’ choices influence others’ 
choices in a direct and meaningful way”. Also, to the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first study to empirically assess the effect of multiple social interaction mechanisms on 
consumption rates in tandem. Predominantly, the social interactions literature has 
assessed whether social interactions are influential, or has limited the investigation to the 
traditional opinion leadership model of social influence. In this dissertation, I offer a 
much broader perspective on social interaction mechanisms by assessing both relational 
and structural models of social influence. Namely, the results of this study suggest that 
we may use the opinion leadership, integration, and constraint models in tandem to 
better understand demand management in the focused social shopping context. 
In addition, this study disconfirms the predominant view that purports that 
marketing activity inherently predicts consumption rates. Instead, the statistical results 
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show that social interaction mechanisms predict consumption rates and that marketing 
activity is a moderator of such an effect. Besides, the study joins the debate on whether 
social interactions are indeed significant after one accounts for marketing activity (Aral 
2011; Aral and Walker 2011; Godes 2011; Iyengar et al. 2011a, b; Van den Bulte and 
Iyengar 2011), thus providing a clear slate for future investigations of social influence 
mechanisms in online retailing context. 
Moreover, the study moves one step further in our understanding of the effects of 
social interaction mechanisms in the social shopping context. This is because it theorizes 
and empirically assesses the relationship between the outcomes of influence (i.e. 
increases in consumption rates) to inventory performance outcomes (i.e. decreases in 
service levels). The study brings together two apparently opposing literatures. While the 
marketing literature suggests that increasing consumption rates should be a goal, the 
operations management literature suggests that achieving high service levels should be a 
goal. However, both goals are often conflicting. This is because increasing consumption 
rates may lead to stockouts, which are widely recognized as costly inventory outcomes 
(Anderson et al. 2006; Zinn et al. 2002) in online retailing settings (Jing and Lewis 2011). 
In doing so, this dissertation answers calls for more research on the interface of the 
marketing and operations management disciplines (Frankel et al. 2008; Ho and Tang 
2004; Karmarkar 1996; Malhotra and Sharma 2002; Mentzer et al. 2008; Rinehart et al. 
1989). 
Furthermore, the use of experiments and econometrics techniques to empirically 
assess the conceptual model is a significant contribution to the operations management 
literature. Researchers in the discipline have been arguing for the use of innovative data 
sources and statistical techniques (Boyer and Swink 2008; Gattiker and Parente 2007)  
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that depart from the predominant approach based on surveys and structural equation 
modeling (Boyer and Swink 2008). In doing so, this dissertation also contributes to the 
behavioral operations management literature (Bendoly et al. 2006; Knemeyer and Naylor 
2012), by investigating how consumer behavior and provisioning decisions affect 
inventory performance outcomes in social shopping. 
Managerial implications 
The results of this dissertation support the use of marketing messages hinging on 
influential consumers exerting above-average social influence on other consumers. This 
study suggests the existence of influential consumers (1) who are well connected and (2) 
who are least constrained in the network, hitherto neglected in extant literature. This 
comes in addition to the more common approach of identifying opinion leaders as 
influential. 
For over seventy years, researchers have attempted to quantify the notions of 
“stars” or “isolates” that would reflect how influential people are in social networks. 
More recently, there have been efforts to quantify consumers’ influence in online social 
networks such as Facebook, Linkedin, and Twitter (e.g. the Klout score). This study’s 
evidence indicating the presence of three mechanisms of influence in tandem joins these 
efforts and is quite novel. As a result, my dissertation equips managers with tools to 
better manage demand by identifying who the influential consumers are in social 
shopping. 
Moreover, the empirical results go beyond marketing practices to suggest which 
levers inventory managers might operate to better manage demand in the presence of 
social interactions. Specifically, social interaction mechanisms will become less 
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influential as the quality of the product being offered as part of deal increases. In turn, 
social interaction mechanisms will become more influential as the price increases.  
Another relevant implication of my dissertation is that, under some 
circumstances, increasing consumption rates may be undesirable because this decreases 
service levels in a non-linear fashion. This challenges the largely held assumption in 
social interactions studies that selling more by selling faster will always be of interest to 
online retailer. Here, the issue is: what is the online retailer’s inventory management 
approach? Managers must address whether stockouts are desirable prior to targeting 
influential consumers, sourcing products according to their quality, and setting prices, 
because of the implications of stockouts for repeat purchases and long-term consumer 
relationships.  
This implication relates to an emerging debate on inventory availability in online 
retailing context. Currently, both scholars and managers have been attempting to model 
and empirically test inventory management practices that would yield high inventory 
availability in numerous settings. However, such efforts have focused more on sourcing 
and operations practices than on demand management practices. From this research 
standpoint, sourcing and demand management go hand in hand. For instance, this study 
suggests the counter-intuitive tactic of setting high prices for deals offering low-quality 
products and having exceedingly high inventory availability, as long as influential 
consumers buy those deals early. This is because influence stemming from social 
interactions might help increase consumption rates. Hence, based on inventory managers’ 
decisions regarding sourcing and pricing, marketers could act to target those influential 
consumers that would yield superior inventory performance – and consequently higher 
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profitability, for instance, by providing them financial incentives to buy a deal early or by 
locating, in a social network, influential consumers who are uninformed. 
Limitations and Directions for future research 
This dissertation has some limitations and opens up interesting research avenues 
to be pursued. Generalizability is a concern, since the use of undergraduate students may 
not adequately represent a population of online consumers. Experiments encompassing a 
more diverse population might increase the generalizability of the current study. 
Alternatively, agent-based simulation studies (Fibich and Gibori 2010; Swaminathan et 
al. 1998) emulating consumer behavior might be useful in the investigation of the 
phenomenon under inquiry in this research. 
Also, our experiments only offered deals of “normal goods”. As such, they 
constrained the investigation to the positive effects of social interactions on consumption 
rates (Duesenberry and Stemble 1949; Granovetter and Soong 1986; Leibenstein 1950). 
Future research might want to investigate the effects of social interaction mechanisms on 
consumption rates of deals offering different types of products, including “Veblen goods” 
(Leibenstein 1950; Veblen 1899). Research (Amaldoss and Jain 2005a, b; Bagwell and 
Bernheim 1996; Tereyagoglu and Veeraraghavan 2011) has found that Veblen goods 
promote conspicuous consumption – that is, there are consumers likely to purchase 
“exclusive” deals of low consumption. In such case, we should expect to observe 
opposite results to the ones obtained in this study, since social interactions should lead to 
decreases in consumption rates of exclusive deals. 
Since social shopping attempts to use technology to mimic the social interactions 
found in offline retailing, another interesting line of inquiry would be to investigate social 
interactions effects and inventory management practices according to different types of 
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technology, including tablets, cell phones, and personal computers. It also might be 
fruitful to make such distinction according to the demographics of the technology users. 
This might provide a fine grained understanding on the channels of influence among 
different groups of consumers in social shopping. 
One notable limitation in this study is the limited definition of product quality as 
low (remanufactured) or high (“mint in box”). Future research might attempt to 
operationalize quality as a multidimensional construct, or measure quality according to a 
continuum scale rather than treating it as binary. Besides, it might be fruitful to 
investigate the effects of social interaction mechanisms on the inventory outcomes of 
those deals offering products in a specific life cycle stage (i.e. introduction, growth, 
maturity and decline). It would also be interesting to contrast such effects for products in 
transition (Li et al. 2010).  
Moreover, it would be valuable to contrast the effects on consumption of social 
interaction mechanisms with consumers’ reactions to their awareness of inventory 
availability (Yin et al. 2009). Another interesting avenue of inquiry is to investigate how 
inventory location and inventory ownership  (Rungtusanatham et al. 2007; Wallin et al. 
2006) might interfere with the results of the current research. This is because online 
retailers might promise different service levels and charge consumers differently 
depending on (1) inventory location in the supply chain and (2) who owned inventory 
(e.g. whether the online retailer sells in consignation) (Rabinovich and Bailey 2004; 
Rabinovich et al. 2003; Rabinovich et al. 2008b). 
In addition, future research might integrate the downstream-facing perspective of 
this study with both internal- and upstream-facing perspectives of operations in this 
research context. For instance, the incredibly fast turnaround time for vast numbers of 
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items represents a burden for warehouse operations in several aspects (e.g. storing, 
picking, packaging, and shipping). Studies building on this research might assess 
warehouse management and inventory control approaches (including implementation of 
information and other systems) of online retailers who invest in social shopping. An 
integrated conceptual framework might assess the drivers and outcomes of inventory 
record inaccuracy in distribution centers (Barratt et al. 2011; Fleisch and Tellkamp 2005; 
Kull et al. 2011) in social shopping. Also, sourcing practices (e.g. supplier selection, 
negotiation, quality assurance, inbound transportation) appear to be crucial for the 
success of online retailers in this focused context. In a similar vein, future research could 
explore the return practices of online retailers in social shopping. 
Furthermore, an emerging body of literature (Chen et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010; 
Kauffman and Wang 2001; Kauffman et al. 2010a; Kauffman et al. 2010b; Kauffman and 
Wang 2002; Netessine and Tang 2009) has investigated price-setting and price 
discrimination in related contexts. In line with Whitin’s (1955) groundbreaking idea, it 
might be interesting to integrate two streams of literature, namely revenue management 
and inventory control (Elmaghraby et al. 2009, 2010) in social shopping. 
Finally, Walmart and Facebook recently announced (Reuters 2011) and have 
been strengthening (Reuters 2012) a partnership. This initiative might provide an 
interesting case study for investigation of changes in business practices in general, and 
supply chain management in particular, as traditional retailers such as Walmart enter 
social shopping and adopt social interactions in large social networking websites as a 
selling mechanism. 
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APPENDIX A  
SEMIPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 
  161 
Cox (1975) (see also Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980) provide a partial likelihood 
estimator for semiparametric hazard models that accommodate right-censored data, such 
as those used in this study. 
Suppose that the baseline hazard h0(t) in equations (11a) and (11b) is arbitrary, 
and recall form those equations that we want to estimate β10. Cox argues that no 
information can be contributed about β by time intervals in which no failures (i.e. 
understocking) occur, because the baseline hazard h0(t) might conceivably be identically 
zero in such intervals. Hence, we make the argument conditionally on the set ~;1 of 
instants at which failures occur.  
For the particular failure at time ti, conditionally on the set of deals that are at 
“risk” of failing at that time, (ti), the probability that the failure is on the deal as 
observed is 
 xO~x13 c xO~xN3N26

1,  
 
where xi are the covariates and indicators correspond to the ordering of times 
(t1<t2<…<tN) of both censored and uncensored observations. Each failure contributes a 
factor of this nature. Thus, the conditional likelihood function is 
, 	 c x131, $  c yz  c xO~xN3N26 

1,  
(13) 
and we obtain the estimation of β in a iterative way.  
                                                     
10
 Cox claims that the loss of information of the parameter estimates β arising from leaving the 
baseline hazard arbitrary is usually slight – and consequently, the procedure put forth by him is 
justifiable as a reasonably cautions approach to the study of β (p. 190). 
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APPENDIX B  
PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 
  163 
Lancaster (1990) provides a maximum likelihood estimator for parametric hazard 
models that accommodate right-censored data, such as those used in this study. 
Consider the hazard function, h(t), defined as f(t)/[1=F(t)]. Then, 
1 $ "; 	 xO $  {tt24  (14) 
Equation (14) is the fundamental relation connecting a specification of the 
probabilities of failure (i.e. understocking) with the distribution of time to understocking. 
Then, the expected time to understocking is 
 1 $ ";; 	4  xO $  {tt
2
4  ;

4  
(15) 
In the simplest case in which we have the completed durations of deals (i.e. all 
deals sold out), the likelihood function is: 
, 	   z1;11,  
(16) 
where, from equation (14), 
z1;1 	 {1;1xO $  {1))264  (17) 
A second situation arises when we have completed durations of some deals only. 
That is, others reach their deadlines without selling out. Consider a deal i that has not sold 
out at time t (t < d), where d is the deadline of a deal (in the case of our experiment, the 
deadline d is 3 minutes). Let c = d – t. The event that a deal has not sold out at time d has 
probability    
  164 
1 $ "1;1  1 $ "1;1   
which is the conditional probability that a deal that has not sold out at time t fails 
to sell out in the subsequent c periods of time. Conversely, the event that a deal i does sell 
out at, say, t+s (0<s<c) has probability  
1;1  11 $ "1;1  
If NU of the deals will not sell out at time d and NO will, then the likelihood 
function is  
: 	   |1 $ "1;1  1 $ "1;1 }

1,  
P;P  P1 $ "P;P

P,   
(18) 
Finally, of course, to complete the likelihood functions in equations (16) and 
(18), we need to provide a specification of F, or equivalently of h. In this research, I 
provide five specifications of h: Weibull, generalized gamma, exponential, lognormal, 
and log-logistic.  
 
